
■ " (Of 





! 



NATURAL THEOLOGY, 



OR 



THE EXISTENCE, ATTRIBUTES 



AND 



GOVERNMENT OF GOD 



INCLUDING 



THE OBLIGATIONS AND DUTIES OF MEN, 



DEMONSTRATED BY ARGUMENTS DRAWN FROM THE 
PHENOMENA OF NATURE. 



BY 

LUTHER LEE, D. D. 

Professor of Theology and Biblical Literature in Adrian College, 
Adrian, Michigan. 



"The works of the Lord are great, sought out of all them that hare 
pleasure therein." 

" The heavens declare the glory of God ; and the firmament show- 
eth his handy- work." 



SYRACUSE : 

WESLEYAN METHODIST PUBLISHING HOUSE. 
1866. 



Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1866, in the 
Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Northern District of 
New York. 



Wm. J. Moses, Printer, Auburn, N. Y. 



CONTENTS. 



LECTURE I. 

PAS*. 

THE SCIENCE DEFINED ITS SCOPE AND UTIL- 
ITY, 7 

LECTURE II. 

THE FIRST GREAT PRINCIPLE ESTABLISHED — 

SOMETHING MUST BE ETERNAL, . .' 19 

LECTUEE III. 

THE VISIBLE UNIVERSE HAD A BEGINNING, . . 27 

LECTURE IV. 

MATTER IS NOT ETERNAL THE GEOLOGICAL 

ARGUMENT, . . . . * 36 

LECTURE V. 

MATTER WAS CREATED, 46 

LECTURE VI. 

MARKS OF DESIGN WHICH NATURE REVEALS, . 60 

LECTURE VII. 

THE ORIGIN OF LIFE, 68 



4 CONTENTS. 



LECTURE VIII. 

ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN FAMILY, 79 

LECTURE IX. 

PHENOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND, ...... 97 

LECTURE X. . 

THE UNIVERSAL IDEA OF GOD, .111 

LECTURE XI. 

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD, 118 

LECTURE XII. 
god's moral character, . .130 

• LECTURE XIII. 

god's moral government, . . 148 

LECTURE XIV. 

DUTIES WE OWE TO GOD, 159 

LECTURE XV. 

RECIPROCAL DUTIES BETWEEN MEN, 166 

LECTURE XVI. 

DUTIES WHICH MAN OWES TO HIMSELF, .... 176 

LECTURE XVII. 

CONCLUDING REMARKS, 183 



PREFACE 



This volume is the result of the Author's conviction 
of the need of such a work. On being called to teach 
in the department of Natural Theology, he found no 
Text-Book in use in the Institution, and on inquiry, 
none was found in the market, which appeared to be 
sufficiently adapted to the instruction of a class in Col- 
lege, to justify its introduction. The consequence 
was, the work of instruction was undertaken by means 
of original Lectures. This process revealed what all 
experienced teachers have found to be true ; namely, 
that it is difficult for most students to come to their 
recitations with good lessons, from the hearing of a 
Lecture, read to them one or two days previously, 
without a Text-Book, that they can carry with them 
into their private study. To* remove this difficulty", 
the Lectures, first read to a class, have been revised, 
and published in this convenient form. 

On the subject of merit, the Author will leave these 
brief pages to speak for themselves, only stating that 
they teach what he earnestly believes, and that he 
intends nothing but good in giving them to the 
public. 

It will be observed by every attentive reader, both 
Christian and Skeptic, that it has been the Author's 
design to elaborate a system of Natural Theology, in 
1 



6 



PREFACE. 



harmony with Revealed Religion. This appears • to 
him to be best calculated to secure the two most 
important ends to be reached by any systematic em- 
bodiment of the principles of Natural Theology. 

1. If the effort shall prove a success, a clear exhi- 
bition of the harmony between Natural and Revealed 
Religion, will remove much prejudice against Natural 
Theology as a science, and exalt it in the estimation of 
the Christian public. 

2. Such an exhibition of Natural Theology will tend 
to lead Skeptics, who are interested in the study of 
Natural Religion, to examine the Scriptures, by which 
they will be compelled to admit that the Scriptures 
teach the truth, so far as Natural Religion reaches, or 
that their boasted Reason plays falsely. The Author 
is a believer in the Divine Inspiration of the Scriptures, 
and has made them the subject of his most intense 
study for half a century. Of course he cannot ignore 
his Christian faith, in writing a small treatise on Nat- 
ural Theology. 

With these remarks, his work is committed to the 
judgment of a candid public, hoping that it will be 
found, as the Author infends it, to promote truth, and 
supply a want in our Educational Interests. 

LUTHER LEE. 

Adrian College, Adrian, Michigan, Jan. 1, 1866„ 



NATURAL THEOLOGY. 



LECTURE I. 



THE SCIENCE DEFINED, THE FIELD IT OCCUPIES 
MARKED OUT, AND ITS UTILITY INDICATED. 

I. The Science of Natural Theology Defined. 

The word Theology is derived from two Greek 
words, Theos, God, and Logos, Discourse ; hence, 
Theology denotes a discourse relating to God ; but 
in usage, it signifies the science which treats of the 
existence, attributes, character and government of 
God, including the obligations and duties of men 
as God's creatures, and the subjects of his moral 
government. 

The word Natural, as a prefix to Theology, 
stands opposed to Supernatural ; hence, Natural 
Theology is the science of God, as derived from the 
revelations of Nature, without a supernatural rev- 
elation, such as is believed to be contained in the 
Scriptures. If the Scriptures are true, and have 
been derived in the manner which they claim for 



8 NATURAL THEOLOGY DEFINED. 

themselves, they give us a supernatural Theology. 
But any Theology which may be learned from the 
works of God, without any such supernatural rev- 
elation as the Scriptures claim for themselves, is 
properly called Natural Theology, because it is a 
revelation of Nature, or a revelation of God in Na- 
ture. If the human intelligence cannot find God 
revealed in some or all of the phenomena of Na- 
ture, there can be no such thing as Natural Theol- 
ogy. If the human intelligence can find God re- 
vealed in all or in any part of the phenomena of 
Nature, so much of God as is thus revealed consti- 
tutes the substance, extent, and limits of Natural 
Theology. Natural Theology, then, supposes that 
the works of God are a revelation of himself to the 
human mind, and proceeds to demonstrate and in- 
terpret such revelation, by which process the sci- 
ence is elaborated. 

From what has been said, it follows that the ob- 
ject of Natural Theology is to make us acquainted 
with God, that we may know that He is, and what 
are His attributes, character and government, and 
what obligations we are under to Him. This being 
the case, the whole science is involved in two 
questions, namely : 

1. Is God so revealed in His works as to enable 
the human intellect to gain, through this source, 
with reasonable certainty, such a knowledge, in 
kind and degree, as renders the science useful and 
important ? 



FIELD OF INVESTIGATION. 



9 



2. If God may be known through His works, 
that is, through what is known as the phenomena 
of Nature, what and how much of Him may be thus 
known ? These two questions appear to bring be- 
fore us the whole subject of Natural Theology, and 
to elaborate answers to them, is the task of him 
who would construct a science on the subject. 

II. The Field of Investigation marked out. 

In prosecuting^ our inquiry after the truth of 
Natural Theology, we shall find the whole field of 
Nature open before us, and in this field must the 
truth be found, if found at all. We are not limited 
to any part of this field ; its wide extent is open 
before us, comprehensive of all the objects of human 
knowledge. The proof may be found in the har- 
monious complex whole, or in any part or parts of 
that whole ; and in either case the conclusion will 
be equally certain, if the process of reasoning be 
sound. # As the same mind is not likely .to compre- 
hend all the departments of Nature to the same 
extent, it must be expected that there will be di- 
visions and classifications of the evidence, and that 
each investigator will contribute his portion of the 
proof from his own department of science. 

1. Those principally devoted to the study of 
Physical Geography will be most likely to find 
proofs of the existence of God on the broad surface 
of the earth. If they can see foot-prints of the 
Creator, or marks of an Almighty forming hand 



10 PROOFS IN PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY, 

impressed upon the face of the world, they will re- 
port to us, as the result of their research, that there 
is a God. If rocks talk in reason's ear of the hand 
that moulded them ; if brooks and rills sing to the 
reasoning soul of man, the praise of the Immortal 
Spirit that bids their waters flow with unabating 
fullnes§ ; if mountains are suggestive of the power 
that reared them as Nature's watch-towers ; if the 
eye of reason can see the touch of a Divine hand in 
the flowers that bloom, and in the golden fruits as 
they ripen ; and if the heart of gratitude conceives 
the idea of a bountiful Provider, on sight of rich 
and abundant harvests waving on hill and plain, 
there is furnished from this department an array of 
corroborating proofs conclusive of the existence of 
God, provided the facts are clear, and the conclu- 
sions well drawn from the premises. 

2. The Astronomer directs his way upward, and 
wanders in thought amid celestial spheres, and as 
he traces the rounds of revolving worlds, he notes 
the response which world gives to world, and sys- 
tem to system ; by which the motion of each is 
modified, controlled, and perpetuated, and the grand, 
galaxy of worlds is held in its glorious array, and 
rolled on in its cycles. If such a view of the uni- 
verse suggests to the beholder a higher Power, lead- 
ing to the conception of a Creator, who made and 
governs the whole, there is developed the truth of 
Natural Theology ; and Addison, when under the 



ASTRONOMY AND GEOLOGY. 



11 



influence of the conception, he uttered the following, 
gave us not only poetry, but the truth of philosophy : 

"The spacious firmament on high, 
With all the blue ethereal sky, 
And spangled heavens, a shining frame, 
Their great Original proclaim : 

"In reason's ear they all rejoice, 
And utter forth a glorious voice; 
Forever singing as they shine, 
* The hand that made us is divine/ " 

This is as good Theology as it would be if it 
were derived from any other source, provided the 
conception is the legitimate consequence of the con- 
tact of the knowing mind with these vast ethereal 
objects of knowledge. 

3. The Geologist is likely to dig for the great 
truth of the Divine existence, and if he can find the 
proof folded in the various strata, it is just as good 
as though he brought it from above, provided his 
premises are facts, and not assumptions, and his 
conclusions are logical deductions.. 

4. There is one department of Nature yet un- 
named, in which search may be made for the great 
idea. The Mental Philosopher may search within 
hjmself, and in so doing will find his own mind its 
greatest wonder to itself. The mind is a knowing 
power, a power to know ; and yet it does not know 
itself. It knows itself to be a knowing power, and 
yet it knows not what the power is that knows. It 



12 PROOF IN MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 



knows itself to be a spirit, because it knows that 
matter knoweth not. It knows its own identity, 
that it is the same continued self, because it knows 
that that which now knows is that which knew in 
time past ; and yet what is the essence, the sub- 
stance in which this same continued power to know 
resides, it does not know. 

The mind, in consciousness, knows its own 
thoughts, and purposes, and feelings, and in know- 
ing so much, it knoweth all its knowledge. It is 
hid from itself under an impenetrable veil of mys- 
tery, which defies the gaze of its own piercing 
eye, and yet looks out upon the world and sees 
mtfch, and gathers in its store of knowledge from 
near and far. It walks through the earth in 
thought, and ascends the milky way, and surveys the 
heavens, and leaps from world to world, and so 
comprehends the motions of the heavenly bodies for 
a hundred years to come, as to tell the year, and 
day, and hour, and minute, when each eclipse, and 
other celestial phenomenon, will transpire. In a 
wor^the mind grasps this vast universe of worlds, 
and wraps the whole up in one of its little complex 
thoughts, which a mental Philosopher would call 
an understanding notion, and holds the whole under 
its own eye of reflection. If the mind, which pos- 
sesses such intellectual powers, does, in the exer- 
cise of these powers, awaken within itself the con- 
ception of a higher creative power, by which the 
soul says to itself, there must be a Creator, who 



UTILITY OF THE SCIENCE. 



13 



made me to know, and made all the objects of my 
knowledge, there is found a volume of Theology 
within ; provided the conception is' the result of 
the mind's own spontaneity, under the pressure of 
its surroundings. 

It is not affirmed that all that has been supposed 
will be found in exact conformity with the above 
outline ; that would be to regard the question as 
settled. The design, thus far, has not been to 
demonstrate the truth of Natural Theology, but 
only to point out the field in which we are to 
search for it, and open up the way so plainly that 
we shall not wander from the right path, in our 
investigations. 

III. The Utility of the Science Defended. 

In entering upon a consideration of this question, 
it is proper to premise that there are three classes 
of opinions to be met in the investigation, namely, 
all Christians who receive the Scriptures as given* 
by inspiration of God, all Deists, who reject the 
Scriptures as a Eevelation from God, yet believe in 
the existence of a Supreme Creator, and Ruler of 
the Universe ; and Atheists, who deny the exist- 
ence of God, and admit of no intelligence higher 
than their own. These three classes, viewing the 
subject from such widely different stand-points, 
sustain different relations to the question of utility, 
and the question needs to be discussed with special • 
reference to each of the three separately. 
1* 



14 



UTILITY OF THE SCIENCE. 



1. Is the Science useful, allowing Christianity to 
be true ? 

There is not a uniformity of opinion on the sub- 
ject. Some have assumed, that if Natural Theology 
be admitted as a Science, sufficiently comprehensive 
and clear to render its study useful and important, 
it must detract from the necessity, importance and 
usefulness of the Scriptures. The argument is, 
that the fact that God has given us a revelation of 
His will in the Scriptures is proof positive that such 
a revelation is necessary in our circumstances, and 
if a revelation is necessary, it follows that Natural 
Theology is insufficient, and therefore unimportant, 
if not useless, with those who possess the Scrip- 
tures. This may appear plausible upon its face, yet 
it admits of & sufficient reply. 

First. The study of Natural Theology, if rightly 
pursued, cannot fail to support and illustrate much 
of the evidence by which we labor to support the 

• claim of the Scriptures to Divine Inspiration. Al- 
lowing all that is claimed for the Scriptures, still 
the undeniable fact will remain, that many do not be- 
lieve and never have believed and appreciated them, 
and by such they are regarded as false or fabulous. 
A portion of this class maintain the sufficiency of 
Natural Theology, and urge it as opposed to and 
contradictory of the Scriptures. This no Christian 
can allow, and his only sure ground of defence 

. against it is, the study of Natural Theology, that 
he may understand it, and make it talk its own 



UTILITY OF THE SCIENCE. 



15 



truthful language, and not allow it to be palmed 
off as the voice of Nature, distorted by the blind 
heart and false tongue of Infidelity. If God is 
alike the Author of the material universe and of the 
Scriptures, they must speak the same language, so 
far as they speak on the same subject. God has 
not spoken one thing through Nature, and some- 
thing different and contradictory through the Scrip- 
tures. They may speak different truths, but can- 
not speak contradictory truths, for one truth cannot 
contradict another truth. Where there is contra- 
diction, there is falsehood. All real science is truth, " 
and hence there must be perfect harmony between 
Science and the Scriptures, upon the assumption 
that the Scriptures are a revelation from God. But 
science is often imperfectly understood, and that 
which has been regarded as science has, on further 
investigation, been found to be error. Thus has 
there often been contradiction between what was 
at the time regarded as science and the teachings 
of the Scriptures ; and again and again has Skepti- 
cism brought forward its own scientific ignorance, 
to refute the clearly demonstrated truths of Keve- 
lation ; but in every case, further investigation has 
developed a scientific error, or a misapplication of 
truth, which has left our faith in the Scriptures 
resting upon a firmer foundation than before. If 
the Scriptures are a Kevelation from God, their 
voice must accord with the voice of Nature, so far 
as they both speak on the same subject. If, then, 



16 



SCRIPTURES STILL NECESSARY. 



Natural Theology, on investigation, proves to be a 
practical science, and is found to teach the same 
truths that are taught in the Sciiptures, so far as it 
teaches anything, then will natural and revealed 
religion not only harmonize, but will mutually sup- 
port and explain each other ; and the study of 
Natural Theology may be of great service to the 
cause of Scriptural religion. 

Second. If all be admitted that is or can be 
claimed for Natural Theology, allowing its widest 
range, it cannot, in the slightest degree, supercede 
the necessity, or lessen the importance of the Scrip- 
tures. Allowing that Natural Theology can. make 
us acquainted with the existence of God, and our 
general obligation to obey Him in the light of the 
simple relation existing between Creator and cre- 
ated intelligences, it would not meet our religious 
wants, and the Scriptures would still be necessary. 
Our relation to God is not the simple relation 
between a Creator and created intelligences. We 
are revolted, fallen beings, redeemed, and under a 
dispensation of grace, upon which subjects Natural 
Theology does not and cannot teach, when all its 
claims are allowed. Our condition, as fallen beings, 
requires a remedial system, in regard to which Nat- 
ural Theology is necessarily silent, that system 
being found only in the Gospel. It has now been 
shown that Natural Theology may greatly assist 
the cause of Bevealed Religion, while, by no pos- 



UTILITY OF THE SCIENCE. 



17 



sibility can it lessen its importance ; and here let 
the Christian aspect of the subject be dismissed. 

2. Deists who reject the Scriptures as a Revela- 
tion from God, must admit the utility of Natural 
Theology. 

Deists, at least the better class of them, while 
they deny the Inspiration of the Scriptures, believe 
in the existence of God, and to some extent in 
Natural Religion. Natural Theology is all the 
Theology they admit ; and holding, as they gene- 
rally do, that the light of Nature is sufficient, they 
must admit the utmost importance of the science of 
Natural Theology, well systematized and clearly 
developed. Such a system of Natural Theology 
may be useful to them, not only by making them 
better men, as Deists, but by leading them to em- 
brace Christianity, by revealing to them the entire 
harmony of Natural Theology, when properly un- 
derstood, with Revealed Religion. 

3. Natural Theology may benefit Atheists. 
Atheists deny that there is any such being as 

God, in the Theistic sense. With them, Nature is 
all. As they deny everything but what they are 
pleased to call Nature, it is difficult to see how they 
can be reached, except by arguments drawn from 
Nature. They may be expected to contest the con- 
clusions of Natural Theology, at every stage in the 
progress of its development ; yet are they bound to 
investigate the subject, and cannot consistently re- 



18 



MAY BENEFIT ATHEISTS. 



fuse to give it their attention, for two very obvious 
reasons. 

First The principal issue is with them, and they 
cannot, as honest men, refuse to meet it. Is there 
a God, an Allwise and Almighty Being, before Na- 
ture, above Nature, and the Creator of Nature ? 
Theists affirm, Atheists deny, and with them the 
issue is joined in Natural Theology. 

Second, The appeal is to their only volume, Na- 
ture, and they must not turn away their ears when 
we read their own book. If they will attend to the 
argument, they may be convinced. 



LECTURE II 



THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE STATED— THE ARGUMENT 
OPENED THE TRUTH OF ETERNAL SELF-EX- 
ISTENCE ESTABLISHED THE ADVANTAGES . 

0* THE POSITION POINTED OUT. 

' I. The Principal Issue Stated, 

The existence of God is the .first great truth to 
be established in the process of elaborating a sys- 
tem of Natural Theology. There are two forms of 
error with which issue is joined, and which will be 
* overthrown by the establishment of this truth. 

1. It takes issue with Atheism, which denies 
that there is a God. This form of error has no sys- 
tem, and contains but one fundamental principle in 
its creed, and that has only a negative existence. 
That principle is, that there is no God. In the 
place of the common belief in the existence of God, 
it gives us nothing. To account for the various 
phenomena which it cannot overlook or deny, it 
sometimes talks of chance, sometimes of the effi- 
ciency of nature, and sometimes of the eternity of 
matter. These assumptions need not be examined 
and refuted at this point, as they will be over- 



20 



THE ISSUE WITH PANTHEISM. 



thrown by the establishment of the fact that there 
is a God. 

2. The great affirmative proposition, that there 
is a God, takes issue with all forms of Pantheism. 
This name comes from two Greek words, Pan, all, 
and Theos, God, literally, all God. The doctrine 
of Pantheism is, that nature is God, God is every 
thing, and every thing is God ; every separate part 
is God, while the whole complex universe is the su- 
preme God. This system was originated by the so- 
called Greeks Philosophers, in their h^then blind- 
ness, but it constitutes the warp and woof of mod- 
ern Transcendentalism. 

^ In opposition to # these errors the Theistical view 
Stands opposed, which is, that there is a God, who 
is an eternal, almighty, intelligent Spirit, the Cre- 
ator of all things besides Himself. The simple fact 
that there is a God must first be established, and 
then we shall have a ground on which we can show 
His character. 

II. The Argument Opened. 

To furnish a ground upon which we can stand 
and elaborate direct arguments in support of The- 
ism, it is necessary to establish the fact of eternal 
self-existence somewhere, as a necessary truth. 
Something is, and of necessity must be, eternal. 

1. Nothing cannot produce something. This is so 
self-evident that no one is likely to deny it. To 
affirm that nothing can produce something, is to 



ETERNAL SELF-EXISTENCE. 



21 



affirm that nothing is something. That which pro- 
duces must be, must exist, and that which exists is 
something, not nothing. The word nothing, no- 
thing, is exclusive of every thing, and implies the 
absence of every thing, all matter, all spirit, all 
action, and all power to act ; and therefore nothing 
cannot produce something. To produce something 
implies the presence of both power and action, but 
nothing excludes them both ; therefore, where noth- 
ing is, something cannot be produced. If there had 
once been nothing, no matter when, there never 
could have been any thing. 

The same result will be reached by the applica- 
tion of another self-evident truth. No one will, or 
can, deny that every effect must have a cause, and 
that it cannot transpire without the existence of 
such cause ; but nothing is not and cannot be a 
cause, since it is exclusive of every thing, and there- 
fore, where nothing is, there can be no cause of any 
thing. A cause is something and not nothing, and 
as a cause is not nothing, nothing cannot be a cause. 
The inevitable conclusion is, that where nothing is, 
nothing must remain, and something can never be. 
If, then, there had ever been a time when there 
was nothing, nothing would always have remained, 
and there never would have been any thing. If, 
then, there is now any thing, something has always 
existed, because something could not begin to 
exist without the prior existence of something else as 
its cause. As a cause is something, and must exist 



22 



SOMETHING NOW EXISTS. 



before an effect can exists to' say that something 
began to exist, when nothing existed, would be to 
make the self-contradictory affirmation that some- 
thing existed when nothing existed. 

2. There is something, that is, something now 
exists. The argument of Dg&Qartes proves this point, 
though it came far short of filling the measure of 
his proposed theory. He said, " I think, therefore, 
I am/' Every rational person can affirm this with 
the greatest confidence. Every person knows, in 
consciousness, that he thinks, and his reason affirms 
that that which thinks, exists and is something. 
A class of Philosophers, called Idealists, have denied 
the existence of a material world, external to the 
human mind ; but these intellectual dreamers have 
been constrained to admit the existence of mental 
phenomena, while they contend that nothing else is 
certain. This admission h sufficient for the pres.- 
£nt argument, inasmuch as mental phenomena can- 
not exist without the existence of mind. Mental 
phenomena is something, and it implies the exist- 
ence of mind, which is something, and its existence 
implies a cause why the phenomena is developed, 
when and what it is, and such cause must be some- 
thing. How futile is it, then, to insist that nothing 
exists. No man can prove to himself that there is 
absolutely nothing in existence, he can do no more 
than doubt, and that which doubts must exist. No 
man can evade the fact of his own existence, for if 
he denies it, by that very denial he proves it, for 



SOMETHING HAS ALWAYS EXISTED. 23 



that which denies must exist. The second premise 
in the argument is then proved, which is, that some- 
thing exists. 

3. Something*must have always existed. This 
conclusion follows from the two preceding proposi- 
tions, which have been established with absolute 
certainty. Nothing cannot produce something ; 
something now is ; therefore, something always was . 
We have now reached a position in the argument 
where it is certain that something has, and of 
necessity must always have existed, and is eternal. 
The question here is not, what is eternal, which is 
eternal, whether little or much, or all, is eternal, 
but simply that something is, and of necessity must 
be, eternal, and so far, the preceding argument is 
and must be, absolutely conclusive. 

It is not pretended that the Theistic view of God 
has been proved, nor even the Deistic view, but a 
position has been established, upon which other 
arguments can be built, bearing directly on the point. 

III. The Advantages of the Position pointed out. 

The simple point that something must be eternal, 
which has been established, may, at first sight, 
appear but a small gain, yet it will prove like an 
elevated outpost, which, when taken, will silence 
every other battery, and command the whole city. 

1. The fact proved that something is eternal, 
gives us the advantage ground of self-existence, not 
only as a possible thing, but as an absolute fact 



24 



ADVANTAGES POINTED OUT. 



existing in the elemental nature of some thing or 
being. That which always existed was never caused 
to exist, and hence can have no cause of existence, 
beyond such uncaused cause as exists in its own 
eternal nature ; and that which has no cause of 
existence, only what exists in itself, is, and must be, 
self-existent. The argument proves, beyond the 
power of a doubt, that self-existence is not only 
possible, but that it has an embodiment in some 
thing or being that really is. This self-existent 
something or being, whenever and wherever we 
shall find and identify it, we propose to call God, 
the Creator, the Jehovah. The advantage of the 
position, in part, lies in the fact that it will preclude 
future cavil as the argument progresses. It being 
proved that something is eternal, and consequently 
self-existent, all future cavil about the impossibility 
and absurdity of self-existence is precluded, and we 
may carry the principle forward in the argument, 
and search out and identify the Eternal One, and 
Atheism will be overthrown. 

2. The position gained that something must be 
eternal, will enable us to overthrow all forms of 
Pantheism, and every other like ism, by simply 
proving that Nature had a beginning. If it can be 
proved that the material universe had a beginning, 
it will follow that there was a cause for the begin- 
ning, which existed before Nature, and which, itself, 
must be uncaused and eternal, in which case Nature 
cannot be God, and Pantheism will be proved false. 



ADVANTAGES POINTED OUT. 



25 



In connection with every index, which reason finds 
in all the field of Nature^pointing to a beginning, 
she affirms, clearly and absolutely, that there was a 
cause of that beginning, which was itself uncaused 
and eternal, which annihilates the Pantheistic view. 

3. The point proved that something must be eter- 
nal, will greatly assist us in our search after God, 
and in identifying Him when we find Him revealed 
in any of His works. We may trace backward 
chains of causes and effects, as they are stretched 
through the ages of the past,, and may find foot- 
prints and hand-marks of the Great First Cause, 
but He is not found in any succession of causes and 
effects, for these must all have had a beginning, and 
yet something is eternal, and that must be looked 
for back of all successions. Every succession of 
cause and effect may point reason back to God, as 
the great universal cause of all, but none of them 
is God himself, for as He is eternal, He must exist 
back of all successions. What we call time, is du- 
ration measured by the revolutions of the heavenly 
bodies, hence time is known to man, only as dura- 
tion measured and divided into periods by events, 
and as we trace the stream of time upward to its 
source, the events by which it is measured and di- 
vided into successive periods must grow less, until 
we reach the first event where time began, and here 
we find the Great First Cause of all things, Him- 
self uncaused, self-existent, dwelling in His own 
eternity. All along the course of time, and in the 



26 



ADVANTAGES POINTED OUT. 



motions of the orbs that measure time, and in every 
thing that time evolves, we may be able to find 
proofs of the existence of an Eternal One, but Him 
we find not in person or substance, in any thing that 
had a beginning, in any thing that is marked by 
change, in any thing that increases the number of 
its years, nor yet in any thing that shall have an 
end. When, in thought, we follow backward the 
indexes which time has set up along her course, to. 
point to her beginning, until w r e reach the place 
where time herself /was first evolved, as the worlds 
wheeled into their orbits and formed the grand gal- 
axy ; here we pause in awe, and know that all 
beyond is the Eternal One, dwelling in His own 
infinitude of self-existence. 



LECTURE III. 



THE VISIBLE UNIVERSE HAD A BEGINNING. 

I. The Issue Defined. 

At this point in tlqe investigation, a new issue is 
raised. In the preceding argument the issue was, 
is there something which is eternal, which always 
existed, which never began existence ; or did every 
thing have a beginning ; or is there nothing now ? 
It was demonstrated that something is eternal. 
That being settled, a new one is raised, by taking 
an advanced step in the general argument, which is, 
what and which is eternal ? is all eternal, or is 
there an eternal Creator, who is the cause of all 
existence except his own ? This issue is between 
Atheism and all forms of Pantheism, on one side, 
and Theism on the other. Atheism and Pantheism 
agree in affirming that the visible Universe is eter- 
nal, while Theism denies it, and affirms that there 
is an Eternal, Intelligent Being, commonly called 
God, who created the visible universe. The pres- 



28 



TIME AND ETERNITY. 



ent argument regards only what is called the mate- 
rial universe, or matter. 

II. Time and Eternity Defined. 

To bring the argument out distinctly, and in its 
full force, it is necessary to define Time and Eter- 
nity, and make plain the distinction between them. 

The subject of eternity has been greatly mysti- 
fied, by attempted definitions and explanations. 
In these attempts, made by a number of able wri- 
ters, two principal errors have been committed. 
The first is that of attempting to form an abstract 
notion of eternity, and then to treat of it and 
explain it accordingly, as an abstract something, sep- 
arate from God, as though it were a place where 
God lives, or an element in which he lives. The 
second error lies in confounding this supposed no- 
tion of eternity with our notion of time, as though 
time were a part, and eternity the whole of the 
same thing. All this can only serve to mystify and 
produce confusion of thought. If time were a part 
of eternity, " a fragment broken off from eternity," 
as one author has called it, then eternity must con- 
sist of parts, and cannot be infinite or unlimited, 
as all agree that it is. No matter into how many 
parts it be divided, whether two or many, and no 
matter how large one part may be, and how small 
the other, relatively to each other, it is a self-evi- 
dent truth, an intuition of reason, that no number 
of parts, each of which must be limited to be a part, 



TIME AND ETERNITY. 



29 



can, combined, constitute an infinite, unlimited 
whole. It is then certain that time, being divided 
into limited periods, cannot be a part of eternity, 
unless eternity also be a limited period, divided 
into less periods. 

No abstract idea can be formed of eternity. 
What is it in the abstract ? It is not matter, for 
matter is limited, bounded, and divisible. It is not 
spirit, for there is but one Eternal Spirit, and that 
is the God of the Theist. It is nothing which God 
has created, for then it must have had a beginning, 
and cannot be eternal, and of course not eternity, 
as understood. It cannot be something separate 
from the being of God, which was never created, 
for then there would be two eternal natures, and 
God cannot be the Creator of all things, since there 
is this one thing, besides God, eternity, which never 
was created. It is clear, then, that there can exist 
in the human mind no abstract notion of eternity ; 
it is indescribable, undefinable, inconceivable and 
unthinkable ; it is an absolute nonentity. 

It may be asked how the idea got into the mind. 
The reply is, it never did get into the mind, as an 
abstraction ; it is not, never was, and never can be 
in the mind. We have the word eternity, but it 
represents no abstract idea. Webster defines the 
word eternity to be "duration, without beginning 
or end/' but this definition is a solecism, for dura- 
tion implies both limitation and lapse, or a passing 
onward, a continued increase of the whole period 
2 



30 



TIME AND ETERNITY. 



of the duration referred to. Even Mr. Webster 
defines duration to be, " continuance in time/' and 
when he adds, " everlasting duration/' as expressing 
a shade of meaning within his one definition, he 
only affirms an endless continuance, but does not de- 
ny a beginning, which comes, short of the common 
notion of eternity. But should it be allowed that 
eternity is endless duration, or rather duration with- 
out beginning or end, a contradiction in terms, still 
this is not definable, and is inconceivable, it is 
unthinkable. We cannot form an abstract idea of 
duration without beginning or end. We can give it 
no ground or form in thought, so as to hold it in 
the mind as an object of attention and reflection. 
It is not space, limited or infinite. It is not place, 
large or small. It is not a sentiment or a principle, 
as right and wrong, or beauty and deformity. It is 
not a principle or rule of action as a law. It is not 
body, and has no form, no locality, no extension, no 
quality, and must be absolutely unthinkable as an 
abstraction. What, then, is eternity ? and how is 
it distinguished from time ? 

We give the only understandable definition of 
eternity; when we say that it is one of the divine 
attributes ; that it is that element of self-exist- 
ence, which renders the being of »God without be- 
ginning and without end. The fact has been dem- 
onstrated, that something is eternal, by which is 
meant, without beginning or end. The fact of eter- 
nity, in this sense, has been proved, or rather shown 



TIME AND ETERNITY. 



31 



to be a self-evident truth, an intuition of reason, 
but the attribute or quality of eternity, exists in 
God alone, and cannot be abstracted, and is un- 
thinkable as an abstract notion. Eternity enters 
into our notion of God. We conceive of God as an 
Eternal Spirit, almighty, all-wise, omnipresent, just 
and good. Of such a being every one can conceive, 
and form a distinct understanding notion of him, 
embracing the above named attributes ; the com- 
plex notion is clearly thinkable, while the manner 
is incomprehensible and unthinkable. The attri- 
bute or quality of eternity exists in God himself, 
and exists nowhere else, has no existence in any 
other being or thing, and hence is incapable of be- 
ing abstracted, and is unthinkable as an abstraction. 
When we undertake to make an abstraction of eter- 
nity, and treat of it as a distinct being, thing, or 
entity, existing separate from God, as an element in 
which He has His being, yet not Himself, the 
mind becomes confused and lost in its attempt to 
explain what cannot be explained, to define what 
cannot, be defined, and to think what cannot be 
thought. 

We can now define time, and no one will fail to 
distinguish time, and all that time has evolved, 
from eternity, and to note the whole as devoid of 
the attribute of eternity. 

Time is duration measured by the revolutions 
of the heavenly bodies. Time is known to us only 
by events. Our experience of successive sensible 



32 



PRINCIPLES APPLIED. 



events, events known to sense, in connection with 
consciousness of personal* identity or continued 
sameness, gives us an idea of time, the lapse of 
duration. Without events, no lapse could be perceiv- 
ed, and time would be unknown. The revolutions 
of the earth upon its own axis give us day and 
night, events by which time is measured. The rev- 
olutions of the earth around the sun, the centre of 
our system of worlds, give us another and larger 
measure by which time is divided into years. 

III. The principles applied, and the argument 
finished. 

It is obvious, from the definitions given, that the 
visible universe is not eternal, that time, which is 
known only in events, must have had a beginning 
with the whole machinery by which it is measured. 
The visible universe cannot have always existed, 
because its revolutions are increasing in number, and 
therefore must be limited, and must diminish as 
they are numbered backward along the course of 
time. It would be folly to affirm that the earth 
has made no more revolutions now, than it had when 
the Pyramids of Egypt were built. If then less 
years had elapsed when the Pyramids were built 
than at this date, there must have been still less at 
a date as remote from that as that is remote from 
this. Upon the same principle, the number of 
years must continue to decrease, until the first rev- 
olution of the earth is reached, where time began. 



HARMONY OF NATURE AND REVELATION. 33 

The whole of time can be no more than a succes- 
sion of days and years, limited in number. Time 
being divided into parts, days and years, each limi- 
ted, the whole of time must be limited. Every 
part being less than the whole, must be limited, and 
as all the parts are limited, the whole must be, for 
no number of limited parts can make an unlimited 
whole. Time is then limited, and must have had 
a beginning, and of course the visible Universe 
must have had a beginning, and consequently can- 
not be eternal. 

The question here is not, how old this earth is, 
nor yet how old the Universe is of which it is a 
part, whether six thousand years, or six hundred 
thousand, or six hundred millions. As each revo- 
lution sustains to all the revolutions the relation of 
a part to a whole, all the revolutions must be limi- 
* ted ; and combined, can constitute but a limited 
period; and as the existence of the orbs is meas- 
ured by their revolutions, the whole system must 
have had a beginning. 

IV. Thus far Natural Theology testifies to the 
truth of Biblical Theology. 

In elaborating a system of Natural Theology, it 
is no part of the work to vindicate the claims of 
the Scriptures to Divine Inspiration, nor even to 
expound them ; but to show that Natural Theology 
is in harmony with the teachings of the Scriptures, 
is the legitimate and indispensable work of him who 



34 HARMONY OF NATURE AND . REVELATION. 

would elaborate a system of Natural Theology, 
with any hope of success,, so far as the Christian 
world is concerned. This shall be done, in connec- 
tion with every fundamental truth which our Natu- 
ral Theology is made to teach. Let it not be said 
that there is a departure from the legitimate work 
of teaching Natural Theology, when it is shown to 
be in harmony with the Scriptures, by showing that 
they teach the same thing. Without such exhibi- 
tion of a harmony between the two, either in the 
work itself, or in the mind of the reader, the best 
system of Natural Theology would fall powerless to 
the ground, in the presence of every Christian 
mind. The exhibition of such harmony is not to 
establish the claims of the Scriptures, but rather to 
vindicate Natural Theology against a prejudice 
which may exist in the minds of some believers in 
the Scriptures ; but 'more especially to relieve it of 
distortions and mis-applications of Infidels, by which 
they have labored to array Natural and Eevealed 
Religion against each other. 

After stating the reasons for the course to be pur- 
sued, it is proper to show that the conclusion reached 
by the preceding argument, is in perfect harmony 
with the Scriptures. As Nature, by every revolu- 
tion, affirms a beginning, so the Scriptures declare 
that, " In the beginning, G-od created the heavens 
and earth."-^-Ge'n. i. 1. 

Psal. cii. 26. " Of old hast thou laid the foun- 
dation of the earth, and the heavens are the work 



HARMONY OF NATURE AND REVELATION. 35 



of thine hands." Rev. iv. 11. " Thou hast crea- 
ted all things." Chap. x. 6. " Who created heav- 
en, and the things that therein are, and the earth, 
and the things that therein arej and the sea, and 
the things that are therein." The clear and unde- 
niable teaching of the Scriptures is, that the visible 
Universe had a beginning. Its origin is pointed 
out when it said, " These are the generations of the 
heavens and the earth, when they were created, in 
the day that the Lord God made the earth and the 
heavens." — Gen. ii. 4. 



LECTURE IV 



MATTER IS NOT ETERNAL. 



In the preceding Lecture it was demonstrated 
that the visible universe, as now organized, had a 
beginning, but the argument did not raise the 
question whether matter has or has not always 
existed in some form. The issue now raised is, Has 
matter always existed in some form, or had it a 
beginning. This issue will be seen, at a glance, to 
be a vital one, for if matter had a beginning, there 
must have been a cause for that beginning, an 
active, creative Power, which existed before matter, 
and that creative power is the God of the Theist. 
The issue is direct between Atheism and Theism. 
It is the one great object of Atheists to annihilate 
the God of t he Bible, believed by the Theist to be 
an Eternal, Self-existent, Intelligent, Omnipotent 
Spirit, who created all things. As it is so clearly 
self-evident that something must be eternal, they 
affirm the eternity of matter as the only means of 
escaping the most terrible thought to them, that 
there is an Eternal God, to whom they are 
accountable for their conduct. 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



37 



I. The Position avails nothing to Atheism. 

1. It overthrows their principal objection to The- 
ism. Atheists insist that it is impossible to con- 
ceive of an eternal God, who is uncaused, and w T ho 
never began to b@ ; in a word, they affirm that we 
cannot conceive of a self-existing being. But when 
they are pressed with arguments drawn from the 
visible Universe, in proof that it had a Creator, 
they forget their difficulty of conceiving of self- 
existence, and affirm that the Universe is eternal. 
To say nothing of the inconsistency of this course, 
it is an admission that something is eternal, and 
self-existent, and leaves the issue a simple one on 
the question, is the visible Universe eternal and 
self-existent, or is there an eternal God who cre- 
ated it ? This gives the Theist the advantage of 
all the marks of design which Nature reveals, which 
design does not inhere in nature, as proof of the 
existence of an intelligent designer, which advantage 
will hereafter be pressed. 

2. If it were admitted that matter is eternal, it 
would not relieve the Atheistic view. It was de- 
monstrated in the preceding Lecture, that time and 
all that time has evolved, had a beginning, that 
the earth performed a first revolution. This ren- 
ders it just as necessary to suppose the existence of 
God, as a means of accounting for that beginning 
of time, that first revolution of the earth, as it 
would be to account for the existence of matter, 

2* 



38 



CREATION OF MATTER, 



upon the admission that matter is not eternal. 
The admission of the eternity of matter does not 
account for the present arrangement and mechan- 
ism of matter, as it exists in the machinery of the 
Universe. As this cannot have been eternal, as 
was proved, were it allowed that matter is eternal, 
it would still be necessary to suppose the existence 
of a God, to account for the present forms and 
arranged forces of matter. 

3. It is much more consistent to suppose that 
there is a God, who created matter, and gave it all 
the forms it wears, by which we account for all 
the marks of intelligence impressed upon it, which 
intelligence matter itself does not possess, than to 
assert the eternity of matter, as a means of refuting 
the idea of the existence of a God ; by which all 
these marks of intelligence are left unaccounted for. 
Until the signs of intelligence, seen in the arrange- 
ments and developed forces of matter are accounted 
for, the existence of an intelligent Creator is just as 
much a necessary truth, after affirming the eternity 
of matter, as before ; the Atheist therefore gains 
nothing by this position.. 

II. The assertion that matter is eternal is an 
assumption ivhich does not admit of the slightest 
degree of proof . 

1. If matter be eternal, there can be no history 
of the fact ; no record can reveal the origin of that 



♦ 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



39 



which had no origin Nor can the fact be known 
that matter is eternal, if there be no Eternal God 
to reveal the fact. If there be a God, as Theists 
contend, and were matter eternal, God could reveal 
the fact of the eternity of matter, and it might thus 
be known ; but denying the existence of God, as 
Atheists do, they cannot pretend that the eternity 
of matter can, by any possible means, be known. 

2. While it is impossible to prove the eternity of 
matter, if it had a beginning, that fact will admit 
of proof. Whether any such proof exists, or does 
not exist, it is entirely possible that such proof 
should exist. If matter was cheated, a record of 
that creation is a possible thing, whether any such 
record does exist or not ; or the fact of such crea- 
tion might be communicated to man by the Creator, 
at any subsequent period ; or matter might be so 
arranged by the Creator as to show signs in itself of 
having had a beginning. It is therefore legitimate 
to attempt to^prove that matter had a beginning, 
that it was created. In this issue, Theism occupies 
an advantage-ground, and Atheism a disadvanta- 
geous position. The Theistic side of the issue 
admits of proof ; the Atheistic side does not admit 
of proof. 

III. The Issue explained as finally made up and 
joined. 

The issue in the present argument is made to 
turn on a particular science, and the question. is, 



40 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



what does Geology teach in regard to the creation 
or eternity of matter ? This issue has been raised 
by Atheists, and pressed in such a form as to put 
all Christians on the defensive. 

1. Atheists being unable to prove that there is 
no God, and equally unable to adduce the smallest 
degree of proof that matter is eternal, occupy them- 
selves with efforts to disprove and subvert the evi- 
dence usually relied upon as proof that the universe 
is the work of a Creator, God. They make their 
assault upon the Mosaic record of the creation of 
the world. As it must appear somewhat reasona- 
ble, that if there fte a God who created all things, 
there should be given to men, in some way, an 
account of that creation ; and as there is no such 
account which wears upon its face a semblance of 
truth, save the Mosaic record alone, that must be 
demolished, cost what it may. They have dug 
deep into the earth, and claim to have discovered 
from the different strata, each of which represents 
a distinct period in the history of the earth, that 
this world is much older than the Mosaic record 
makes it. 

2. In reply to this, Christians make it their first 
work to defend their record. In reply, they say : 

(1.) The 5865 years, which is the age of the 
world at this writing, according to the Mosaic 
record, commenced with the life of Adam, the first 
man. 

(2.) If it be proved by Geology that the earth is 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



41 



much older, it is no impeachment of the record. 
The record does not affirm that matter did not 
exist long before Adam. The record reads as 
follows : 

" In the beginning God created the heavens and 
the earth. And the earth was without form and 
void ; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. 
And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the 
waters/' Gen. i. 1, 2. 

How long the earth remained without form, and 
void, with darkness upon the face of the deep, 
before the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the 
waters, the record does not pretend to say. This 
may all have passed prior to the commencement of 
the six days employed in forming matter according 
to its present arrangements. The world may have 
lain in darkness, and void, or waste, as some render 
it, before God's Spirit moved upon it, long enough 
to account for all the changes which Geology indi- 
cates, and all this before the creation of Adam, with 
whom our account of time has its date. This expo- 
sition regards the words following as an independ- 
ent statement of God's first act of creation, in 
which he created the material of the world, in a 
state of chaos : "In the beginning God created the 
heavens and the earth, and the earth was without 
form, and void, and da.rkness was upon the face of 
the deep." This enunciates the first act of crea- 
tion, and describes the state that followed, as dark 
and waste. The exposition also regards the words 



42 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



following as the announcement of the commence- 
ment of the six days' work, subsequently described : 
"And God said, Let there be light, and there was 
light." From this point of beginning, the work 
proceeds until the whole is crowned by the creation 
of man. How long the dark, and void, or waste 
state existed, before the Omnific call for light, is not 
revealed in the Mosaic record, and if Geology has 
revealed that fact, it has only thrown so much light 
upon that record, without contradicting or impeach- 
ing it. 

The Mosaic record being defended, we may 
attend to the final issue which the Atheist raises in 
his Geological argument. It is now narrowed down 
to a single question, namely, does the science of 
Geology indicate that the substance of the earth, 
matter, is eternal, or that it had a beginning ? On 
this question the issue is now joined, and as the 
Atheist raised the issue, and forced it upon us, he 
cannot object to having his theory of the eternity of 
matter tested by it, or demur at any of the con- 
clusions legitimately drawn from the discoveries of 
his favorite science of Geology. 

"IV. What does Geology teach ? — The Argument 
concluded — Matter proved to have been created. 

Geology simply proves a succession of changes^ 
which the earth has undergone, and each change 
must have had a beginning, and points to a pre- 
ceding state, until the first change which science 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



43 



can detect is reached, and at that point the crea- 
tive act must have transpired, as will be proved. 

1. Human remains are found only on or near the 
surface of the earth, beneath which change after 
change is clearly revealed in successive strata. 
This proves, beyond a doubt, that the human race is 
of recent origin, compared with the whole period of 
the earth's existence. One thing is now settled, 
and that is, man had a beginning, the -human race 
is not eternal. G-eology testifies that the earth 
existed, and that change after change was devel- 
oped, requiring ages before man appeared. 

2. As we descend towards the centre of the earth , 
we pass strata after strata, each requiring ages in 
the work of formation, until we pass below all ani- 
mal remains. This makes two facts very plain. 
First, animals existed long before man, and sec- 
ondly, animals did not exist until long after the 
earth existed. This proves beyond a doubt, that 
animal existence had a beginning, and is not eternal. 

3. Still passing onward toward the centre, we 
find strata after strata, each representing an age or 
ages, until we reach a point below all vegetable 
remains. This proves that the earth existed long 
before vegetation existed, and consequently, that 
vegetation is not eternal, but had a beginning. 
There must have been a first plant and tree f or a 
number of each, which did not spring from pre- 
viously existing plants and trees. 

4. Still descending, we pass the limits of strati- 



44 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



fication, and stand upon the primitive rock, the 
granitic mass, too deep for human exploration. This 
primitive rock, the last in the order of geological 
discoveries, is itself a crystallization, and must have 
had a beginning, a process involving time, and a 
completion. 

5. The primitive rock, the last reached, is not 
only a crystallization, but a compound, and if we 
a pply chemical analysis to it, until we reduce it to 
nature's simple elements, of which science has dis- 
covered between fifty and sixty, the end of scien- 
tific research \yill be reached, and we shall have 
approached the point where God began the work of 
creation, when he produced the elements, without 
form, void and dark. 

The protracted argument may now be summed 
up in few words, and a final and certain conclusion 
reached. Every change which Geology proves to 
have taken place, in the structure of the earth, is 
suggestive of a beginning ; every strata bears upon 
its face marks of its lineal descent from the next 
below, and each rock is traced to its parent rock, 
until the ultimate rock is reached, and this being a 
crystallization, must have had a beginning, and its 
formations have transpired in time, and not in eter- 
nity. The whole process, if the teachings of Geol- 
ogy are reliable, proves that there must have been 
a beginning, a first state, and that was a state in 
time, and not an eternal state. If matter existed 
from eternity, in the simple state supposed, or indeed 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



45 



in any state, there could have existed no cause for 
change, and changes could never have transpired. 
If a cause for change had existed in matter from 
eternity, it would have acted from eternity, and 
there could have been no beginning of change, as 
proved. If no cause of change existed in matter 
from eternity, no cause for change could ever trans- 
pire, if there be no God, and matter would and 
must have remained without change. Matter, 
therefore, by the testimony of science, is proved to 
have had a beginning, and must have been created. 
Moreover, all the changes which matter has under- 
gone, are scientific changes, science herself being 
witness. Science depends upon fixed laws, and law 
supposes a law-giver, and that law-giver must be 
the Author of Nature, and the God of the Theist ; 
and the Atheistic theories of the eternity of matter, 
and of chance, and fortuitous circumstance, are all 
exploded. This is all in harmony with the teach- 
ings of the Scriptures, but this fact must be 
demonstrated in the succeeding Lecture. 



LECTURE V. 



MATTER WAS CREATED ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS— 

THE SCRIPTURES TEACH IN HARMONY WITH 
THE VOICE OF NATURE. 

I. The Previous Argument — Additional Argu- 
ments proposed. 

1. In the previous Lecture, Atheism was met upon 
its own chosen ground, and vanquished with its 
own selected weapon. It made its appeal to science, 
and by its own favorite science it has been over- 
thrown. But while Atheism has depended almost 
or quite exclusively upon Greology for the overthrow 
of the Christian faith, and has itself been over- 
thrown by it, there remain various other considera- 
tions which prove with equal conclusiveness that 
matter was created. Some of these shall be ad- 
duced in the present Lecture. These arguments 
will not only refute Atheism, as such, but every 
form of error which affirms or implies the eternity 
of matter, or denies that it was created. This ap- 
pears necessary, in order to clear the subject of every 
embarrassment, as some Christian writers have 
expressed themselves in an equivocal manner on the 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



47 



subject, if not in a manner which implies the eter- 
nity of matter, and thereby yield up every argument 
drawn from the visible Universe, in support of the 
existence of God. 

II, False Views corrected. 

Before entering upon the direct line of argument, 
it is proper to notice some views which have been 
advanced, judged to be erroneous. It may not be 
affirmed that any Christian* writer of note, has, in 
so many words, affirmed that matter is eternal, that 
God did not create it ; but the following language * 
of President Mahan appears to overlook the fact 
that God created the matter of the Universe. 

" Does creation reveal its author as Infinite and 
Perfect ? Can an effect, acknowledged to be finite, 
reveal its cause as infinite ? If so, this revelation 
cannot be found in the mere extent of the Divine 
works. Suppose that the creation of one world only 
could have revealed its author as finite, how many 
such worlds would it take to reveal Him as infinite! 
Nothing short of a number absolutely infinite, which 
is an absurdity. It is the highest absurdity, there- 
fore, to reason, as is commonly done, from the mere 
extent of creation, which is still acknowledged to be 
finite, to the absolute infinity and- perfection of its 
Author/' Intellectual Philosophy, page 454 . 

A few remarks will render the errors contained 
in thg above extract visible. The quotation has not 
been made for the purpose of attacking the respected 



48 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



author, but because it represents a view of the sub- 
ject which appears to diminish greatly the force of 
any and all arguments drawn from the visible crea- 
tion, if it will not overthrow them all, if fully 
admitted. 

1. It mistakes the true ground of argument in the 
premises. It is not common, as affirmed, to reason 
from the extent of creation, in favor of the existence 
of God, but from the fact of creation. Creation in 
any visible extent, gives evidence in favor of the 
existence of an Infinite Creator, because reason can- 
not conceive that anything less than Infinity could 
produce a small creation. If appeals are made to 
the extent of creation, it is to move the mind by a 
view of the greatness of the Divine display, rather 
than as proof of the Infinity of the Creator. 

2. The position is entirely unsound, that a finite 
creation cannot furnish proof of an Infinite God. 
It is admitted that creation, comprehensive of all 
known worlds, is finite, yet it may furnish proof of 
an Infinite Creator. Eeason may affirm, intuitively, 
that Infinite Power alone can create. Nothing short 
of Infinite Power could create this one world we 
inhabit ; this world is not eternal, but was created ; 
therefore, there must be an Infinite Creator. The 
supposition " that the creation of one world would 
only have revealed its author as finite," is an absur- 
dity on its face^ because creation can be the work of 
nothing less than Infinite Power. It is admitted 
that if a finite power could create one world, the 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



49 



existence of no number of worlds could prove their 
Creator Infinite ; but the idea that a finite power 
can create the one world, is an assumption in con- 
tradiction of reason, in support of which no proof 
can be offered, of any kind or degree. 

3. If it were true, as affirmed, that " nothing short 
of a number of worlds, absolutely infinite/' could 
reveal their creator u as infinite/' no possible proof 
can exist of Infinitude, and the Infinite is not and 
cannot be revealed to the human mind. If a finite 
creation cannot prove the existence of an Infinite 
Creator, it must be because Infinite proof is required 
to establish the fact that there is an Infinite God. 
If so, the fact of an Infinite God cannot be known 
to man. No adequate evidence can be adduced. 
The human mind being finite, it can neither receive 
or comprehend Infinite proof, and God cannot reveal 
himself to man only by finite proof. God can make 
only a finite revelation to the human mind, and the 
revelation he has made, is no more than finite, 
though it reveals the fact of an Infinite God. The 
human mind may comprehend a revelation of the 
fact that God is Infinite, while the infinitude itself 
is incomprehensible, and remains unrevealed to, or 
is hid from the mind. It is on no other principle 
that the existence of an Infinite God can be proved 
to, and be comprehended by, the human mind, without 
being itself infinite, and hence, to allow the position 
that a finite creation cannot reveal an Infinite God, 
would be to allow that no proof can exist of the 



50 



Creation of matter. 



fact that God is Infinite, relatively to the human 
mind. 

4. The language quoted from President Mahan, . 
appears to overlook the fact, that God created th$ 
matter of the universe ; that is, produced it when 
and where there was nofhing prior tp such creation. 
This fact has been proved, and is about to be further 
proved by additional arguments. In the light of 
this fact, the existence of creation, the existence of 
one world, or many worlds, must reveal an Infinite 
Creator. There can be, on the part of finite power, 
no approach to the production of something, where 
there is nothing. No matter how frequently, and 
by what number you multiply *any degreee of finite 
power, while it remains finite, as it always must, it 
can make no approach towards producing something 
where there is nothing ; reason revolts at the 
thought. It is certain, then, that the creation of 
one world, from nothing, or where nothing was, 
must reveal the Creator as. Infinite, to the eye of 
reason. 

III. Direct Arguments in Proof that God created 
matter. 

1. There is and can be no direct proof of any 
kind or degree that God did not create matter, or 
that it is eternal. 

This was shown in the preceding lecture, so far 
as Atheism is considered. It is only necessary to 
add, in this place, that it cannot be pretended 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



51 



that the Scriptures teach that matter is eternal, or 
that God did not create it. 

Some have asserted that there is an absurdity in 
supposing that God could produce something where 
there was nothing, as negative proof that he did 
not create matter. This would be conclusive, if the 
denial that God could create matter was well found- 
ed, but of that there is no proof, nor does the nature 
of the case admit of proof. To prove that, would 
be to prove that Almighty power is not Almighty, 
that unlimited power is limited, that infinity is 
finite. Suppose we cannot conceive hoiv God could 
create something where there was nothing ; still we 
can conceive it possible that he should do it, just as 
easily as we can conceive that he should give to 
bodies of matter their forces, and so arrange those 
powers as to suspend systems of worlds in empty 
space, whirling from age to age with undiminished 
momentum ; or that he should give to the load-stone 
its inexplicable power of attraction. 

But there is real difficulty attending the opposite 
view. To suppose that matter is eternal, is to sup- 
pose that there are two separate, eternal, self-exist- 
ent, independent entities, occupying the same 
infinity. If matter is eternal, it must be self- 
existent, and if self-existent, it must be indepen- 
dent, for that which is self-existent, cannot exist 
dependency upon something else. 

Here, then, is a difficulty at which reason must 
stumble. It is not possible to believe that there 



52 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



are two eternal, self-existent, independent elements, 
each occupying its own sphere of existence, as both 
must, to be eternal, and yet that one should act 
upon, modify and control the other. This is unrea- 
sonable, yea, impossible, because it is an absurdity, 
a contradiction. There is, then, not only no possi- 
ble proof that matter is eternal, but the thing is an 
absurdity, and therefore unthinkable. 

2. Creation includes the production of spirit, as 
well as matter, which cannot have existed from 
eternity, as matter is supposed to have done. The 
supposition is, that matter existed in a common 
mass, or in a state of chaos, and that Grod's creative 
work was that of separating, assorting and forming, 
and arranging the several formations into the com- 
plicated and harmonious universe. This is in har- 
mony with the divisibility of matter^ but the prin- 
ciple is wholly inapplicable to spirit, which is 
indivisible. 

The Christian doctrine is, that there are angel 
spirits, and that every human being is spirit in his 
rational and moral nature. It is impossible that 
all these spirits should have existed from eternity, 
in a common mass, and that God divided that mass 
into all these individual spirits, as he is supposed to 
have divided and arranged matter in the formation 
of the universe, as it now appears. Every angel, 
and every human soul is one, and only one individual 
being, incapable of division. It is not true that all 
angels and all human souls are eternal ; nor can it 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



53 



be pretended that there existed from eternity a 
common mass of spirit, out of which God formed 
them, as he is supposed to have formed the uni- 
verse out of previously existing matter. Each* 
angel, and each of the first two human souls, must 
have been produced by separate acts of creation, in 
each of which something must have been produced 
where there was nothing. God has, then, in cre- 
ating angels and human souls, produced something 
where there was nothing ; for he created all things 
that are in heaven, and in earth, which includes 
both matter and spirit. As it is clear that God did 
produce spirits without a pre-existing element out 
of which he formed them, there can be no ground 
left on which to base a denial that he created mat- 
ter. Moreover, he is affirmed to have created both 
matter and spirit, without notice of any distinction 
in the manner or sense in which it was done ; and 
as it is clear that in the creation of spirits, he pro- 
duced the substance as well as the form, the conclu- 
sion is legitimate, that he created matter in the 
same sense, and that in the creation of the universe, 
he gave existence to matter, which did not exist 
until His creative act called it into being. 

3. The word create properly signifies the produc- 
tion of what did not before exist. It is not neces- 
sary to lumber the subject with Hebrew authorities, 
any amount of which might be adduced. Two cita- 
tions will be as good as more. Gesenius, in defining 
the Hebrew word, hall-rail^ renders Gen. ii. 3 — 
3 



54 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



fi which God created in making/' and adds, " It is 
apparent that bah-rah implies the creation of some- 
thing new, which did not exist/' The word thus 
f defined is the word used where it is said, " God 
created the heavens and the earth/' 

Koy defines the same word, bah-rah, thus : " He 
created, caused to exist, spring forth, as the world, 
from nothing." 

It is not pretended that the word is not used in 
an accommodated sense, to denote various formations 
where there was no production of a new substance ; 
all words are sometimes used in an accommodated 
sense, to denote less or more than their proper 
sense ; even the name of the Supreme Being is so 
used. The thing claimed is, that had the inspired 
writer designed to assert that God produced the 
heavens and the earth from nothing, this is the 
word he would have used. There is no other one 
word in the Hebrew language which so clearly and 
forcibly expresses that idea. 

4. The account of the creation of the heavens 
and the earth, clearly implies that God produced 
the matter of which they are composed. The pro- 
cess is described as consisting of several creative 
acts in regular succession, until the whole work 
was crowned by the production of man. The 
first creative act, as described, could have accom- 
plished nothing beyond the production of matter. 
The words are : " In the beginning God created 
the heavens and the earth." This can mean 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



55 



nothing, unless it be the production of mat- 
ter. It cannot mean their formation out of pre- 
viously existing matter, because no formation was 
effected. The earth, as yet, had no form, and 
therefore nothing could have been done beyond the 
production of matter. After this first creative act, 
it is said, " The earth was without form and void, 
and darkness was upon the face of the deep." As 
God's first creative act produced the earth without 
form, there was an act of creation back of all form, 
which could not have given form, and therefore it 
could have done nothing but produce matter, which 
was afterwards formed by other acts of the Creator, 
successively described. Thus is it seen that the 
Mosaic account of creation teaches that God created 
the matter of the world, as well as to give it form, 
which was done after the matter was created. 

5. There is much force in the fact that in all the 
accounts given of creation, and in all the allusions 
to the visible works of God, there is not one intima- 
tion that anything uncreated ever existed, except 
God alone, or that there was anything existing pre- 
viously to creation, out of which God made the 
world. Had the substance of the universe existed 
from eternity, it is hardly possible that there should 
be no allusion to the fact, in the various appeals to 
God's mighty power and glory, as revealed in and 
through the visible creation. 

6. The idea that matter was not created, but 
eternal, appears inconsistent with God's repeated 



56 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



and unqualified declaration of his absolute propri- 
etorship in all things. If matter never was created, 
but has always existed, it must be self-existent, 
just as much so as God is, and must have existed 
independently of God. Its existence must have been 
as uncaused and unconditional as God's existence. 
In no sense could God be said to have any propri- 
etorship in matter if it be eternal, for in that case 
it existed by itself and of itself, just as much so as 
God did. All that God can claim as his, is the 
forms and motions which he has impressed upon 
matter ; the substance is not his, and never can be, 
since it, is self-existent, in no sense depends upon 
him for its existence, but is co-eternal with him. 
If matter is eternal and self-existent, it must for- 
ever remain so, and must always possess an uncon- 
ditioned existence, independently of God, whatever 
forms and motions He may impress upon it. 

But as we cannot conceive of matter as destitute 
of its essential qualities, which qualities render it 
capable of receiving and sustaining its forms and 
motions developed in the machinery of the universe, 
those qualities must be eternal also, if matter be 
eternal. This view would give God no credit for 
those qualities of matter which are regarded as 
necessary ; for if matter is eternal, all that is essen- 
tial to matter must be eternal, and the conclusion 
must follow, that the mechanical skill is all that 
honors God in creation. It may be admitted that 
God has displayed great mechanical skill, in the 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



57 



manner in which he has arranged the elements of 
nature, which he found, with their necessary quali- 
ties and inherent forces, existing from eternity, 
ready for his hand ; but while this is allowed, the 
claim of God must end here, without any merit for 
the materials of which he constructed the universe. 
Not one item of these materials did God furnish, if 
matter be eternal. 

7. The affirmation that God created the sub- 
stance of the universe, which has been supported by 
so many arguments, in this and the preceding Lec- 
ture ; arguments which nature, reason and science 
have affirmed, with their united voice, is no less 
clearly and positively asserted in the Scriptures. 
In this view, nature, reason, science and Eevelation 
harmonize. Of course, no labored biblical argu- 
ment will be attempted, but enough shall be said 
to show the harmony between Natural and Kevealed 
Religion in this particular. 

" For by Him were all things created, that are 
in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisi- 
ble, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or prin- 
cipalities, or powers, all things were created by 
Him, and for Him ; and He is before all things, 
and by Him all things consist/' — Col. i. 16, 17. 

There are three points in this text worthy of 
special attention. 

(1.) It is comprehensive of the creation of angels, 
and human souls ; indeed, of all spirits. These 
must have been created in substance, the essence of 



58 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



their elemental natures must have been produced, 
as they could have had no pre-existence in some 
unorganic form, as was shown in the second direct 
argument above. 

(2.) It is affirmed that " He was before all things." 
All things include matter of all kinds ; He was 
therefore before all matter. But He could not have 
been before matter, if matter always existed. God 
himself could not be before matter, if matter is 
eternal ; matter, therefore, cannot be eternal, and 
must have been created. 

(3.) It is affirmed that " by Him all things con- 
sist." Here, again, all things include matter ; 
matter, therefore, consists by him. But if matter 
is eternal, it must be self-existent, and consists by, 
in and of itself, and cannot consist by Him. 

" Through faith we understand that the worlds 
were framed by the word of God, so that things 
which are seen were not made of things which do 
appear." — Heb. xi. 3. 

On this text, two remarks only need be offered. 

(1.) If the worlds were made of pre-existing 
matter, that matter does now appear " in the things 
that are seen ; which things were made of that pre- 
existing matter ; therefore, the apostle, by denying 
that the things which are seen were made of things 
which do appear, denies that they were made of 
pre-existing matter. 

(2.) No Greek scholar will deny that the most 
proper rendering of the text is : " things that are 



CREATION OF MATTER. 



59 



seen were not made of things which did appear." 
The idea is, that the visible creation, which is now 
seen, was not made oat of what then appeared, 
what then existed, but out of what did not appear, 
or exist, until God then and there created it. 

It having been proved that God created matter, 
as well as to give it the forms it wears, and the 
forces it develops, both reason and Kevelation 
affirm that the grand visible display is, to the 
human mind, a revelation of the Divine Architect. 

" The invisible things of Him from the creation 
of the world are clearly seen, being understood by 
the things that are made, even His eternal power 
and Godhead."— Kom. i. 20. 

This text overthrows the position taken in the 
quotation reviewed in a previous portion of this 
Lecture, that a finite creation cannot prove an infi- 
nite God. The things that are made, referred to 
in the text, are finite, and yet the apostle affirms, 
that by them are clearly seen and understood " His 
eternal power and Godhead ;" and here Natural 
and Revealed Religion speak with one voice, and 
enlightened human reason responds, and confesses 
both. 



LECTURE VI, 



AN ARGUMENT FROM THE VISIBLE MARKS OF DE- 
SIGN WHICH NATURE REVEALS. 

I. The Ground of the Argument stated. 

1. Designs imply a designer, and contrivances 
imply a contriver. No argument is necessary, and 
no proof can be required, to cause men to believe 
the above statement, which is the major proposition 
of the argument. 

Such is the nature of the human mind, and such 
the spontaneity of human reason, that no person 
needs to be told that there can be no design with- 
out a designer, and no contrivance without a con- 
triver. Tell any ordinary mind that any given part 
of a thing is less than the whole, and that all the 
parts are equal to the whole, or that two things sep- 
arately equal to a third, are equal to each other, and 
no proof will be demanded, for the simple reason 
that the person hearing the statements, knows, 
intuitively, that they are true, without proof or 
process of reasoning. So when the intelligence 
recognizes marks of design anywhere, and in any 
form, it knows, with equal certainty, that there is, 



MARKS OF DESIGN. 



61 



or has been, a designer. Also when the intelligence 
apprehends what it recognizes as a contrivance, it 
knows with absolute certainty, that there is or has 
been a contriver. If a person should see what he 
was sure was a human foot-print in the sand, he 
would be equally sure a human foot had been there. 

The major proposition, then, is self-evident, a 
necessary truth, leaving no ground for difference of 
opinion. 

2. The visible universe reveals various marks of 
design, and is itself, as a whole, and in many of its 
distinct parts, a contrivance. This is the minor 
proposition of the argument, and the one that will 
be disputed, if any, and hence the one which de- 
mands proof. If this proposition be admitted, or 
if it can be proved, it will follow that there is a 
designer, a contriver, back of, and before Nature, 
who, in forming Nature, has left the imprint of his 
intelligence upon its face. This designer and con- 
triver, being before Nature, must be the Eternal 
One, the Q-od of the Theist. 

The first proposition being self-evident, if the 
second be proved, it will follow by an irresistible 
conclusion, that there is a God. 

II. The Argument Illustrated and Verified. 

The visible universe carries upon its face very 
legible marks of design, and is itself a vast contri- 
vance. 

The argument need not be pushed into the 
3* 



62 



MARKS OF DESIGN. 



immensity of space, in search of the fixed stars, so 
called ; our own solar system is quite sufficient to 
give it all the force of which its nature will admit. 
Nor is it best that the argument should be thor- 
oughly and exclusively astronomical. Such an 
argument would necessarily be very conclusive with 
those thoroughly learned in the science ; but would 
be too vast, and would draw its proofs from facts too 
far beyond the common circle of human thought, to 
be appreciated by any save such as have given more 
than usual attention to sidereal studies. There is a 
general knowledge of the machinery of the universe, 
understood and believed by most persons, to which 
an appeal can be made, as follows : 

The child has seen the sun rise and set, has seen 
the moon wax and wane, and has seen the stars 
appear and disappear. The child looked upward 
with emotions of beauty, sublimity and grandeur, 
which it could not explain, as the shadows of a sum- 
mer evening gathered around it, and as one star 
after another came through its fancied canopy of 
blue, like the lighting up of one candle after another, 
until the whole heavens became one vast field of 
bespangled glory. That child then asked, who 
made all those lights ? and with its little mind bur- 
dened with what it had seen, and perhaps burdened 
still more with the answer it had received in reply 
to its question, it fell asleep, and on looking out, in 
the morning, the stars were all gone, and it won- 
dered where so many lights had hid themselves. 



MARKS OF DESIGN. 



63 



It may be said, these are the unscientific wonders 
of childhood, which riper years, aided by science, 
will dissipate. They are the unscientific wonders 
of childhood, and therefore quite limited, obscure, 
and somewhat vague wonders, which riper years, 
aided by science, will bring out in more definite 
form, and in higher and more awful grandeur. At 
every step of progress in the path of science, from 
childhood onward to the ripe scholarship of mature 
years, wonders increase in number and magnitude. 

Let the child learn that this earth is round, and 
that it is suspended in space or hung upon nothing ; 
and that it rolls round once in twenty-four hours, 
producing night and day, by rolling us alternately 
from and to the sun. 

Let the child learn that the moon is a smaller 
body, in form like our earth, and that like our earth 
it is hung upon nothing and rolls round, and also 
passes round the earth once in about twenty-eight 
days, producing all the changes observable in it. 

Let the child then learn that this earth, with the 
moon attending it, performs a journey round the 
sun once in a little over three hundred and sixty- 
five days and six hours, or one year : thereby pro- 
ducing all the seasons, Spring, Summer, Autumn 
and Winter. 

Let the child next learn that this earth is one of 
thirteen worlds, several of which have moons like 
this, and that they all whirl, and also all travel 
round the sun like our earth. 



64 



MARKS OF DESIGN. 



Let it also be demonstrated to the child, that 
these worlds move, in their circuits round the sun, 
at different distances from it ; that the nearest to 
the sun is thirty-seven millions of miles from it. 
Also, that this earth moves at a distance of ninety- 
five millions of miles from the sun, making its yearly 
journey, five hundred and seventy millions of miles, 
to accomplish which, it must fly at the rate of more 
than sixty-five thousand miles per hour. 

Let the child now understand that the most dis- 
tant world from the sun performs a journey round 
it of sixteen thousand eight hundred millions of 
miles. 

Finally, let the child, or rather the man — for 
he must be approaching manhood by this time — 
understand that these thirteen worlds, of which this 
earth is one, with their moons, move round their 
center, the sun, as regularly as our sun rises and 
sets, and our seasons roll round. No clock, or 
machine for measuring time, can be constructed by 
human skill, which will run so exactly from age to 
age, as this great clock, whose wheels are mighty 
worlds. On this state of things, let the following 
facts be considered : 

1. There is, most clearly, an arrangement of 
worlds in which part is adapted to part, and world 
is adjusted to, and balanced against world, so as to 
produce an exact equality of forces and counter-for- 
ces, by which all these worlds are propelled and held 
in their own orbits. This is not accomplished by 



MARKS OF DESIGN. 



65 



material guards, as railroad cars are made to keep 
the track, but it is done in space, by an unseen 
influence called attraction and repulsion, which 
defies human scrutiny. 

2. This machinery has run six thousand years, 
according to the smallest calculation, while many 
suppose it to be much older, and yet none of its parts 
have failed ; none of its motion has abated ; none 
of its momentum appears exhausted, and no irregu- 
larity has attended it. So far as is known, the light 
and heat of the sun are just as intense as they were, 
a thousand years ago, and the great clock of time 
has made no approach towards running down, as 
all man-made clocks do and ever must. While all 
man-invented lights and heat consume and waste 
by their own action in lighting and warming sur- 
rounding bodies ; and all man-contrived forces are 
exhausted by the action of their own momentum, 
the sun, and moon, and all the stars, give just as 
much light as they ever did, and perform their rev- 
olutions in the same time they ever did, and all 
their transits are marked by the same regularity 
they were a thousand years ago. 

3. While the above facts are undeniable, there 
has been found in nature no power, no efficiency, 
and no law which could have brought the parts of 
the great machine together, much less have formed 
its separate parts, so adapted to each other as to 
constitute the complex perfect whole. No power 
or law is found in nature which could restore the 



66 



MARKS OF DESIGN. 



harmony of the machine, if it were thrown out of 
gearing. If we deny the existence of a Creator, it 
is not possible to imagine how this machine was 
formed and got together in such perfection. No 
known power of nature could have produced it, 
and no human intellect has yet been able to con- 
ceive even a hypothesis how it came to be as it is, 
which can stand the test of reason for one moment. 
Men may affirm what they will, concerning their 
own blindness on the subject, yet it must be impos- 
sible for any rational mind to contemplate the 
machinery of the heavens, and understand its parts, 
and the relation which part sustains to part, and 
the adjustment of all its forces, without being con- 
scious of the affirmation of reason within ; that it 
gives evidence of design, and that the whole is a 
vast contrivance of a vast intellect. 

Having passed, in our investigation, from the 
unscientific view of childhood to the scientific view 
of manhood, the averment is proved, which was 
made, that riper years, aided by Science, would 
bring out the wonders of the child in more defifiite 
forms and more awful grandeur. Wonders, and 
increasing wonders rise to view at each step in the 
path of Science, and are seen clearer in each increased 
degree of scientific light. So great is the wonder 
which a view of the Universe produces in the 
rational mind, that reason can relieve itself of the 
burden, only by taking shelter under the conclusion 



MARKS OF DESIGN. 



67 



that there is a God, an Infinite Creator, whose wis- 
dom planned, and whose power built and upholds it # 
The argument is now finished, and may be closed 
by a statement of the propositions of which it is 
composed : 

First Where designs are seen, there must be a 
designer ; and where contrivance is visible, there 
must be a contriver. 

Second. The visible Universe reveals clear marks 
of design, and is itself a vast contrivance. 

Third. There is, therefore, a designer and con- 
triver, who must have existed before the Universe, 
and who, by His intelligence, designed and con- 
trived it, and by His power made it what it is. 
That designer, and contriver, and builder, is God, 
the Eternal One. 

The above argument rests upon a very general 
view of the material Universe, but there are partic- 
ular portions, which reveal marks of design, and 
constitute contrivances in themselves, as parts of 
the great whole. It will be the object of a few 
future Lectures, to elaborate arguments from some 
of these detached portions of God's great work. 



LECTURE VII. 



THE EXISTENCE OF GOD PROVED FKOM THE 
PHENOMENA OF LIFE. 

I. Ground of the Argument Stated — Life not 
inherent in Matter. 

1. Life is an undefinable, and inexplicable mys- 
tery. If the simple question be asked, what is life ? 
no one can give a direct, clear and descriptive 
answer. Whence came life at first, and w'hither 
does it go, when death transpires ? Death, we 
know, is the absence of life, and to die, we know, is 
to cease to live ; but what is that vital force which 
we call life, no one can tell. Much of the phenom- 
ena of life, and much of the action of the vital force, 
in the process of living, may be known and described, 
but the life itself remains unknown, the most pro- 
found mystery to him who liveth. 

2. One of the facts which may be known, in 
regard to life is, that it is not inherent in matter, 
and is no essential part or quality of matter. It is 
upon this fact that the present argument rests. 

3. Life not being an essential property of matter, 
yet existing in connection with matter, and in such 
a manner that matter lives, or is alive, it follows 



PHENOMENA OF LIEE. 



69 



that life must be imparted to matter by a higher 
power ; and if there be a higher power than matter, 
and all the life of matter, a power that has produced 
life, and imparted it to matter, that power must be 
God, and Atheism is overthrown. 

That life is not an essential property of matter, 
if not self-evident, becomes manifest upon the slight- 
est observation. If life were an essential property 
of matter, all matter would be alive, nor could there 
be any such thing as death, or absence of life. We 
know this is not the case, for we see live matter 
and dead matter, and all living matter dies around 
us. Life, then, is not an essential element of mat- 
ter, but is imparted to it whenever matter passes 
life. 

4. The only possible resort of Atheism, at this 
stage of the argument, to save itself from annihila- 
tion, is to affirm that life is the result of organiza- 
tion. This ground is often taken, and in proof, the 
fact is urged, that life is found only in connection 
with organized matter. It is admitted that life is 
developed only in connection with certain organiza- 
tions ; but this does not relieve the difficulty in the 
slightest degree, but rather increases it, as will be 
made to appear. 

II. The Main Point Proved — Life is not the 
result of organization. 

1. No known combination of material elements 
will produce either animal or vegetable life. A 



70 PHENOMENA OF LIFE. 

plant may be analyzed, and all the parts of matter 
it contains, and the proportion of each, can be ascer- 
tained, and yet no human skill can put them 
together so as to produce life, and thus originate 
a living plant. 

In like manner, an animal body can be analyzed, 
and all the parts and properties can be ascertained. 
All the organs of life can be examined, and their 
functions pointed out, and yet the vital force, the 
life, is something different from anv or all of these. 
These organs may all remain entire and intact, after 
life has left the material organism. Chemistry can 
take the animal economy to pieces, and tell just 
what and how many material elements compose it, 
and in what proportion the parts are combined, yet 
no known power can impart vitality to these com- 
bined elements ; life must have a higher origin. 

2. Life precedes organization, and therefore can- 
not be the result of organization. So far is life 
from being the result of the organization of matter, 
that it is clearly the power that produces the organ- 
ization. When Atheists affirm that life is the 
result of organization, they subvert the law of being, 
by putting the cause for the effect, and the effect 
for the cause. Life is the cause of organization, and 
hence, the organization cannot account for the life, 
but the life accounts for the organization. To 
make the organization account for life, is to make 
an effect account for the existence of its own cause, 
which is an absurdity. Life, therefore, can be 



PHENOMENA OF LIFE. 



71 



accounted for only by supposing a higher power, 
acting back of both organization and life, and that 
higher power must be God. 

The organization of the material elements of both 
vegetable and animal bodies, commences in an em- 
bryo state, around its nucleus, life ; life is the first 
thing that acts, and it begins the process, and is 
the vital and vitalizing power of assimilation, which 
gathers to itself the appropriate material elements, 
and completes the organization. It is clear that 
life precedes the organization, and therefore cannot 
be produced by it. It is equally clear that life, 
residing in the organization which it has assimilated 
to itself, by the same vitalizing and assimilating 
power, repairs its waste, and counteracts the tend- 
ency of all organized matter to decomposition, until, 
having accomplished its mission, it withdraws and 
lets the organization return to its primitive ele- 
ments. 

It may now be regarded as settled, that life is 
not an essential, inhering property of matter, and 
is not the result of the organization of matter, and 
hence it must be conditioned upon some power dis- 
tinct from and above matter, and if so, Atheism 
must be false, and Theism must be true. 

III. The conclusion reached above, verified by 
another class of arguments. 

1. Life of every kind is derived, transmitted, and 
perpetuated by a succession of individual lives, each 



72 



PHENOMENA OF LIFE. 



life in the chain of succession being distinct, one 
and indivisible. Life is not one whole identical life, 
but the whole is composed of a succession of lives, 
each constituting a distinct, whole, perfect life, by 
itself. Every life, of every kind, is derived from a 
prior life of its own kind. This succession of lives 
is proof positive that there must have been a first 
life of each kind, which was not derived from a 
prior life, as all subsequent lives have been derived, 
but which must have been the result of a pre-exist- 
ing life-giving power, and that power is God the 
Creator. 

The Atheist will look in vain for a subterfuge 
that will evade the above conclusion, in the oft- 
repeated affirmation, that life is the result of 
nature's own spontaneity. Such an affirmation is 
an assumption which is not, and cannot be sustained 
by any kind or degree of evidence ; while, on the 
other hand, the well known operations of nature 
contradict it. There are two facts which must 
overwhelm this assumption of the Atheist. 

(1.) No power or operative force of nature has yet 
been discovered which can originate life ; nature's 
only power being to transmit it, when and where it 
already exists. 

(2.) Nature has never been known to produce 
life, but only to foster and develop it, where, in 
some form, it had been deposited. Nature has 
never been known to produce or develop life, with- 
out a seed, a germ, a scion, or root, which contained 



PHENOMENA OF LIFE. 



73 



the vital principle of life. Under no circumstance 
has nature been known to originate life, or develop 
it, without the deposition of a germ, in some form. 
If nature had ever been known to bring forth life of 
any kind, and in any form, without a seed or germ, 
Atheists would point to such facts with an air of 
triumph, but in this nature responds not to their 
views. Earth, air and water combined in any pos- 
sible proportions, aided by the summer sun, has no 
power to develop life, until the vital element has 
been supplied, and the conclusion is, that there is 
no inherent power in nature that can originate life. 

2. The different kinds and forms of life which na- 
ture develops are distinct, the one frgm the other, 
and never cross or blend. The Atheist, on being driv- 
en by the preceding argument from his position, that 
life is the result of nature's own spontaneity, may 
attempt another subterfuge, by affirming that while 
nature is never known to develop life, at once, in its 
higher forms, the result is reached by its own law and 
force of progress. The proposition stated above 
overthrows this position. Nature has never devel- 
oped any such law and force of progress. One uni- 
form law governs all the operations of nature in her 
developments of life ; like produces like. Nature, 
in the transmission of life, in every case, transmits 
the kind of life she receives in the germ deposited 
with her, preserving each succession of lives distinct^ 
the one from the other. Climate and culture may 
modify, but cannot originate what did not exist in 



74 



PHENOMENA OF LIFE. 



kind in the parent. Here nature is true to her 
trust ; she never receives the germ of one kind of 
life and responds by developing another kind of life. 
She never receives the seeds of the herbaceous plant, 
and develops the woody shrub or tree. She never 
receives the filbert and develops the oak. She never 
receives the acorn and develops the pine. So she 
never receives the deposit of vegetable life of any 
kind, and in response, throws out animal life, even 
of the lowest grade. Under her care, vegetable life 
never progresses into animal life. And so with 
every kind of animal life, she preserves each distinct. 
Under her care, no kind of life progresses beyond its 
own nature, to be lost in another and a higher kind. 
There is no progress from one kind of life to another. 
Under nature's faithful charge, every kind of life 
sends forth its own stream, like itself, and each 
branch of life runs on its own rounds of succession, 
without crossing or intermingling with other suc- 
cessions of life. Herbs never progress into trees, 
Vegetable life never progresses into animal life, and 
one kind of animal life never progresses into another 
and higher kind of animal life. Oysters never 
become fish with fins ; reptiles never rise above 
reptiles ; fishes never become bipeds, or quadrupeds, 
and never drop their fins and scales, and don feath- 
ers and wings, and become fowls of heaven ; and 
brutes never progress into men. 

If the Atheist could produce one clear case of a 
deviafion from these laws, he would pretend, at 



PHENOMENA OF LIFE. 



75 



least, to consider his cause gained, but he finds not 
one fact in all the realm of nature. Suppose it had 
been known, no matter how long ago, that pine 
trees grew from acorns, that apple trees grew from 
filberts, that petted toads feathered out and became 
hens and ducks ; that children had been known to 
grow as fruit upon some plants or trees, and to 
drop off like ripe fruit, in full developed infancy ; 
or suppose oysters had been known to become fish 
without shells, and with fins and scales ; and fish 
had been known to turn into mermaids, and mer- 
maids had improved into real human beings ; and 
suppose all this had clearly resulted from nature's 
own progressive force, the Atheist would give a 
shout of triumph over the revelation of such facts. 
But there is no such illustration found amid all the 
operations of nature. Nature has never been known 
to develop life, without first receiving the deposit of 
the vital principle, in each case, and then she has 
only developed the kind of life, the vital power of 
which she received. This all proves that the first 
life, of each kind, must have had an origin, distinct 
from, and above nature, and to account for that we 
must fall back upon the Theistic belief in the exist- 
ence of God. 

IV. The Argument summed up and concluded. 

1. The following points have been proved : 
(1.) Life is not inherent in matter, as one of its 
essential qualities, but is something added to it 



76 



PHENOMENA OF LIFE. 



whenever matter is vitalized, or may be said to live, 
or to be alive. 

(2 ) Life is not the result of organization. The 
organization of matter does not originate life, but 
the presence, vitalizing and assimilating power of 
life, originates the organization. 

(3.) Life, of each kind, exists, not as one whole, 
but in a succession of individual lives, each a dis-. 
tinct identity, and indivisible. 

(4.) There is no known power in nature which 
can originate life, only as the medium of transmis- 
sion from a pre-existing life ; and nature never has 
been known to develop life, without the deposition 
of a germ in some form. 

(5.) Life is not developed by any force or law of 
progress in nature, by which the lower forms of life 
are improved into the higher, but each kind and 
form is preserved distinct, and maintains its identity 
from age to age. 

2. From the above facts in regard to life, which 
have been established beyond a doubt, the conclu- 
sion follows irresistibly, that life, in each of its dis- 
tinct forms, had a beginning. There must have 
been a first life of each kind. To say that life had 
no beginning, in view of the above facts, is to out- 
rage one's own common sense. We never saw or 
heard of vegetable, or animal life, that had no be- 
ginning ; and from the points proved, or from what 
is seen and known of life, reason makes the undeni- 
able deduction, that every plant, and every tree, and 



PHENOMENA OF LIFE. 



77 



every animal, and every human being, that ever 
lived, began to live, and that, therefore, there was 
a beginning of the first life of each kind. No mat- 
ter how far you carry your reasoning backward along 
the chain of successive lives, with the facts proved 
before the mind, it is not possible, at any remote 
period in the past, to think of the life of a plant, 
tree, animal or man, that had no beginning. Fini- 
tude, or a beginning, and end, is so impressed upon 
each life, in all visible successions of life, that he 
who pretends to believe that once there lived a 
plant, tree, animal or man, whose life had no begin- 
ning, does violence to his own reason. 

3. The fact now established, that life had a 
beginning, entirely overthrows Atheism, and estab- 
lishes Theism. Atheism does not and cannot 
account for that beginning of life which has been 
proved. Indeed, Atheism can account for nothing, 
for its fundamental principle, that there is no Grod, 
no Creator, precludes the possibility of a beginning 
to any thing, as it precludes all cause for any thing, 
and renders everything necessarily eternal, which 
the eyes of the Atheist must tell him is false. He 
sees things beginning and ending, living and dying, 
all around him every day, and yet in his madness 
adopts a theory which implies that there is no first 
cause for anything. It is, then, impossible for an 
Atheist to account for the beginning of life, which 
has been proved ; and yet, to deny a beginning is 
to affirm that there exists a series of lives, perpet- 
4 



78 PHENOMENA OF LIFE. 

ually increasing in number, which had no beginning, 
which is to affirm a mathematical impossibility. 
On the other hand, for the Atheist to admit that 
life had a beginning, is to admit that there was a 
cause for that beginning, and that cause must have 
existed prior to the beginning of all successions of 
life, and hence, could itself have had no cause, and 
must have been eternal and creative, and of course, 
is the God of the Theist. Thus is it not only 
proved that there is a God, but the idea of God is 
rendered universal, and is revealed as a necessary 
idea of reason, in the presence of the five facts which 
have been established, concerning life. The idea 
that there is a God, a Creator, cannot be escaped 
without affirming that life commenced without a 
cause, or that nothing produced it, or that a limited 
and increasing series of lives had no beginning ; each 
and all of which is impossible ; and as neither of 
these can be true, the other only possible thing must 
be true— there is a God, the author and source of 
life. 

A word only is necessary to show that the Scrip- 
tures teach, on this subject, in harmony with the 
voice of nature. Israel's ancient bard, in his song 
to the God of the Bible, sang, " With Thee is the 
fountain of life/ 7 



LECTURE VIII. 



THE EXISTENCE OF GOD PEOVED FROM THE EXIST- 
ENCE OF THE HUMAN FAMILY. 

The following argument rests upon the fact that 
physical humanity cannot be rationally accounted 
for, only upon the hypothesis that there is a God 
whp created a first man and a first woman, from 
whom all other human beings have descended by 
natural generation. 

The plan of the argument is to state all the con- 
ceivable methods of accounting for the existence of 
humanity, as it is, and then to prove that they are 
all impossible, or false, except the Theistic one, 
stated above. If the premises are made sufficiently 
broad, to comprehend all conceivable methods of 
accounting for the existence of our race, and the 
reasoning on each point be clear and conclusive, the 
argument will be demonstrative. 

There are but four conceivable methods of account- 
ing for the existence of the human family, three of 
which have sometimes been resorted to by Atheists, 
and the fourth is the Theistic mode, by supposing 
a Creator, God. These four methods shall now be 
examined. 



80 



ORIGIN OF HUMANITY. 



I. The Theory of Eternal Generation. 

This assumes that the human race had no begin- 
nings and, of course, that there never was a first 
man and a first woman, and that the race is eternal. 

In opposition to this theory, it is affirmed that it 
is impossible, a contradiction upon its face, and that 
there must have been a first man and first woman, 
who did descend from a previously existing man and 
woman. In support of this denial of the assump- 
tion of eternal generation, the following considera- 
tions are urged : 

1. It was proved in Lecture III, that time, and 
all that is evolved in and by time, had a beginning, 
which is comprehensive of the race of human beings ; 
it must, therefore, have had a beginning. 

2. It was proved in Lecture V, from the develop- 
ments of Geology, that the human family is more 
recent than the earth, vegetables and animals, 
human remains being found only on or near the sur- 
face of the earth. 

3. It was proved in the last Lecture that life 
had a beginning, which is comprehensive of the 
position that the race of human beings had a begin- 
ning. It was shown that life is not one whole, but 
a succession of individual lives, and that succession 
necessarily involves a beginning. 

4. Humanity is known to us only as possessing a 
limited existence, with a beginning and an end, per- 
taining to each individual of the race. Every indi- 



ORIGIN OF HUMANITY. 



81 



vidual known to us, personally or by history, began 
to be,- and has ceased or must cease to be. Now, 
what is true of all the individuals, must be true of* 
the race composed of such individuals. In the 
light of these facts, it is impossible to conceive of 
the race as having had no beginning. To suppose 
a race of beings without a beginning, composed of 
individuals, every one of which has a beginning and 
an end, is simply to suppose an impossibility. 

5. It is impossible to conceive of our race as hav- 
ing had no beginning, without conceiving of, at 
least, one man and one woman which had no begin- 
ning. This must be more difficult of conception, 
and harder to believe, than the Theistic idea of a 
Creator. 

But to suppose a man and woman once existed, 
who had no beginning, is to suppose that they were 
eternal, and consequently self-existent. If they 
were self-existent, they had no cause of existence, 
only what was in themselves, and that must have 
been an eternal cause ; and hence, it must ii^ve 
ever remained a cause ; and the conclusion is unde- 
niable, that the eternal father and mother of our* 
race must be alive somewhere upon the earth. 
Such eternal self-existent persons could not die, 
since the only cause of their existence is an eternal 
cause, and in themselves. And if there be no God 
to take them away, they must now be living upon 
the earth. Would it not be worth a search, to find 
and look upon the venerable pair who never began 



82 



ORIGIN OF HUMANITY. 



to be, and to hear, in their own words, the history 
of their immortal round of life in the midst of this 
* world of their dying children. 

The argument need be pushed no farther, — rea- 
son repudiates such a hypothesis, — as a method of 
accounting for the origin of our race. It is impos- 
sible to believe it ; it must, therefore, be dismissed 
as absurd and false. 

II. The Progressive Theory. 

This theory assumes that there is in nature a 
progressive force, by which the higher and more per- 
fect forms of being have been developed from lower 
forms by the action of nature's own law of progress. 
According to this theory, humanity had its origin in 
the oyster, or some other half-animal, half-vegetable 
existence, and that half-animal, half-vegetable some- 
thing, was developed from vegetable life, and that 
again sprang by the force of nature from inorganic 
matter. 

Ig reply to this theory, the following considera- 
tions are offered : 

* 1. If all were allowed that is claimed for nature's 
progressive law, it would not account for the origin 
of our race, but only throw the first cause further 
back, leaving it unexplained. If man sprang from 
an oyster, the question arises, • — from whence came 
the oyster? There must be just as much difficulty 
in accounting for the race of oysters, as for the race 
of men. If it be said the oyster sprang from inor- 



ORIGIN OF HUMANITY. 



83 



game matter, two questions arise, which the theory 
leaves unanswered : 

(1.) Where did the matter come from ? 

(2.) What was the cause of the change in matter, 
from an inorganic to an organic state, from an inan- 
imate to an animate state ? 

The theory furnishes no answer to tfiese questions. 
If it were assumed that the matter was eternal, the 
Assumption would imply that a first change from an 
inorganic to an organic state would be impossible, 
because it coiild have no cause. 

2. There is no such law of progress in nature. 
This is an assumption, not only without proof, but 
in the face of positive proof Nature has never 
revealed the slightest sign of such a law of progress, 
not one fact has ever occurred to suggest its exist- 
ence. On the other hand, nature has ever been 
uniform in her operations, acting under one unde- 
viating law of conservatism, by which every thing- 
is preserved in its own identity and nature, and 
held in its own rounds of succession, like descend- 
ing from like. 

3. This theory has been exploded and entirely 
overthrown in preceding Lectures : 

(1.) In Lecture III. it was proved that the pres- 
ent form of the material universe had a beginning. 
While that argument was elaborated in view of 
time, as measured by the revolutions of the heav- 
enly bodies, the principle is comprehensive of the 
present argument, as it most clearly involves a begin- 



84 



OBIGIN OF HUMANITY. 



ning to every form that nature wears, and a cause 
for such beginning. Nature, in the form of human- 
ity, must have had a beginning ; even if it be by 
progress, it must havQ had a beginning, and a cause 
for that beginning of progress. 

(2.)' In Lecture IV. and V, it was proved that 
matter is not eternal, but that it was created and 
had a beginning, which entirely overthrows the pro- 
gressive theory. If matter was first created, noth- 
ing is gained by the progressive theory, since the 
existence of a Creator is then proved, which will 
equally account for the existence of man. 

(3.) It was proved in Lecture VII, that animal 
life had a beginning, in which argument the pro- 
gressive theory was directly met and overthrown. 
What was there proved of the life of men, must 
be equally true of the material organism in which 
that life inheres. These arguments need not be 
repeated ; this reference to them as applicable to 
the progressive theory is sufficient, and it stands 
distinctly and conclusively overthrown. 

III. The Accidental Tlieory. 

This theory supposes the first of the race to have 
happened by chance ; that, without the action of 
intelligence, the fortuitous coming together of the 
required parts of matter, produced a man. This 
may be regarded as the Atheist's last resort, and 
hence, if he be overthrown here, his defeat is com- 
plete and final. Let us, then, test this last and 



* ORIGIN OF HUMANITY. 



85 



strong hold of Atheistic Infidelity. It must have 
required a combination of concurrent accidents to 
produce the race of humanity in this way, too 
numerous and vast to admit of belief. The following 
outline presents but a part of what must be required. 

1. The frame-work of the human body consists 
of about two hundred and fifty bones. These are 
all so framed together as to make a perfect whole. 
And so perfect is the whole, that the following 
statements are true, beyond doubt : 

(1.) The frame is so complete that no bone could 
be added which would improve it. 

(2.) No bone could be removed which would not 
impair it. 

(3.) No bone could be altered without damage, 
so perfectly are all the bones fitted together. 

(4.) No two bones could change places without 
damage to the frame, so perfect is the whole arrange- 
ment, and so exactly are all the bones fitted to each 
other, and each fitted for its own place. 

2. The bones are all framed together in such a 
manner, and the joints so constructed, as to give 
the greatest strength where most strength is needed ; 
as to favor rapid motion where quick motion is most 
needed ; and slow motion where slow motion is most 
needed ; and so as to retard or prevent motion 
where easy and free motion would impair and weaken 
the structure. The particulars of what has been 
stated might be pointed out, but it is unnecessary, 
the facts are so obvious. Such is the frame-work 

4* 



86 



ORIGIN OF HUMANITY. 



of the human body, and if the argument was left 
here it would be conclusive, for it is impossible to 
suppose that it could come into existence without 
an intelligent, designing cause. There are so many 
adaptations, presenting such a combination of contri- 
vances, as to set skepticism at defiance. Two hundred 
and fifty bones, most of which present two distinct 
adaptations, each end being adapted to its fellow- 
bone. Then each of these adaptations involves 
another adaptation, being adapted to perform a 
given motion, and to perform it by means which 
will, at the same time, prevent other motions, which 
would interfere with the general design of the struc- 
ture. Can reason conceive all this possible without 
an intelligent author ? Never ; and he who affirms 
it, affirms without consideration, or falsifies his own 
convictions. But, as yet, we have only the opening 
of the argument before us, and will proceed. 

3. The bones, above noticed, are all tied together 
in a manner which proves it to be the work of intel- 
ligence. They are not all fastened together in the 
same way. 

(1.) Where little or no motion is required, they 
are fastened more firmly, as though they were 
framed and pinned together. 

(2.) Where limited motion is required, they are 
united by cartilage, sometimes called gristle. 

(3.) Where extended and easy motion is required, 
they are united by ligaments, which are less confin- 
ing and allow of ready and free play. 



ORIGIN OF HUMANITY. 



87 



(4.) All the joints, where two bones are united, 
are lubricated or oiled with a very slippery fluid, 
called sinavia. The secretion of this fluid is pro- 
vided for in the joint, which is no less an evidence 
of design, and no less a contrivance, than the oil 
can, always kept at hand by him who runs a machine. 

4. The frame being completed, the whole is 
securely covered with a peculiar membrane, called 
the periosteum . This answers a two-fold purpose. 

(1.) It nourishes the bones by means of the ves- 
sels which pass through it for that purpose. 

(2.) It serves as a ground upon which the mus- 
cles and tendons are set. It being firmly attached 
to the bones, and the muscles and tendons being 
firmly attached to it, it holds them from breaking 
loose by their powerful action. 

5. The bones are filled with an oily substance 
called marrow, upon which their life, health and 
strength, appear to depend. 

6. The frame being finished, there must be added 
the locomotion power, for the bones are only levers, 
and can act only as they are acted upon. To effect 
this, the whole is filled out with flesh and hand- 
somely covered with skin, which adds form and 
beauty to the whole. The flesh constitutes the 
muscles which move the bones. The large and full 
muscles taper off at each extremity into a cordy, 
powerful substance, called tendons, which are firmly 
attached to the bones. By the contraction and 
relaxation of the muscles, the* bones are moved. 



88 



ORIGIN OF HUMANITY. 



and the machine is started and made to operate. 
But the muscles are not self-moving, but act only 
as the ropes and belts of a machine, which connect 
the working parts with the working power. There 
is another power that acts upon them. - 

7. The nerves are a most wonderful contrivance. 
They appear like fine, white cords or threads, and 
when traced to their source, are found to issue from 
the brain, and from its elongation, called the spinal 
marrow. The trunks of the nerves are divided and 
subdivided, until, in their most minute forms, they 
reach every part of every extremity. There are two 
classes or sets of nerves. 

(1.) One class of these nerves gives the power of 
sensation, which renders us capable of feeling. 
They are, hence, called nerves of sensation. 

(2.) The other class of nerves gives the power of 
motion, and are called the voluntary nerves, or nerves 
of motion. They act upon the muscles at the bid- 
ding of the will, and cause them to contract and 
relax, by which the bones move and the whole 
machine is made to operate. 

8. The human machine, as described above, is 
further provided with a reproductive apparatus, 
by which its wastes are supplied, but for which it 
would soon fail. This department is too multifari- 
ous to be described, in detail, in this argument. 
A mere outline will answer every purpose, so far as 
the force of the argument is concerned. 

(1.) The stomach, which first receives the food 



ORIGIN OF HUMANITY. 89 

we eat, is a wonderful apparatus, with its appenda- 
ges. It has the power of reducing what it receives 
to a common substance, and of assimilating it to 
the various parts of the organism, adding bone to 
bone, flesh to flesh, substance to like substance, in 
every part of the body. 

. (2.) The blood is a principal agent in this repro- 
ductive process. It is formed, principally, from 
what is eaten, but, in part, from the air that is 
breathed. To effect the repairing of the system by 
means of the blood, it is sent coursing through every 
part in vessels called arteries, and is returned to its 
starting point in another class of vessels called veins. 

(3.) The blood is propelled through its course by 
the powerful action of the heart, an organ exactly 
contrived for that purpose. 

(4.) Along the course of the blood there are num- 
berless absorbing vessels which take up from the 
blood, as it passes, the substance which every part 
of the body requires. Each of these vessels takes 
up just that material from the bi£>od which the part 
demands for which it acts, and rejects all the rest. 
The blood being thus robbed of its vital qualities, it 
is returned to be renewed for another round. The 
blood is renewed from two sources, as has been inti- 
mated, namely : from the material prepared by the 
stomach from the food that has been eaten, and 
from the air that is breathed. 

(5.) To effect the renewal of the blood by means 
of the atmosphere, a breathing apparatus has been 



90 



ORIGIN OF HUMANITY. 



prepared. The lungs constitute the most important 
organ of the breathing machine. The lungs are so 
constructed as to admit a large quantity of air, and 
by their action they receive and expel it constantly, 
from the beginning to the end of life. The blood 
returning exhausted is passed through the lungs, 
and thereby brought in contact with the air that is 
breathed, and absorbs the oxygen of the air, by which 
it is vitalized and changed from a dark to a light red. 
The air is exhaled, minus its oxygen, and fresh air is 
again inhaled, and so the process goes on until death 
takes place. In this breathing machine the lungs 
and the air are adapted to each other, and the air and 
the blood are adapted to each other. If the lungs were 
not so constructed as to receive the air, give off its 
oxygen to the blood and expel the remainder, breath- 
ing would be impossible or useless. If the air was 
not composed, as it is, of twenty-one parts of oxygen 
and seventy-nine parts of nitrogen, it would not sub- 
serve the purposes of animal life, and the lungs would 
be useless, or would inhale death. If the air was 
differently compounded, it would be a fatal poison. 

The wonderful system of reproduction, with its 
numerous organs, may be summed up under three 
heads or divisions : 

The first is the Laboratory, by which elements 
N are prepared for the support of the system. 

The second division embraces the absorption appa- 
ratus, by which the prepared elements are taken up 
and made a part of the organism. 



ORIGIN OF HUMANITY. 



91 



The third is the discharging system, by which all 
unnecessary matter is thrown off, and thereby the 
overloading of the system is prevented. This relates 
not only to the rejected portions of what is eaten, 
but also to the worn-out parts of the body itself, 
which has to be re-placed with new matter. 

9. The human system is also supplied with a sen- 
sation machine, which is no less wonderful, and no 
less reveals a design. The nerves of sensation were 
named while treating of the locomotive power, but 
they must now be looked at as the ground-work of 
the sensation apparatus. These nerves, which have 
their seat in the brain, and which terminate in the 
several local organs of sense, constitute a wonderful 
machine for seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting and 
smelling. It will be sufficient to name the visual 
apparatus. Vision is the result of the wonderful 
eye, and the wonderful light, and their wonderful 
adaptation to each other. 

The eye is a wonderful thing, in itself. It is too 
complicated to admit of a minute description in a 
Lecture like this, without occupying too much time. 

(1.) There is a collection of different kinds of 
matter, the right kinds of matter, the right quan- 
tity of matter, and the right proportionate quantity 
of each kind. 

(2.) There is, next, the form of the eye, which 
constitutes its adaptation to receive the light in the 
right quantity, and to produce the figure and color 



92 



ORIGIN OF HUMANITY. 



of the object emitting or reflecting that light upon 
the retina. 

(3.) Then there is the relation which the two eyes 
sustain to each other, being so placed as to give 
the right angle to bring the light that enters each 
eye to a focus at the right point, so that one act of 
vision is the result of the action of both eyes, and 
that vision is rendered stronger by the united action 
of the two eyes in the act of seeing. 

(4.) Finally, w T e have the place in the body which 
the eyes occupy. There is no other place in the 
body where they could be set with the same advan- 
tage. They are set high up in the structure, so as 
to place them out of the way of the more active 
portions of the frame, and out of the way of the 
material objects upon which we expend our greatest 
physical exertion. They are set in front, as it is 
more necessary to see where we are going than to 
see where we have been, and yet so as to enable us 
to see on either side if there be a better way than a 
strait line before us. 

The eye, then, as an apparatus for seeing, is too 
wonderful to be the result of anything less than a 
master intellect acting from design, carrying out the 
ideal which existed in the intelligence before an eye 
was formed of matter. A camera obscura is an 
apparatus which represents the eye. The images 
of external objects are received through a double 
convex glass, and are exhibited in their native col- 
ors on- some white surface placed within the machine, 



ORIGIN OF HUMANITY. 



93 



in the focus of the glass. This illustrates the phi- 
losophy of vision, so far as the structure of the eye 
and the action of light are concerned. 

To suppose that this camera obscura was not 
designed, and contrived, and adapted to the light, 
by intelligence ; to suppose that it was formed by 
crystalization, or that it grew as a fruit, or that it 
came into being without any previously existing 
cause, would be less absurd than to suppose that 
the first pair of eyes grew, in the head of the first 
man without the action of intelligence. But sup- 
pose this great accident did occur, that the first two 
eyes were a mere accident, still a greater accident 
must be supposed, which is, that the first two eyes 
happened to select their location in the head and 
not elsewhere, happened to get in such relation to 
each other, and in so happening, without design or 
intelligence, they happened to produce a universal 
and unvarying law, by which all eyes have followed 
their example in selecting for themselves the same 
position in the body. To believe all this, must 
require a much larger degree of credulity than is 
required to believe that there is a God who formed 
the eye. 

(5.) But the eye itself does not give us vision 
without light. The wonderful eye would have hap- 
pened in vain, if there had happened to be no light, 
or if light had happened to be unsuited to the eye. 
Light, we know, is adapted to the eye, as the 
medium of vision. It is a wonderful element, but 



94 



ORIGIN OF - HUMANITY. 



little understood. White light is said to be a com- 
pound of seven different colors, yet in its purity it 
is invisible, while it renders everything else visibl e 
upon which it falls. Did light happen to be, and 
to be just what it is? If so, by what a profound 
accident did this world escape the fate of unbroken 
darkness, though full of accidental eyes. 

In the. above outline of physical humanity, only 
a part of its wonderful machinery has been revealed ; 
it is proper, therefore, to make a comprehensive 
statement of what cannot be given in detail. 

10. The human organism, as a compound whole, 
is composed of more than ten thousand parts, the 
want of any one of which would impair, if not ruin 
the whole machine. It must have been a tremen- 
dous accident that produced so many adaptations, 
so many concurrent facts in so small a compass. 
The existence of one human body, as it is, involves 
more than ten thousand adaptations of part to part, 
within itself, besides the adaptation of the whole to 
an end, and its adaptations to external surround- 
ings, as the lungs to the air, the eyes to the light, 
and the ear to the atmosphere, to produce hearing. 

11. But this number of concurrent facts must be 
doubled, to give existence to the race. There must 
have been two human beings, one man and one 
woman, if no more, to originate the race, the human 
family. There must have been two such tremen- 
dous accidents as has been described, each involving 
more than ten thousand coincident facts, a failure 



ORIGIN OF HUMANfTY. 



95 



of any one of which, out- of the more than twenty 
thousand, would have defeated the present result. 

12. In the concurrence of the two tremendous 
accidents, another must have occurred, which is, 
that one, by accident, was a man, and the other, by 
accident, was a woman. But for these accidents, 
there would have been no race of human beings. 

13. Still another accident must hav-e occurred, 
which is, that by accident, the two accidents hap- 
pened so near together, in point of time, that they e 
both lived at the same time. But for this accident, 
which made them cotemporary, there would have 
been no race, even had this wonderful and powerful 
agent, called accident, produced a thousand men, 
and as many more women, so remote from each 
other as not to live at the same time. 

14. There must have been yet another accident, 
which is, that by accident, it happened that the two 
accidents happened to occur at or so near the same 
place on this wide earth that the accidental man and 
the accidental woman accidentally found each other. 
But for this last named accident, all the other acci- 
dents might have occurred a thousand times in por- 
tions of the earth remote from each other, without 
giving existence to the race of mankind, 

15. One more most profound accident must have 
occurred, to make out the case, which is : all these 
numerous and great accidents must have occurred 
so as to place themselves and their immediate and 
remote results, under a fixed law, by the action of 



96 



OKIGIN OF HUMANITY. 



which the race has ever since been developed and 
perpetuated ; so that since those first great acci- 
dents, nothing in this matter has been left to, or 
occurred by accident. If the history of humanity 
recorded, now and then, a like accident ; and if one 
or two had undoubtedly occurred in our own times, 
it - would greatly strengthen the faith of those who 
believe that the original production of humanity was 
an accident ; but such accidents have never been 
repeated. As impossible as it is to believe all this, 
it must be believed, and much more of the same 
kind, if the existence of God, the Creator, be denied. 

The argument need be pushed no further. Eeason 
repudiates the supposition of such an origin of 
humanity, as absurd, and a thousand times more 
•unreasonable than the Theistic belief in the exist- 
ence of God, who created all things. 

« 

IV. The Theistic Theory is the only remaining vne. 

The Theist affirms that there is a God, who cre- 
ated a first man, and a first woman, from whom all 
other human beings have derived their existence by 
natural generation. 

It has been shown that there are but four meth- 
ods of accounting for the existence of the human 
race, of which this last named is one. The three 
former have been proved to be absurd, false, and 
impossible ; and the conclusion is irresistible, that 
the fourth and last named must be true ; there is, 
therefore, a God, a Creator. 



LECTURE IX. 



AN ARGUMENT FOUNDED UPON THE PHENOMENA 
OF THE HUMAN MIND. 

M 

PRELIMINARY REMARKS. 

We now enter a field of investigation different 
from those that have been occupied in gathering the 
facts which have constituted the basis of preceding 
arguments. Arguments have been drawn from mat- 
ter, in several of its forms and relations, and not- 
withstanding it is destitute of intelligence, it has 
been found to bear visible marks of intelligence 
impressed upon it ; seen in its arrangements, adap- 
tations, and in the contrivances into which it has 
been formed by some unseen contriving, arranging 
and organizing force. 

In now turning to the investigation of mind, we 
have a very different element to deal with, as mind 
is not matter, and is not governed by the laws that 
govern matter. Mind differs from matter as widely 
as thought does from the marble pillar. The law 
which governs mind differs from the law which gov- 
erns matter as widely as the argument or motive 
that sways the mind differs from the power of the 



98 



MENTAL PHENOMENA. 



rock, which crushes by its weight. The law which 
brings the loosened rock bounding down the moun- 
tain side cannot be confounded with the law that 
carries the man up the same mountain side, for the 
sake of the prospect its lofty summit will afford. 

The power to think, feel, and will are the most 
wonderful of all powers, and lie so far beyond the 
comprehension of the thinking mind itself, as to 
awaken thoughts of a Higher Power, as the author 
and source of intelligence. 

It is not proposed to give a detailed analysis of 
mental phenomena, for the purpose of developing 
the evidence it might thus be made to contribute 
towards proving the existence of God ; a few lead- 
ing facts only will be presented, which will render 
the argument more simple, without materially di- 
minishing its force. 

The argument will be made to depend, mainly, 
upon two facts, both fundamental in their nature. 

1. Intelligence is not matter, is no quality of 
matter, and matter is not intelligent. 

2. While intelligence is not matter, and matter 
is not intelligent, the two are so fitted to each other, 
and so united in the human organism, as jointly to 
constitute an intellectual machine, for knowing the 
material world. 

I. Intelligence is not matter, is no quality of 
matter, and matter is not intelligent. 

The thinking and knowing power in man, is. 



MENTAL PHENOMENA. 



99 



spirit, and not matter. We call it spirit, soul, or 
mind, but whatever we call it, it is distinguished 
from the body, and hence it is not matter, not 
material, but immaterial. This is a vital principle, 
a nd if it can be established on natural and philo- 
sophical grounds, it will go far towards establishing 
the existence of God as the Creator "of the spirits 
of all flesh/' So far as is known, all who admit the 
immateriality, spirituality, and immortality of the 
human soul or mind, also admit the existence of 
God. 

The bearing which this point has upon the ques- 
tion of the existence of God will be shown after the 
fact in regard to the mind has been established. 

It is a significant fact, that the distinction 
between body and soul, matter and mind, is a uni- 
versal idea, All men, in all ages, and in all lands, 
have recognized a distinction between the body and 
mind. Men have never been in the habit of con- 
founding the body with the knowing power which 
resides in the body. While the idea of a distinction 
between body and mind is nearly or quite universal, 
existing as commonly among the ignorant and 
unlettered as among the learned, philosophy has 
reduced that distinction to a scientific certainty, by 
noting the phenomena of each as so diverse as not 
to be given by the same element. 

We are now in a field of investigation where we 
are re quired to reason from natural principles, and 
this we can do only so far as science lights our path', 



100 



MENTAL PHENOMENA. 



and we can reason only in the light of science as it 
now shines, taking its clearest aspects, and using 
all the light we have, until we can develop more. 
What, then, does philosophy teach 7 

Philosophy teaches us that all we know of matter 
or mind, is the phenomena they give us ; and hence, 
it teaches us, where we find two classes of phenom- 
ena, which are of such opposite natures as not to be 
given by the same substance, we know there must 
be two elements. On this principle, philosophy 
draws a line between matter and mind. Mind is 
that which perceives, thinks, knows, wills, feels, 
loves, hates, and is joyful and sorrowful. Matter is 
that which gives the phenomena of impenetrability, 
inertia, extension, divisibility, figure, color, &c. 
These two classes of phenomena cannot inhere in 
the same substance, and hence, matter and mind 
cannot be the same thing. To deny the distinction 
between them is to set ourselves against, not only 
the universal opinion of the unlearned world, but 
Against the world's philosophy, as held and taught 
by the most learned and wise. A few illustrations 
of the principle involved will be sufficient on this 
point. 

1. The phenomena of volition cannot be given by 
the same substance that gives the phenomena of 
inertia. Volition, which is a mental power, is the 
power of self-action • but inertia, which is a quality 
of matter, is the absence of the power of self-action ; 
it being capable of acting only as it is acted upon. 



MENTAL PHENOMENA. 



101 



It is therefore certain that mind and matter are not 
the same thing. 

2. The phenomena of intelligence cannot be 
given by the same element that gives the phenome- 
na of extension, divisibility, figure, color, and iner- 
ertia. The power to know is and must be self- 
acting, and of that which is self-acting, not one of 
the qualities of matter can be affirmed. The power 
to know must be a simple and indivisible power, and 
therefore cannot inhere in matter, which is divisible. 

No one can contend that matter is intelligent, 
unless upon one of two assumptions, neither of 
which can be true. 

(1.) The assumption that intelligence is an essen- 
tial property of matter, cannot be sustained. If it 
were so, every part and particle of matter would be 
intelligent, and whatever is not intelligent, if any 
such thing there be, cannot be matter. That which 
is destitute of any essential property of matter can- 
not be matter. All matter is not intelligent, does 
not think, know and feel, and therefore intelligence 
is not an essential property of matter. 

(2.) The assumption that matter, not embracing 
intelligence as one of its essential properties, becomes 
intelligent by having intelligence superadded to it, 
cannot be maintained on Atheistic ground. If there 
be no God, matter must be eternal, and if intelli- 
gence is not an essential property of matter, nothing 
but matter originally existed, and there being no 
God, there could be no intelligence to add to mat- 
5 



102 



MENTAL PHENOMENA. 



ter, and no power to add it. Therefore, upon the 
Atheistic theory, matter could never become intelli- 
gent by having intelligence superadded to it. 

Matter could not add intelligence to itself. The 
idea that matter added intelligence to itself, must 
suppose that intelligence existed outside of and 
separate from matter, which overthrows the whole 
theory of the intelligence of matter. 

It is equally impossible that matter should orig- 
inate intelligence within and of itself. As it is now 
admitted that matter does not possess intelligence, 
as an essential quality, it must be something beside 
matter, and distinct from matter ; and to say that 
matter originates it, is to say that matter creates a 
new thing, which did not before exist, and that this 
new thing is created out of nothing, for it could not 
create it out of itself. To suppose that matter 
created intelligence out of itself, would be to sup- 
pose that it so changed itself as to cease to be mat- 
ter. To suppose that matter, as an active power, 
or cause, should use itself up in producing intelli- 
gence, another and distinct entity, is not only philo- 
sophically impossible, but if allowed, would prove, 
after all, that it is not matter, but something else, 
that is intelligent. 

It is, then, certain that intelligence is not an 
essential property of matter, and that it is not and 
cannot be something superadded to matter. The 
conclusion is undeniable, that intelligence is not 
matter, and that matter is not intelligent. 



MENTAL PHENOMENA. 



103 



3. The phenomena of memory proves that the 
mind, which remembers, is not matter, and is no 
part of what is called the body. Take as an illus- 
tration, a single mind, possessing the largest amount 
of knowledge, and there is no known philosophy 
which will explain how such a vast storehouse of 
ideas can exist in man, upon the assumption that 
the mind is matter. Thoughts, ideas, knowledge, 
and volitions are immaterial. The objects of know- 
ledge may be material, but the knowledge of the 
object is immaterial. I behold a mountain, it is a 
material object impressed upon my sense through 
the medium of vision, but the mountain is not in 
my eye, and is not, in substance, in or on my brain. 
I close my eyes, or turn away from seeing the 
mountain, and think of it, and it is not now, in 
substance, in my mind. There is only a thought, 
or notion of it, in the mind ? embracing its size, form, 
&c. I saw it and it was then in my mind only 
in thought ; I now remember it and it is not in my 
mind, I have only a conception of it. I may have 
seen a hundred mountains, and remember them all ; 
I may have become learned in all the sciences, and 
remember their varied principles and their applica- 
tions ; I may have studied the history of all nations, 
and be capable of remembering the origin and prin- 
cipal events attending each ; and in addition to all 
this, I can remember my own history, embracing 
most of the incidents that have occurred during my 
life-journey of sixty years. Where are all these 



104 



MENTAL PHENOMENA. 



matters stored in the mind, to be called up as occa- 
sion requires, upon the assumption that the mind is 
matter, or that it is the body, or any part of the 
body ? If the whole body was impressed with them, 
it would not suffice, much less the small space of the 
brain. The old philosophy of memory, which made 
it depend upon images stored away, to be brought 
out in the act of remembering, like the sliding pic- 
tures of a panorama, was very unphilosophical. To 
make the mind material, and then store, it with 
images or pictures of all the sights and thoughts of 
half a century, is physically and philosophically 
impossible. But suppose the mind to be spirit, 
without figure, color, extension, or divisibility, and 
that the act of remembering is simply the act of the 
mind in returning to one of its former states, and 
every absurdity vanishes. 

4. The phenomena of conscious identity proves 
that the mind is no part of the body, and that it is 
not matter. 

The man of sixty years does not believe, but 
knows that he is the same person that was the child of 
six years, the youth of sixteen, and the man of 
thirty ; and he knows that it was he, and not 
another, that performed such acts, and had such an 
experience along the way as he remembers of him- 
self. If there is not in man a mind, which is not 
matter, a soul, which is no part of the body, this 
affirmation of consciousness would be a greater false- 
hood than tongue ever told. It is not true of the 



MENTAL PHENOMENA. 



105 



matter that composes the body. The body includes 
organs for reception and discharge, and the process 
of waste and renewal is perpetually going on, so that 
the man of sixty years does not consist of the same 
matter that constituted the youth of sixteen. 

5. The phenomena of conscience proves that the 
mind is no part of the body, and that it is not mat- 
ter. 

By conscience, here, is meant that sense of self- 
approbation which we feel when we do what we 
believe to be right ; and that sense of self-condem- 
nation which we feel when we do what we believe 
to be wrong. The simple question is, upon what do 
these judgments of conscience rest ? What is it 
that feels self-approval or self-condemnation ? It 
is not the body, not any part of the body. Did any 
man's feet ever feel guilty for carrying him astray ? 
or did any man ever blame his feet for not keeping 
the right road ? Did any man ever feel guilt in his 
hands for the unlawful acts they performed ? Did 
any one ever believe his brains were guilty for his 
evil thoughts, desires, and purposes ? Did any one 
ever feel his tongue throb with guilt after uttering 
falsehood to men, or blasphemy against God ? 
Every one knows that no part of his body bears the 
guilt of wrong-doing ; guilt rests upon the inner 
man, the mind, the conscious soul. The argument 
triumphs over all caviling and all sophistry ; it is 
what every one knows of himself, it is the voice of 
the soul, saying, " it is not the body, not the hands 



106 



MENTAL PHENOMENA. 



or the feet, but I, the soul, I did it, I am the 
responsible agent, I am the guilty one." 

It has now been established that intelligence is 
not matter, and that matter is not intelligent, by 
which the .way has been prepared for another step 
in the general argument. 

II. The intelligent mind, which is not matter, is 
so connected with and adapted to matter, as to 
constitute, in conjunction ivith it, an intellectual 
machine for knowing material things. 

The material part of this machine was considered 
in the last Lecture. The frame work was briefly 
examined, and its leading parts and adaptations 
pointed out. As wonderful as the complex machine 
appeared^ it would be an inert, lifeless, useless thing, 
without the mind that lives within it. The mind 
is the engineer which runs this wonderful engine. 
How complicated does the human organism appear, 
when to the wonderful body there is added a spirit- 
mind, which is so joined to the body as to live and 
act in every part of it, and yet constitute no part of 
it. This wonderful knowing power, the mind, 
which can think the universe through and around 
in a moment, is so confined within, and attached to 
the body as to have no, communication with the 
material world without, only by using the body for 
such communication. The body is its instrument, 
by which it gains a knowledge of material things. 
It sees, hears, feels, tastes and smells through the 



MENTAL PHENOMENA. 



107 



organs of the body. All primitive ideas are derived 
through the living organs of the bod) 7 , by its con- 
tacts with the material world ; and yet having 
obtained a few ideas through this source, it can lock 
itself up in abstraction, and reason upon, them inde- 
pendently of what is going on around and outside of 
itself. 

Here we reach a fact that places the machinery 
of humanity beyond the reach of any known science, 
and beyond the ken of the mind's own knowing 
power. We know the fact, but the manner of that 
fact is hid, and no science has yet been able to 
approach the union of the material with the imma- 
terial in man, so as to explain the nature of the ties 
that bind them together. This is a mystery for 
which Atheism furnishes no solution, and which is 
solved "only by supposing that there is a God. The 
way is now prepared for taking another and final 
step in the general argument. 

III. The Intelligent Mind must have had an In- 
telligent Cause. 

1. Atheism cannot account for the existence of 
the first intelligent minds. We may allow, that in 
natural generation, matter begets matter, and mind 
begets mind ; still it will not account for - the first 
two minds. It has been demonstrated that there 
must have been a first man and a first woman, and 
so there must have been a first two minds, or souls, 
to animate the first two bodies. Whence came 



108 



MENTAL PHENOMENA. 



these first minds ? Atheism answereth not, while 
reason affirms that they must have had an intelli- 
gent cause, which did not exist if there be no God. 
Nothing short of an intelligent cause could produce 
intelligent minds. Allowing that matter existed, it 
could not have produced intelligence. Matter is 
not intelligent, has no intelligence in and of itself, 
and therefore it could not produce intelligence ; and 
could not impart intelligence, for the simple reason 
that it had none to impart. 

Were it allowed, for the sake of the argument, 
that the thirty thousand accidents necessary to the 
accidental production of the human body actually 
occurred, the mind would remain unaccounted for. 
Matter could not produce intelligence in any con- 
ceivable manner. One universal law governs ; like 
produces like ; every effect must have a 'cause, 
which, in nature, corresponds to itself, and no cause 
can produce an effect greater than itself : matter, 
therefore, could not have produced mind. To deny 
this, would break up the foundations of philosophy. 
Mind, therefore, cannot be accounted for, if there be 
no Creator. The argument might be safely left here, 
for no sophistry can subvert its foundation, so 
securely . laid in universally admitted philosophy. 
But further investigation will more fully expose the 
absurdity of every attempt to account for the exist- 
ence of intelligence upon the Atheistic theory. 

2. It was demonstrated in the preceding Lecture 
that the human body must have had an intelligent 



MENTAL PHENOMENA. 



109 



Creator. It was shown that the first human bodies 
could not have been eternal, could not have been 
produced by any law of progress in nature, and could 
not have been the result of accident. But we have 
now added to the body an intellectual ma.chine, not 
matter, but spirit ; no part of it, but joined to it, 
dwelling in it, ruling over it, acting upon it, and 
causing it to act. This mind is as much superior to 
the body as is the engineer superior to the engine 
he runs and guides. It is as much superior to the 
body as is the power to think and know superior 
to the complications of a hand organ, which plays a 
tune by having its crank turned, which a child can 
do. If, then, the body gives such undeniable proof 
of the existence of God, as was seen in the preced- 
ing Lecture, how conclusive must the proof be, 
arising from the existence of the spirit-knowing- 
machine, which resides in the body, and controls it, 
and runs it as its engine ; and uses it as a whole, 
or in its parts, as a means of securing its ends ! 

If accident or chance could not produce the body, 
much less could it produce the mind, with the 
wonderful complications of its knowing, feeling and 
willing powers. 

3. But were it possible to conceive that accident 
or chance gave existence to this wonderful machine, 
for thinking, feeling, and willing, we must add 
another stupendous accident. Two such accidents 
must have transpired near together, as it required 
two souls for the two bodies. 
5* 



110 MENTAL PHENOMENA. 

4. Yet another great accident must have occur- 
red, which is, that these souls so happened to be, as 
to be suited to the two bodies which accident pro- 
duced. If either had happened to have been a 
little different, both accidents would have happened 
in vain. 

5. Another accident must have occurred, which 
is, that the two souls took up their abode in the 
human form, and not in the head of a donkey or a 
baboon. If the whole matter was not under the 
direction of a guiding intellect, as the Theist sup- 
poses, the two accidental souls might have found a 
home elsewhere. If one had found its home in the 
head of a donkey and the other in the head of a 
baboon, there would have been no human race, as 
it is. We are, then, forced to the conclusion that 
there is a God, who created both body and mind, 
and so admirably adapted them to each other, with 
all their complications, and in this conception every 
absurdity vanishes, and reason is disburdened, and 
stands relieved. 



LECTURE X. 



AN ARGUMENT FROM THE UNIVERSAL IDEA OF GOD. 

It cannot be denied that the idea of God is uni- 
versal. It developes itself among all people, in 
every land and age, and in every rank in society. 
No one will pretend to deny that the idea of the 
existence of God prevails in all enlightened lands. 
If a very ignorant and degraded people were found 
on some remote island of the sea, far removed from 
science "and civilization, among whom we should fail 
to discover the idea of God, it would not prove that 
it did not exist in their minds. It might be the 
result of a failure so to comprehend each other's 
mode of communication, as to understand the con- 
tents of each other's minds. It is extremely diffi- 
cult, if not impossible, on slight acquaintance, to 
reach the contents of dark and degraded heathen 
minds, of whose language we are ignorant, and 
who have no knowledge of our language. Yet this 
idea of Grod is so prevalent and prominent, as every- 
where to reveal itself in some form. 

Bu^t there is another method of reaching the uni- 
versality of the idea of God. It cannot be denied 
that all nations have had their religion ; and the 
idea of God is the first and fundamental element in 



112 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 



religion. Those who worship idols, and make their 
deities, and carry them about their persons as a tal- 
isman, regard them only as representations of the 
Invisible Power that rules the destinies of men. 
The idea of God may, therefore, be regarded as 
universal. Atheism cannot account for this uni- 
versal idea of God, which must be a universal false- 
hood, if there be no God. They cannot deny it, it 
is so well known. If they were to pretend that it 
is not universal ; that some persons have been found 
who have been destitute of it, they could then only 
claim a mere exception, and the rule would stand, 
that men, generally, have an idea of God. Whence 
came this universal falsehood, as it must be, if there 
be no God ? 

It cannot be claimed that the idea is an accident, 
because it is general. To say that an idea so gen- 
eral and uniform is accidental, is to insult our com- 
mon sense. Moreover, it is clear that there can be 
no accident in the matter. Every effect must have 
a cause, and every thought that men think must 
have a cause. The philosophy of the mind reveals 
the law by which thought succeeds thought, and 
every thought has its pre-existing cause why it 
occurs as it does. Why, then, does the thought 
occur in the human mind, that there is a God, if 
there be none ? There are but six conceivable ways 
in which the idea of God can have been produced 
in the human mind, every one of which, if allowed, 
will lead to the conclusion that there is a God. 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 



313 



1. It may be supposed that the idea has come 
down from the first man, having been communica- 
ted from man to man, from father to son, through 
all past generations. This is possible, but it sup- 
poses that the first man had a knowledge of God, 
which he transmitted, and if so, there must be a 
God. If the first man did not commence his exist- 
ence with this knowledge/in order to a transmission 
of the idea of God, he must have obtained it in 
some one of the five remaining sources, from whence 
it may be derived. 

2. It may have been derived from the Scriptures. 
But this accounts for it, only upon the assumption 
that the Scriptures are a revelation from God. 
They abound with the idea of God, but if they are 
not from God, the idea of God found in them is 
only the idea of the several writers, and how they 
came by the idea is left unexplained. If the Scrip- 
tures are inspired, there is a God ; if they are not 
inspired, the writers must have got their idea of 
God in one of the four remaining ways. 

3. The idea of God may be the result of the 
mind's own spontaneity. The human mind may be 
so constituted as to originate the idea of God, 
within itself, as an original conception. It is not 
affirmed that this is the case, but only that it is 
possible that it should be so. Now, if this be the 
origin of the idea of God, he who denies the exist- 
ence of God, denies what his own internal convic- 
tions affirm, and plays false to his own nature. 



114 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 



4. If there be a God, it is possible that He should 
make a revelation of the fact of His existence in 
the mind of every rational being. Allowing that 
there is a God, who is a Spirit, He must be able to 
so act upon the human mind, as to produce a con- 
viction of His existence. But this view does not 
help Atheism, for it assumes the existence of God, 
and though it is held Try many ^Theists, it is not 
urged as opposed to Atheism, but only introduced 
as one of the conceivable methods of accounting 
for the universal idea of God. 

5. The universal idea of the existence of God, 
may be a deduction of reason from the visible uni- 
verse, as its premise. This is, certainly, a conceiv- 
able method of accounting for the existence of God, 
and whatever may be thought of it, as the probable 
origin of the idea, it has been held by many learned 
and distinguished writers. Paul, who wrote about 
eighteen hundred years ago, appears to have 
expressed this view, when he said : " The invisi- 
ble things of Him, from the creation of the world, 
are clearly seen, being manifest by the things that 
are made, even His Eternal Power and Godhead/' 

But if this origin of the idea of God be allowed, 
it must be fatal to Atheism. If reason deduces 
the idea of the existence of God from the visible 
universe, it must, in some way, contain upon its 
face visible proofs of the Divine existence ; and as 
nature cannot be supposed to bear false witness, 
there must be a God. 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 



115 



. 6. The idea of God may be suggested to the 
human inind, by his own convictions of the necessity 
of a higher and overruling Power. It is a well known 
fact that the greatest minds feel unequal to the 
emergencies of their being. Ignorance shrouds the 
mind, w 7 here knowledge appears indispensable ; 
weakness is felt where strength is required ; and 
doubt and uncertainty hangs over the future, just 
where assurance and certainty are most desirable. 
Indeed, without a God, the great problem of human 
destiny is a painful uncertainty, without any possi- 
ble rule by w T hich it can be solved. Man wakes up 
to conscious existence, and fmds himself the sub- 
ject of wants, hopes and fears ; often his hopes dis- 
appoint him ; often his fears mock him. He asks 
himself, what governs human destiny ? I do not 
govern my own destiny, for failure often attends 
my best efforts, and unforeseen events transpire 
which blast my hopes, on one hand, and mock my 
needless fears on the other. Is there a Higher 
Power, guided by intelligence, or does blind chance 
direct my way from life's cloudy dawn to its dark 
going down ; and then ! — what then remains, when 
life's dim lamp goes out in death ? 0, that there 
were a ruling Power, almighty, all-wise, just and 
good ; how a knowledge of such a ruling Power 
would relieve this burdened heart of mine ! I feel 
that it would be a blessing, if there were a God ; 
it would relieve this feeling of orphanage, of home- 
less, friendless insecurity. Eeason within me affirms 



\ 



116 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 



that a God is necessary, and does reason affirm the 
necessity of what is not and cannot be ? Is my 
inmost soul false, and does nature mock herself? 
It must be so, if there is no God, no ruling Power ; 
and yet it cannot be, reason will not allow that what 
is not and cannot be, is necessary ; there is a God. 

It is not affirmed that the idea of God is origina- 
ted in this way, it is only given as one of the pos- 
sible methods of accounting for the idea, and he 
who admits it to be the true method, must prove 
false to his own nature to deny that there is a God. 

The six only conceivable methods of accounting 
for the universal idea of God among men, have now 
been examined, and every one of them, if admitted, 
will force us to the conclusion that there is a God. 
The argument, then, is conclusive. There are but 
two grounds upon which an argument of this kind 
can be successfully assailed, neither of w r hich is 
available in this case. 

1. If it could be shown that the argument is not 
comprehensive of all the conceivable ways in which 
the idea of God might be originated, the argument 
would be overthrown, but no other method can be 
named. 

2. If it could be shown that one of these meth- 
ods might be true, without implying the existence 
of God, the argument would fall ; but this cannot 
be done. 

It is not necessary to demonstrate which is the 
true method of accounting for the universal idea of 



THE IDEA OF GOD. 



117 



God ; the force of the argument does not depend 
upon a knowledge of which of the six methods is 
the true one, but upon the fact that there is no 
other method ; that, therefore, it is and must, be 
one or all of the six. It may be that they are all 
true methods, that each, by itself, is sufficient, and 
would give the idea of God, provided it had not 
been previously given in one of the other methods. 
If so, the argument is sound. On the other hand, 
if but one of them, no matter which, is a sufficient 
and the true method of accounting for the idea of 
God, the argument is sound, since either of them, 
if admitted, will force us to the conclusion that 
there is a God. The argument, then, may be 
summed up thus : 

1. There are but six possible ways in which we 
can account for the universal idea of the existence 
of God. 

2. If* the idea of God be derived in either of 
these six ways, then it follows that there is and 
must be a God. 

3. Therefore, the universal idea of God, which 
cannot be denied when traced to its origin, furnishes 
absolute proof that there is a God, and Atheism is 
overthrown, and Theism is established. 

Here we rest the argument for the existence of 
God, and will proceed in a few subsequent Lectures, 
to demonstrate His character, and bring what light 
we can to shine on the path of human duty. 



LECTURE XI. 



THE ATTRIBUTES AND CHARACTER OF GOD. 

Having concluded the argument in support of the 
Theistic faith, and, as is believed, established the 
fact that there is a God, it is proper to inquire into 
his attributes and character. 

It is not pretended that we can fully know and 
comprehend the attributes and character of God. 
That which fully knows and comprehends must be 
equal to, if not greater than that which is known 
and comprehended. One inquired, more than three 
thousand years ago, " Canst thou, by searching, find 
out God ? Canst thou find out the Almighty to 
perfection ?" 

But while we may not presume to " find out God 
to perfection/' something may be known of God, 
and it is our duty and privilege to know that some- 
thing. It is now too late to insist that nothing can 
be known of God, for two very good reasons. 

1. It has been demonstrated that there is a God, 
and hence one thing is already known of God. It 
is known that God is. 

2. In demonstrating the existence of God, other 
facts and traits have been necessarily brought to 
light. It were not possible to demonstrate that 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



119 



God is, as has been done, without demonstrating 
certain other facts in regard to the attributes and 
character of God. The proof which has established 
the fact that God is, has, to a limited extent, 
revealed to us what he is. But it is necessary to 
make a more distinct and classified exhibit of the 
attributes and character of God, as they stand 
revealed to the human mind, in the light of nature. 

The attributes of God are properly divided into two 
classes, which it is somewhat difficult to distinguish 
from each other, for want of proper terms. They may, 
however, be distinguished by using a little circum- 
locution. They are, first, such as do not, necessa- 
rily, involve moral character, or moral right and 
wrong ; and, secondly, such as do pertain to moral 
character, or moral right and wrong. The first 
named class will be made the first subject of investi- 
gation. 

I. God is Eternal, that is, He always existed, 
and always will exist. 

1. It was proved in the second Lecture, that 
something is and must be eternal ; and having since 
proved that there is a God, the Creator of all things, 
it follows that He is the Eternal One. This posi- 
tion is already made sure, and we have the truth 
that God is eternal, as a starting point, and it gives 
us a ground on which we can stand, and from which 
we can build out new arguments, relatively to other 
attributes and perfections of His nature. 



120 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



2. Eternity, as an attribute of God, has been 
defined as that element of self-existence which ren- 
ders the being of God, necessarily, without begin- 
ning, and without end. God is, and always w r as, 
and always will be. This attribute distinguishes^ 
God from everything else, so that there need be no 
confusion, and no blending of elements with the 
Divine, in the discussion of the subject upon which 
we now enter. God being eternal, nothing else is 
or can be eternal ; this attribute is His, and His 
alone, and it is incommunicable. God may render 
other things perpetual in existence, but he can 
produce nothing of which it can be said it had no 
beginning. 

3. The eternity of God having been fully settled, 
it is proper to remark, that this truth does not and 
cannot exist alone. An eternal, self-existing being 
must necessarily possess other attributes correspond- 
ing to this essential element of His nature, and 
from it we will proceed to demonstrate other attri- 
butes of the Divine nature. All that can be proved 
to be a necessary consequence of the eternity of His * 
nature must now be admitted, as His eternity can- 
not be denied. 

II. God is Omnipotent, or All-powerful. 

1. The omnipotence of God becomes a necessary 
truth in the light of His eternity. He who is eter- t 
nal, and consequently existed before all things, and 
created all that exists beside himself, is necessarily 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



121 



the source of all power. There is not a power that 
acts, not an energy that stirs in all the universe, of 
which God is not the author. Now, as God has 
produced all the powers that fill and stir the uni- 
verse, animate and inanimate, He must possess all 
power in himself. This power is unlimited. It 
will not be pretended, that in producing the uni- 
verse, God has diminished his own power, that it is 
now less than it was before He formed the worlds, 
and hung them upon nothing. That power, then, 
which is conditioned upon nothing but itself, it 
being eternal, and which can produce such a uni- 
verse as this without diminishing its own efficiency, 
must be omnipotent, or an unlimited power. 

2. The works of God furnish a clear and practical 
illustration of His power. The worlds, and systems 
of worlds, which His hand has scattered through 
space, testify of the power of Him who hung them 
there, and who imparted to them their motions, and 
continues to roll them round. 

It has been objected to this view, that as all the 
works of God are admitted to be finite, they cannot 
prove the existence of an infinite power. This may 
appear plausible at first view, but it is not con- 
clusive. 

(1.) It has been demonstrated that, in creating 
the worlds, He produced the matter of which they 
are composed. This must settle the question, for 
it must require infinite power to create from nothing, 
one world, or any part of a world. If it be admit- 



122 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



ted that creation, as a mere formation, is not con- 
clusive of the existence of infinite power, still, when 
it is made to comprehend the production of matter 
where there was nothing, the argument is absolutely 
conclusive. 

(2.) It may not require a visible display of infi- 
nite power to produce a conviction in the human 
mind that such a power exists. Suppose I am pre- 
sented with a hundred magnets, of which I have no 
knowledge. By accident I discover that one of 
them attracts iron. The question arises in my mind, 
whether the power of attraction is peculiar to this 
one, or whether they all have the same power. This 
I undertake to test by experiment. I try them one 
by one, and find that each one, on trial, exhibits the 
same power. Before I have tried fifty of them I 
am convinced beyond a doubt that the whole hun- 
dred have the power of attracting iron. I have no 
more doubt of it than I should have after testing 
every one of them. Such is the law of the human 
mind. On the same principle, a view of the works 
of God, without reaching infinity, may convince the 
mind that the power that produced them is infinite. 
It may be in accordance with the nature of reason, 
to affirm, intuitively, on sight of such vast works as 
the universe displays, that the power that produced 
them is infinite. 

(3.) It may, after all, be a necessary principle of 
philosophy, that produces a conviction in the human 
mind, that the visible creation, though finite, was 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



123 



produced and is upheld by an infinite power. All 
finite power exhausts itself by its own action. Every 
finite force is diminished just in proportion to the 
momentum it imparts to other bodies ; yet it has 
been seen that nature has lost none of its energy 
during all of the thousands of years it has operated ; 
from which reason may infer that the power that 
rolls the world round is infinite. 

The argument for the omnipotence of God may 
be rested here, and it cannot fail to be regarded as 
conclusive. 

III. God is Omniscient , or All-wise. 

1. The perfect wisdom of God, like His omnipo- 
tence, becomes a necessary truth, in the light of 
His eternity. As God is eternal, and existed before 
any other being existed, all wisdom existed in Him, 
and must be of Him. As God is the Creator of all 
things, visible and invisible, He is the author of all 
intelligence, and has kindled every light that glows 
throughout the realm of space, widely dotted with 
thinking and knowing minds. As God is eternal, 
His knowledge is conditioned alone upon. His own 
eternal knowing nature, while all other knowledge 
is conditioned upon Him, hence He is the source of 
all knowledge, and must be all-wise. As He has 
made everything, including all active powers, there 
can be no object of knowledge which he did not 
make, or which does not result from what He did 
make ; there can, therefore, be no object of know- 



124 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



ledge which He does not know ; and He who knows 
all there is to be known, must be all-wise. 

2. The works of God give a practical illustration 
of His wisdom. When we consider what has been 
brought to light in preceding arguments, that the 
production of the first two human beings involved 
from twenty to thirty thousand adaptations, and 
then add the necessary adaptations of every separate 
item of creation throughout the vegetable and ani- 
mal kingdoms, from the violet to the oak, and from 
the gnat to the elephant, and from the minow to 
the whale ; and then ascend to the heavens, and 
contemplate worlds adapted to and balanced against 
worlds, with all the internal adaptations of each, 
and reason will not and cannot conceive that the 
whole has been planned, arranged, comprehended, 
and executed by a finite intelligence. In view of 
the state of things described, reason affirms the 
existence of an all-wise mind. 

IV. God is Omnipresent, or exists everywhere. 

When it is affirmed that God exists everywhere, 
it is not meant that He reveals himself alike every- 
where, at all times. Nor is it meant that there 
is not a particular place somewhere in space, which 
may be ' called the seat of His empire, and where 
He dwells in a sense in which He does not dwell 
everywhere. Yet it is affirmed that God is ubiqui- 
tous, that He is in all places at the same time. 
This has now become a necessary truth, in view of 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



125 



what has been established, and all that is required 
is to show that it follows as a consequence of the 
facts that have been demonstrated. 

1. As God is eternal, He existed before all things, 
when nothing but himself did exist ; and when 
nothing but God existed, there was nothing to 
limit or bound Him outside of himself ; He was 
then the whole of being, and in the fullness of His 
own existence, He filled all in all. 

2. As God created all things, He must be where 
all things are ; as He could not create where He 
was not, so nothing can exist where God is not. 
As God is the creator of all things, the existence 
of everything is conditioned upon Him, and of course 
can exist only where He is. The conclusion is, God 
is everywhere, where there is anything. If, then, 
God pervades all worlds, and every part of all 
worlds, it cannot be denied that he pervades the 
space between them, and that surrounds them. 
God cannot exist in two places at the same time 
and not exist in and pervade all the space between 
them. If, then, God exists everywhere, where any- 
thing exists, and pervades and surrounds all that 
exists, He must be omnipresent, for beyond all that 
exists there is nothing to limit His presence. 

3. God has been proved to be omnipotent, and 
from this His omnipresence becomes a necessary 
consequence. No being can act where he is not, 
and no being, less than omnipresent, can be in two 
places at the same time ; but as God is omnipotent, 

6 



126 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



he must be capable of exerting power everywhere 
at the same time, and therefore He must be omni- 
present, for He can exert power only where He is. 

4. It has been proved that God is all-wise, and 
from this it follows that He must be omnipresent. 
Eeason cannot conceive of perfect personal know- 
ledge beyond the sphere of .existence filled by the 
knowing subject. But it has been proved that God 
knows all there is to be known, and, therefore, he 
must exist everywhere where there is anything to be 
known, and must be omnipresent. 

V. God is zmmtdable, unchangeable. 

When it is affirmed that God is immutable, the 
sense is not that there is no variety in His acts or 
works, nor yet that there is no variety in the gov- 
ernment which He administers over intelligent 
beings. The particular awards of His administra- 
tion may be conditioned upon the conduct of the 
subjects of His government, and that being various, 
there may be variety in His administration, and 
still He be unchangeable. 

By the immutability of God, is meant that He 
is unchangeable in His nature and in the princi- 
ples that govern His actions. As He acts towards 
one man, at any time, so will he act towards all men, 
at all times, in view of the same state of facts. No 
one can deny that the simple element of goodness 
or justice, would reveal a variety, when applied by an 
immutable mind, to different states of facts. God 



ATTRIBUTES. OF GOD. 



127 



would have to change, to administer without variety, 
in view of all unlike combinations of facts. Amid 
all apparent variety, God remains unchanged and 
unchangeable. 

1. The immutability of God is a necessary truth, 
in view of His eternity. As God is eternal, and 
self-existent, he can have no cause of existence, only 
what is in himself, and eternal, like himself, and 
hence there can be no cause of change in Him. If 
there were, or could be any cause of change in God, 
it must be an eternal cause, and to talk of an eter- 
nal cause of change is a solecism, an absurdity. 
God, then, must be unchangeable in His own eter- 
nal nature. As God is eternal, existed before all 
things, and created all things, there is no power or 
force outside of himself by which He can be affected 
and changed. He must, therefore, be and remain 
eternally unchangeable. 

2. The immutability of God is illustrated by the 
uniformity of the operations of nature. The visible 
universe appears to be under uniform and unchang- 
ing laws. All the operations of nature are now 
carried on upon the same principle they ever have 
been, so far as our knowledge extends. While per- 
petual changes are transpiring, they appear to be 
effected by unchanging laws. Uniform laws appear 
to produce all the changes which give useful and 
pleasing varieties, causing nature to wear the aspect 
of stability. If nature only revealed as much 
caprice and eccentricity as man does, in his limited 



128 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



circle of action, it might be inferred that God rules 
by a fluctuating impulse, and with an unsteady 
hand, but such is not the case. If earth received 
one kind of seed and responded by giving another ; 
if trees produced apples one year, cherries the sec- 
ond, and acorns the third ; if the seasons sometimes 
failed to find their places ; if, now and then, winter 
took the place of summer, and summer took the 
place of winter ; if the moon occasionally held on to 
its full-orbed light, for a few weeks, without waning ; 
if the earth should occasionally change its motion, and 
roll the other way for a few months, causing the sun 
to rise in the west and go down in the east, it might 
leave the impression upon rational minds that God, 
like men, is changeable. But nature gives no such 
hint, but, on the contrary, she is uniform in all her 
operations, and works out and develops all her 
changes in accordance with fixed, unchanging laws, 
suggesting to the rational mind, that God, who 
formed and governs nature, is an unchangeable 
being, and with this accords the word by one of the 
Seers, " I am the Lord, I change not." 

What some have called the natural attributes of 
God, in contradistinction from what they have called 
his moral attributes, have now been considered. 
They have been found to be five in number, and are 
such as constitute God what he must be, to meet 
the necessities of humanity, and secure the endorse- 
ment of enlightened reason. More than this, you 
cannot conceive God to be, in this direction. You 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 129 * 

cannot conceive another attribute of the class, the 
addition of which would improve his character, or 
make Him more efficient, or worthy -of trust. On 
the other hand, not one of these attributes can be 
ignored without destroying the very idea of God, 
and rendering Him, if He is not annihilated, insuf- 
ficient to meet the undeniable wants of humanity. 
Such has God been proved to be, in the light of 
reason, and by the force of necessary truths. It 
is now only necessary to remark, such also is the 
God of the Bible. 



LECTURE XII. 



THE MORAL CHARACTER OF GOD. 

Having established the Theistic view of what 
some writers have called the Natural Attributes of 
God, attention must now be directed to what they 
have called his Moral Attributes. Moral is that of 
which right or wrong may be affirmed, and hence, 
the moral character of God is in issue in the present 
Lecture. 

As a starting point, it is affirmed that God is a 
morally perfect being, just what he ought to be, and 
what he must be to be God, and to fill the ideal of 
human reason, as God. Perfection, as here em- 
ployed, is comprehensive of all conceivable moral 
goodness, and exclusive of all moral evil. It may 
be -affirmed, then, that God possesses the attribute 
of perfect moral goodness. 

I. God is Perfect in Goodness. 

This attribute is considered first, because it is 
generic, and comprehensive of several more specific 
attributes or moral qualities, which must be after- 
wards considered. Such will stand revealed as 
necessary truths, when it shall have been proved, 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



131 



beyond a doubt, that God is perfect in goodness. 
This great truth, that God is perfect in goodness, 
is proved by two arguments. 

I. It is a necessary truth, in the light of the at- 
tributes of God, which have been already established 
in the preceding Lecture. 

Such are his Eternity, Omnipotence, Omniscience, 
Omnipresence, and Immutability. Such a being 
must be perfect in goodness. 

The argument, which is necessarily a little com- 
plicated in detail, may be stated, in substance, in 
few words, and in simple form, thus : God must 
be perfect, or imperfect, or neither ; but he cannot 
be imperfect, and cannot be neither ; and, there- 
fore, he must be perfect. 

1. God cannot be perfect and imperfect at the 
same time. The words, perfect and imperfect, are 
exclusive of each other, so that both cannot be true 
of the same being or thing. That which is perfect 
is not imperfect, and that which is imperfect is not 
perfect. God is not therefore perfect and imperfect, 
but must be one or the other, perfect or imperfect, 
and cannot be both. 

2. God cannot be neither perfect nor imperfect, 
but must be one or the other. As he is the intelli- 
gent cause of all things, the Creator of all finite, 
intelligent beings, who possess moral natures, and 
have conceptions of right and wrong, and whose con- 
duct is right or wrong, God himself must be right 
or wrong, good or evil. The contrary is impossible. 



132 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



unthinkable. God, then, is perfect or imperfect ; 
he cannot be both, and cannot be neither. 

3. If God is imperfect, it must be in one of two 
ways : either by being a compound of good and 
evil, or by being unmingled evil. God must be 
perfectly good, unmingled good, or he must be un- 
mingled evil, or he must be a mixture of good and 
evil. 

4. God is not exclusively evil, is not wholly ma- 
levolent. This has never been believed by any ra- 
tional being, civilized or savage. There is too much 
goodness displayed to admit of such a belief. Much 
goodness is visible, is an object of knowledge, and a 
substance in experience on the part of all who enjoy 
life. All who admit that God is, and that he is 
the author of anything, admit that he is the author 
of some good, and df course he is not exclusively 
evil ; is not wholly malevolent. That this world 
was created by, and is under the control of a being 
whose nature and disposition is unmingled malevo- 
lence, cannot be believed. 

5. God cannot be a compound of good and evil, 
part good and part evil. This is the only point in 
the argument that can be contested, and here no 
sufficient defence can be made against it. Keeping 
in mind what God has already been proved to be, 
the argument must be conclusive. 

(1.) Moral good and evil are opposed to each 
other, and can never combine their power to pro- 
duce the same act or result, so that it shall be the 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



133 



result of the power of both conjointly. Good can 
produce nothing but good, and evil can produce 
nothing but evil. On this state of things let it be 
remarked : 

(2.) An Almighty Being cannot be, in any degree, 
under the influence of two such conflicting forces ; 
the one or the other must reign exclusively and 
supremely, or God cannot be Almighty. Two 
opposing forces cannot be Omnipotent, separately 
considered, or as a conflicting whole. 

(3.) An Infinite Being cannot consist of two such 
opposing elements as moral good and evil, because 
it would render Him less, than Infinite. If God be 
part good and part evil, the good and the evil must 
both be limited and finite, and as two finites cannot 
constitute one Infinite, both together must be finite, 
and God cannot be Infinite. 

6. If there be evil in the Divine nature, it must 
be there as an eternal, essential, and necessary ele- 
ment, or it must be there by God's own voluntary 
choice and act, neither of which can be true. 

(1.) Evil cannot exist in the Divine nature as an 
eternal, essential, and necessary element, for the rea- 
son just assigned. It would divide the Divine nature 
into two opposite elements, and render God finite. 

It cannot be, for the additional reason that imper- 
fection implies ignorance, weakness, want, or defi- 
ciency. But as God is All-wise, Almighty and 
Infinite, He can be neither ignorant, weak, wanting 
or deficient ; and, therefore, God cannot be imperfect. 
6* 



134 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



(2.) Evil cannot exist in the Divine nature by 
the voluntary choice and act of God. As evil is not 
an eternal, essential, and necessary element of the 
Divine nature, its introduction, at any time, would 
imply an elemental change, which is impossible, 
because it has been proved that God is immutable. 
Evil, therefore, cannot have been imbibed by God's 
own volition and act. 

It is, then, clear that evil does not exist in the 
Divine nature, as an essential and necessary element, 
and that it does not exist by the choice and act of 
the Divine mind ; and, therefore, it does not and 
cannot exist, at all, upon any possible hypothesis. 

7. If it were supposable that good and evil might 
both exist in the Divine nature, it would still be 
manifest that they could not both so act as to pro- 
duce practical results. It has been shown that they 
are opposed to each other, and cannot coalesce ; 
that good tends only to good, and that evil tends 
only to evil. To this add what also has been proved, 
that God is Eternal, Almighty and Immutable, and 
it must follow that these conflicting forces cannot 
receive impulse or strength from any source outside 
of the Eternal mind itself, from which one of three 
things must appear certain. 

(1.) The good would overcome the evil and 
entirely suppress it, so that good only would pro- 
ceed from God ; or, 

(2.) The evil would overcome the good, so that 
evil only would proceed from God ; or, 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 135 



(3.) They would counteract and counterbalance 
each other and prevent all moral action, so that 
neither good or evil would proceed from God. In 
neither case can it be maintained that God is both 
good and evil. 

The principle of the preceding arguments cannot 
be applied to man ; he being finite, ignorant and 
weak, is liable to be affected by different and con- 
flicting influences, and hence, he may develop good- 
ness under this influence, and in this direction, and 
evil under that influence, and in that direction. 
With God, who is eternal, infinite and immutable, 
it cannot be so, for there is no cause for what He is, 
and what He does, outside of His own essential 
nature. 

Here this argument reaches it close, and it may 
be summed up in few words. The points which 
have been established are as follows : 

1. God must be perfect or imperfect, or neither 
perfect or imperfect, because He cannot be both 
perfect and imperfect. These points have been 
made certain beyond a doubt. 

2. God cannot be imperfect, as He cannot be 
wholly evil, and cannot be a mixture of good and 
evil ; cannot be evil, necessarily,' and cannot be evil, 
voluntarily ; and, therefore, He cannot be evil at 
all, in any way. 

3. As God must be good, or evil, or neither, and 
cannot be evil, or neither, he must be good, entirely 
and supremely good. 



136 ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



II. The Goodness of God is Proved by His Works. 

After the protracted argument, in which the 
supreme goodness of God has been demonstrated as 
a necessary truth, it cannot be necessary to make a 
labored effort in the present argument. It will, how- 
ever, be a relief to turn the mind from its close 
application to metaphysical reasoning, to contem- 
plate a visible exhibition of the goodness of God, 
everywhere glowing upon the face of nature. 

It may be affirmed that, throughout the whole 
realm of nature, convenience, usefulness and beauty, 
were consulted by the Divine Architect. In the 
combination of these three elements in the visible 
Universe, happiness was the end aimed at, and 
mainly the happiness of man, the most noble crea- 
ture and crowning glory of this mundane sphere. 
Any number of particulars might be adduced in 
evidence of the goodness of the Creator, but how 
can it be necessary, since every eye can see, and 
every ear can hear, and every hand can pluck, and 
every nerve can sense, and every heart can feel, in 
the midst of the universal surroundings of God- 
given and heaven-distilled goodness ? Blind indeed 
must be the eyes, deaf the ears, torpid the nerves, 
and cold the hearts, that are not moved, and even 
transported, by the goodness that nature everywhere 
displays, and that do not, in thought, trace these 
flowing streams of blessings up to their great source, 
the Creator. Of such it may be said : 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



137 



" Fools never raise their thoughts so high ; 
Like brufes they live, like brutes they die." 

A few particulars may be properly named as spec- 
imens, which, though it appear to lessen the view 
by turning the mind from the comprehensive whole 
to a very limited part, may serve to direct the 
unpracticed into the right channel of thought. 

1. The human body furnishes a good illustration 
of the benevolence of the Creator, since every part 
of it has its use, and promotes the usefulness of the 
whole, and is so contrived as to yield the greatest 
amount of happiness to the rational mind that dwells 
within. The five senses, so called, are not only 
exceedingly useful, but are all sources of enjoyment. 
If it be urged that they are also instruments of 
torture, the reply is sufficient. 

(1.) The liability to suffering, so far as appears, 
could not have been prevented . without rendering 
the system incapable of the enjoyment which is now 
drunk in through these senses. Who would prefer 
being blind, lest he should see something unsightly ? 
Who would be deaf, lest he should hear what would 
grieve him ? Who would be without feeling, lest 
he should sense pain ? Who would be without i 
taste, lest something bitter or acrid should get upon 
his tongue ? Who would desire to have no olfac- 
tory organ, lest it should remind him of the pres- 
ence of some offensive odor ? 

(2.) While pleasure is the natural result of the 



138 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



organs above named, pain is only the result of their 
misapplication, perversion, distortion, or disease. 

2. The human mind, no less than the body, is 
formed with reference to its own usefulness and hap- 
piness. Mental phenomena is divided into three 
general classes, as given by intelligence, sensibility 
and will. 

(1.) The wonderful intellectual powers of man 
introduce him into the boundless fields of truth as 
his pleasure grounds. 

(2.) But for man's sensibility, that is, capability 
of mental feeling, he would be incapable of intellec- 
tual pleasure. Now his soul vibrates with pleasure 
at the sight of every object, beautiful, sublime or 
grand ; on the hearing of every euphonious sound, 
especially where there is melody and harmony, — and 
the world is full of music, — and so may every other 
organ of sense be made to fill the mind with pleas- 
ure. The soul may lock itself up in abstraction, 
and then stir itself with pleasurable emotions with 
its own thoughts. Memory delights the soul with 
pleasing recollections of all the good that has been 
enjoyed and is gone ; hope stretches forward and 
gathers joys from the future, and blesses the pres- 
ent hour with anticipations of all the good that is to 
come. Thus, by means of memory and hope, the 
past and future are made to pour their contents of 
pleasure into the cup of present enjoyment. 

(3.) The will is the helm of the soul, by which it 
directs its own powers in accordance with the die- 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



139 



tates of its own intelligence, and by this means com- 
mands the sources of its own happiness. But for 
the will, the mind would have no self-control, and 
could not direct itself to, or hold itself to drink 
from the various fountains of enjoyment ; and might 
wander, hungry and athirst, without once blunder- 
ing upon a fountain of pleasure, or crossing one oasis 
in its own unguided, uncontrolled, and desolate 
rounds of being. 

If it be said that these same mental powers ren- 
der us capable of misery, it is a sufficient reply to 
remark : 

First. There could be no happiness without 
them. 

Secondly. There need be no misery with them ; 
misery is not a necessary result, but comes in conse- 
quence of an abuse or perversion of these powers. 

Thirdly. Those who raise the objection that 
these mental powers are sources of evil rather than 
a blessing, would not be willing to part with them 
in their own case, were it possible. Who would be 
willing to have his own intelligence extinguished, to 
prevent or to erase his knowledge of evil ? Who 
would be willing to have his sensibility removed 
from his soul and be rendered incapable of mental 
feeling, lest he should feel mental anguish ? Who 
would desire to have no will, to prevent his own will- 
fulness or obstinacy of disposition ? Who would 
be willing to have no power to will that which is 



140 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOT). 



right and good, lest he should will that which is 
wrong or hurtful ? 

This argument might be enlarged to any extent, 
by showing that in a thousand particulars the mate- 
rial world is adapted to man's mental powers for the 
production of happiness, but the argument has been 
pushed far enough to answer all practical purposes, 
and the conclusion is, that God is perfect in goodness. 

The only Objection Ansivered. 

The only objection which ever has or ever will be 
urged against the entire view which has been given 
of the goodness of God, is founded upon the fact 
that evil, both physical and moral, does exist, and 
that good and evil mingle in human experience. 
Here the heathen have sometimes blundered ; seeing 
good and evil in the world, they concluded that 
there w&s a good and evil principle in the Deity, 
and that the good principle produced all the good, 
and that the evil principle produced all the evil. 
This has already been proved impossible. But in 
further reply to the objection, let it be remarked : 

1. Much of the evil complained of, undeniably 
results from man's own wrong actions, which are 
voluntary on his part, and which he might avoid, 
or from which he might refrain. This all men prac- 
tically admit, by applauding or censuring their fel- 
low-beings, as they judge their actions to be right 
or wrong. If all men would do right, do as well as 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



141 



they might do, a thousand streams of evil would 
be dried up. 

2. If all the evils which result from the wrong 
actions of men were removed, nothing would remain 
which could be proved to be inconsistent with 
supreme and universal goodness. In such case 
there would be no moral evil, no crime, and no 
guilt ; and how much of physical evil would exist 
in the shape of suffering attendant on the dissolution 
of our physical organism in death, it may not be 
possible to determine ; yet it cannot be denied, that 
if there were no violations of physical laws, physical 
suffering would be much less than it is, and death 
itself, occurring in old age, might be with such a 
gradual wearing out of the physical organism as to 
be attended by no dissolving pangs. 

3. As it now is, it cannot be denied that the evils 
which men suffer, tend to restrain them from vice- 
If there were no suffering connected with this life, 
and especially none connected with vice, it is impos- 
sible to calculate how wicked our race would become. 
The fact of life's ills, and of its certain and speedy 
termination in death, may serve greatly to lessen our 
attachment to this world, and thereby restrain our 
evil propensities, and check our worldly ambition, 
which too oft en, as it is, has desolated whole lands, 
and caused nations to groan. 

4. Death itself, which worldly minded men regard 
as the greatest of all human ills, may be, for all 
we do or can know from the light of nature, the 



142 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



greatest good that can overtake humanity. There 
are pervading all minds, thoughts of a future state, 
arid if there be a future life, death itself, with its 
dark and dreaded surroundings, must be the passage 
through which we enter upon that life ; and if it 
were divested of all the fears and terrors with which 
conscious guilt has armed the dying hour, death 
might not be regarded as a positive evil. But as it 
is, death may be a very useful admonition to the 
living, and a blessing to such of the dead as live in 
accordance with the dictates of £heir own intellectual 
and moral natures. These views are not given as 
Christian Theology, but only as Natural Theology, 
the deductions of reason from what is seen and known 
of God through His works, and the conclusion is, 
that God is good, without mixture of evil, and that 
what real evil there is in man's experience is the 
result of his own erratic course, in wandering from 
the way of right, and the path of duty. 

Having now established the fact of the Divine 
goodness, a ground has been secured in which other 
attributes can be seen as necessary truths. 

II. God is just. 

We cannot conceive that God is otherwise than 
just, since it has been proved that He is perfectly 
good. No unjust being can be perfectly good, as 
goodness is comprehensive of justice, and hence, as 
God is perfectly good, he must be just. 

1. Justice is that virtue which gives to everyone 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



143 



just what is due. To withhold what is due, what 
may be claimed as a right, would be unjust, but to 
bestow more than can be claimed of right, is not 
necessarily unjust. We see a man withhold from 
his fellow man what is his, and we say he is unjust ; 
and we see another man bestow upon his less fortu- 
nate fellow man, not only what is his right, but 
even what he could not claim as his right, and we 
say he is more than just, he is generous, he is 
benevolent, and we approve of his conduct. We 
do not think of accusing him of injustice, because 
he bestows more than strict justice could claim. 
The reason is, what he gives more than justice 
requires, is his own, and he has a right to dispose 
of it in the way he does. The same is true of God's 
administration. 

2. J ustice requires such retribution for evil deeds, 
and such only, as is for the benefit of the whole. 
Keason cannot approve of purely vindictive punish- 
ment, nor can it be made to appear from what we 
can see and know of the Divine administration, that 
God ever inflicts such punishment. Justice could 
not allow a whole social compact to suffer damage, 
including the innocent, for the purpose of securing 
the evil doer from the painful consequences of his 
own wrong acts. Justice demands that the wicked 
suffer so much for their sins as the general good 
requires. It appears to be upon this principle that 
God has established the laws of nature, which gov- 
ern both matter and mind. 



144 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



It is better for the idle to suffer hunger, than 
that they should reap a harvest without sowing ; 
better for the whole. 

It is better for the whole community, that the 
glutton, the drunkard, and the debauchee should be 
afflicted with disease, than that men should be able 
to practice these vices with impunity. The same 
must be true of God's punitive administration ; 
God's goodness and justice must unite to inflict such 
punishment on evil doers as the good of all demands. 
So much, reason affirms, and so much, justice must 
require, and will administer, either in this world or 
in the next, or in both. 

III. God is truthful. 

A statement, to be true, must be in conformity 
to what has been, what is, or what will be, as it 
may refer to the past, the present, or the future. 
Truthfulness may be predicated of actions as well 
as of words. Truth and falsehood may be acted as 
well as spoken. 

As God has been proved to be perfect in moral 
goodness, He must be truthful, as not to be truth- 
ful would render Him imperfect. No argument 
can be necessary to establish this point. It is 
morally impossible that God should possess entire 
moral goodness and not be truthful. The truthful- 
ness of God may be regarded in two points of light. 

1. If God. has made, or ever shall make a revelation 
to men, it must be true. The Bible professes to be 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



145 



a revelation of the will of God to man, but it is not 
the work of Natural Theology to decide whether it 
does contain such a revelation or not ; it can only 
affirm that if it be a revelation from God, it must 
be true. 

2. The truthfulness of God must be revealed in 
the complete harmony of His works, so far as we 
can comprehend them. There can be no contradic- 
tion between one truth and another truth, hence, 
what are called the laws of nature must be a per- 
fectly harmonious code in themselves, and would so 
appear, if we perfectly understood them. This gives 
to science absolute validity. Beason never asks the 
question, is science 1^ue ? It knows that it is true. It 
only asks the question, what is science ? or is this 
science ? or does science teach this or that ? Men 
often misapprehend the laws of nature, or mistake 
the teachings of nature, and when they do, they falsify 
science, or understand as science what is not science. 
All real science is the voice of God speaking through 
His works, and must be true, for God could no 
more act a falsehood than he could speak one. Two 
things are, then, certain ; first, all science is true ; 
and secondly, no two sciences can contradict each 
other. Where reason can detect a contradiction, it 
knows there is falsehood ; and when the laws of 
nature, or two sciences appear to contradict each 
other, there is and must be a misapprehension of 
the teachings of nature. This view of the truthful- 
ness of God is undeniable, in the light of reason, 



146 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



and here we leave this attribute, without further 
remarks. 

IV. God is forbearing, or long -suffering. 

By this is meant, that God does not punish 
offenders so soon as they offend, and to the extent 
their offence deserves. It is not affirmed that God 
does not finally punish the guilty according to their 
demerit, but only that He forbears, at least for a time. 
This fact is a matter of experience, or it is deduci- 
ble from what is seen and known by observation. 

1. Men do wrong, and deserve punishment. This 
statement rests up(jn the universal conviction of 
mankind. The idea of right ai^L wrong is a uni- 
versal idea. It is not confined to Christians, or 
civilized communities, but is common to all classes, 
even the wildest of savages, and the darkest of 
heathen, have their ideas of right and wrong. Men 
differ widely as to what is right and what is wrong, 
but they all agree that some things are right, and 
that some things are wrong ; that some actions of 
men are right, and others wrong. Some few may 
be found, who, to sustain a theory, will deny that 
men are responsible for their actions, or that they 
render themselves guilty and ill-deserving, by what 
is called wrong in human conduct ; but such, if 
any there are, are a small fractional exception of 
mankind, and affirm what is so at variance with 
their own and everybody else's convictions, that 
their affirmations weigh nothing, as an argument. 



ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



147 



Moreover, let any one trespass upon what they call 
their rights, and they will be as loud as any in their 
complaints of wrong, and will insist as strongly 
upon the guilt of the offender. The universal con- 
science of mankind declares that there is guilt and 
ill-desert, where there is intelligent and voluntary 
wrong-doing. 

2. Justice does not at once overtake the wrong- 
doer ; at least, in many cases it does not, and often 
it delays long, as men reckon time. In all such 
cases, God bears with them, or forbears to punish 
them, and he must be forbearing or long-suffering. 
So far, known facts talk, but beyond this, unaided 
reason sheds but little light. The doctrine of par- 
don is not taught in nature, and hence is unknown 
in Natural Theology. The fact of forbearance does 
not prove or ensure a pardon, because there may 
be a reason for delay, in the divine perfect knowledge, 
and reason cannot know that judgment will not be 
meted out in the future. If it could even be known 
that no punishment is awarded evil-doers in this 
life, it would not prove that God overlooks or par- 
dons sin, since He may punish it in a future state, 
for all that reason can know, without a revelation 
of the mind of God on the subject. 

All, then, that can be known from the state of 
facts before us is, that God is forbearing, and here 
let the subject rest ; and here the argument on the 
subject of the moral attributes of God is closed. 



LECTURE XIII. 



god's moral government. 

What remains to finish our Science of Natural 
Theology, is to point out the obligations and duties 
of men, as they stand revealed to the human under- 
standing and conscience, in the light of all that has 
preceded. 

Before attempting to exhibit specific duties, cer- 
tain preliminary principles must be considered, by 
which a ground will be revealed, in which these du- 
ties can be seen, and their claim be more forcibly 
felt. 

I. God is, and can but be, a Moral Ruler, 

A moral government is a government maintained 
over mind, as mind, and not over matter, or over 
mind as matter. Physical and moral government 
are so distinct from each other as not to be con- 
founded. The distinction is recognized by all ration- 
al' minds. A physical government is the govern- 
ment of force over matter, in which the governed 
object has no part, no choice, no responsibility, no 
merit, no blame. No man ever thought a rock 
praiseworthy for rolling down hill, or censurable for 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 



149 



bruising his limbs, if he stood in the way of its 
descent. 

A moral government is a government over mind, 
which possesses intelligence, moral sensibility, and 
will, rendering the governed free in, and responsible 
for, his actions. Such a government is a govern- 
ment by motives, which act, not as gravitation in 
the rock, but which, while it moves the mind to act 
in a given way, leaves it free to act in that way or 
in some other direction. This fact will be more 
fully noticed under a subsequent division. 

That God is a moral governor is a necessary truth, 
in the light of what He has been proved to be. 

1. God is intelligent, is all-wise, and hence com- 
prehends all causes and all effects, from beginning 
to end, and must know all the consequences of both 
virtue and vice, to individual actors, and to the 
whole moral system. 

2. God has been proved to be perfectly good, and 
perfectly just. These attributes have been so clearly 
and irrefragably established, that nothing need be 
added on the subject, more than to apply the facts 
to the case in hand. 

3. In view of the fact that God is perfect in wis- 
dom, goodness and justice, reason cannot conceive 
that He is indifferent to the conduct of His rational 
creatures, by which their happiness and misery are 
affected. To suppose this, would be to attribute to 
God conduct which is universally condemned in 
mankind. Every person is held responsible to wish 

7 



150 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 



well to his fellow beings, by the universal judgment 
of mankind, and simple indifference is regarded as 
a moral defect, or crime. Season, then, cannot 
attribute the same state of mind to God. 

The goodness of God must interest Him in the 
happiness of His creatures, and His justice must- 
take cognizance of the relative actions of men, as 
men are just or unjust to their fellow men. 

4. As God is not an indifferent spectator of the 
moral conduct of men, so he cannot be a passive 
beholder of His own moral universe, everywhere 
alive with activity, for weal or wo. Just what, how 
much, or in what manner, God should do to prevent 
wrong and misery, and to promote right and happi- 
ness, reason cannot determine, because it cannot 
know all the facts, and all the consequences, as God 
comprehends them ; yet this does reason affirm, that 
God must do all that He can do, consistently with 
His own perfect nature, and the greatest good of 
His whole moral universe. That a perfect God 
should do less than this, it is not possible for reason 
to believe. 

5. No valid objection can be urged against these 
views, growing out of the fact that wrong and 
misery do exist. It cannot be proved that God 
could prevent the wrong and misery that exist, 
without preventing the right and happiness that 
exist. The theory now being elaborated, assumes 
that man is a free moral agent, which fact shall soon 
be proved beyond a doubt. Until the point is 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 



151 



reached, let it be taken for granted. None but such 
a moral agent can perform a morally right or wrong 
act, and hence, none other could be the subject of 
a moral government ; and such a moral agent is and 
can but be capable of abusing his moral freedom, 
and of producing sin and misery. Without freedom, 
by which wrong can be done, there could be no 
moral action, no moral virtue, no moral nature, no 
moral government. God stands justified in the light 
of reason, in creating just such a race of beings, on 
the following ground. 

(1.) God could produce no other race of beings 
that could glorify Him as rational beings, be virtu- 
ous and happy, and constitute the subjects of a 
moral government under Him. Without the free- 
dom and power of will which renders evil possible, 
there could be no moral character, and hence no dis- 
play of God's moral character, in creation and gov- 
ernment, no moral obedience, no worship, no praise, 
and rational happiness, based upon virtue. No obe- 
dience, no worship, and- no praise is valid in the 
sight of God which is not free, and which is not 
chosen ; and the power to choose, and the act of 
choosing, imply the possibility of a different choice 
and a different course of action. The power to obey, 
worship, and praise God, cannot exist without the 
power of refusing to obey, worship and praise Him. 
The ]>ower to do right, in a moral sense, cannot exist 
without the power to do wrong. It is absolutely 
unthinkable. No man can think of the power to 



152 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 



perform morally right actions without power to per- 
form morally wrong actions. We can think of a 
disposition to do right without a disposition to do 
wrong ; or we can think of a disposition to do wrong 
without a disposition to right ; but the power to 
do right and to do wrong inhere together in man's 
moral nature. 

2. God may have seen that any other race of 
beings, possessing the same elements of an intel- 
lectual and moral nature, would render themselves 
just as perverse and miserable as the human family 
has done. When man first sinned, God may have 
seen that nothing would be gained by exterminating 
him and creating another race, with the same 
mental and moral nature. This, certainly, is all' 
possible, and no one can prove that it was not so. 
Allow that it was so, and the Divine mind chose 
between withholding His creative power, and retain- 
ing within His own eternal being, all knowledge, all 
moral goodness, and all rational happiness, or of dif- 
fusing them abroad through a wide-spread moral 
system, with the liability to ; or even certain know- 
ledge of all the evils that pervade the moral uni- 
verse. So far reason safely conducts us ; and upon 
the state of things now reached, let one remark more 
be made. 

(3.) The all-wise mind may know that such a 
moral system, notwithstanding all the evils that 
attend it, will, ultimately, result in more good, and 
rational happiness to the great whole of moral being, 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 



153 



than it will in wrong and misery. If all this is 'so, 
the great Author of the moral universe stands vin- 
dicated in the light of reason, whatever evils may 
be seen and felt. 

The main proposition under discussion is, that 
God is, and can but be a moral Euler, and that He 
does maintain a moral government over His intelli- 
gent creatures. The fact has been proved, and the 
objection founded on the existence of evil, has been 
thoroughly answered, and the way is prepared for 
another step in the main argument. 

II. Man is and can but be a Subject of God's 
Moral Government. 

This, of course, has been implied in demonstra- 
ting the fact that God is a moral governor, but 
there is a weight of direct proof which needs to be 
considered. # 

1. Man's relation to God clearly brings him within 
the divine jurisdiction. If man was a child of accident, 
an offspring of chance, the question might be raised, 
whether or not accident or chance must not possess 
the right to govern him. Even if chance produced 
man out of matter that previously belonged to God, 
a metaphysical lawyer might contend that the 
change was so great, and that it so affected the 
identity of the property as to render God's claim 
doubtful, if it does not vitiate it altogether. But 
there is no ground for any such cavil ; it has been 
proved that God created all things, and is the 



154 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 



absolute proprietor of all things. God being the 
Author of humanity, the Creator of both body and 
mind, with all their powers, He has a right to 
govern, and the supreme jurisdiction must be His. 

2. Man clearly possesses those powers which 
make him accountable for his conduct, and consti- 
tute him a fit subject of a moral government. 

(1.) Man possesses intelligence ; he is a knowing 
power, and perceives, conceives, understands, judges, 
and reasons. Without this intelligence, man would 
not be accountable, and could not be governed, only 
as matter, or at most as a brute, by force. 

(2.) Man, in the exercise of his power to know, 
has a knowledge of right and wrong. This know- 
ledge is absolutely universal among men ; all men 
know that some things are right, and that some 
things are wrong. They often misjudge, and judge 
differently in regard to which is right and which is 
wrong, but all agree that some things are right, and 
that some things are wrong ; and all agree in some 
things relatively to what is right and what is wrong, 
and this is sufficient to render them accountable, 
and to bring them within the jurisdiction of a moral 
government. 

(3.) Men have moral susceptibility, which causes 
them to feel a pleasing self-satisfaction, when they 
do what they believe to be right : and self-dis#atis- 
faction, or condemnation, when they do what they 
believe to be wrong. This element is called con- 
science, in common language. Some have called it 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 



155 



a moral sense. It is better called a moral suscepti- 
bility, in this place, because it is a capability of 
moral feeling, and which causes the mind to feel as 
above stated, when its own idea of right and wrong 
is applied to its own actions. This is universal, for 
though it manifests itself much stronger in some 
than in others, all feel more or less of it. Some- 
times the sense of guilt deepens into remorse, more 
terrible than bodily suffering. If this proves no 
more, it proves that all men think themselves 
accountable for their conduct, whatever their pre- 
tended creeds may be. 

(4.) Men are endowed with the power of willing, 
or of free choice. As this is a vital truth, a brief 
statement of the principal proof shall be given. 

First. The very common, if not the universal 
convictions of mankind, furnish strong proof that 
the will is free. We know this conviction exists in 
our own minds, and we see undeniable signs of its 
existence in others. This conviction of mankind 
has impressed itself upon all languages. Our plain 
English word, will, with its equivalent in all known 
languages, denotes a free, self-acting and self- 
deciding power of the mind. If it does not signify 
this, no definition ever has or ever can be given of 
it, as a simple power or activity of the human mind. 
It ca*i be nothing else that is definable. 

So with all its derivations, as willful, willing, and 
several others. Deny the self-acting power of the 
will, and such words have no definable sense. 



156 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 



The same is true of all its synonyms, such as, to 
determine, to resolve, to purpose. These and like 
words have no definable meaning, as mental acts, if 
the will is not a free self-acting power of the mind. 

If, then, the idea of free choice has impressed 
itself upon all human languages, it must be a uni- 
versal idea. The will is defined to be, " that fac- 
ulty of the mind by which we determine either to do 
or to forbear an action ; the faculty which is exer- 
cised in deciding among two or more objects, which 
we shall embrace or pursue/' Deny that we have a 
self-determining power in the will, and this stand- 
ard definition is exploded, and we shall determine, 
forbear, and decide nothing. If the will is not free, 
the power that determines is not in or of the mind ; 
it is no faculty of the mind, as the definition 
affirms. 

Secondly. The universal consciousness of mankind 
also proves the freedom of the will. Consciousness 
is the knowledge which the mind has of its own 
acts and states. When a man thinks, he knows 
that he thinks, when he experiences mental feelings 
he knows that he feels, and when he wills he knows 
that he wills. No man is conscious of any restrain- 
ing or controlling power by which his choice is ren- 
dered unfree. Every man, when he wills, feels and 
believes that he acts freely, and that he might will 
differently, «and of this feeling and belief he is con- 
scious. 

Thirdly. Every man's conscience bears witness 



MORAL GOVERNMENT. 



157 



within him, that he acts freely, that his will is unre- 
strained. Conscience has been explained. When 
men do what they believe to be wrong, they feel 
guilty, but they always discriminate between free 
and necessary actions, between intentional and unin- 
tentional actions. A man performs a given act in 
obedience to the decision of his will, and he feels 
guilty ; in another case, he performs the same act, 
securing the same result, but without the decision 
of his will, by accident or by some irresistible force 
that moves him, and he feels no guilt. Herein con- 
science furnishes absolute proof that the actor 
believes that his will is free, whatever his wordy 
declarations may be on the subject. 

Fourthly. All men practice upon the assumption 
that the will is free, whatever their pretended belief 
is on the subject. It has been shown that all men 
have their ideas of right and wrong. When they 
see a man do w T hat they call a wrong act, they 
blame him ; in which they act upon the assumption 
that he acted freely, and might have acted differ- 
ently. Also, all men, in judging of the actions of 
other men, discriminate between voluntary and 
involuntary acts ; in which they act upon the 
assumption that the will is free, in what are called 
voluntary acts. 

It has been fully proved that men are accounta- 
ble for their conduct, and, of course, accountable to 
God. God is a moral Euler, and man a fit subject 
for moral rule. 

• 7* 



158 



MORAL GOVERNMENT, 



The way is now prepared for the great question, 
namely : What does God require of men ? Jf this 
can be answered, man's duty will stand revealed. 
In view of all that has been proved, it will not be 
denied that it is God's right to command, and man's 
duty to obey. The will of God, in whatever way 
it is made known, so far as it is known, must be 
man's supreme law. 

It is not pretended that the light of reason, in 
our circumstances, is sufficient to discover all that 
it is desirable and needful for us to know. Such an 
assumption would render a revelation, such as is 
supposed to be contained in the Scriptures, unneces- 
sary. But while the writer entertains no doubt of 
the Divine origin of the Scriptures, and of their 
necessity, in order to sufficient religious knowledge, 
it is not his work in this place, to vindicate the 
claims of the Scriptures, on one hand, or to show 
the insufficiency of Natural Theology on the other. 
It is undeniable, from what has been proved, that 
some duties may be known in the light of reason, 
and to point out such duties is the work that 
remains to be done. Man being, as has been proved, 
a responsible moral agent, and, sustaining a relation 
to God as his Creator, and to man as his fellow- 
creature, his duties must be of three classes, name- 
ly : such as regard God directly, such as regard his 
fellow- men, and such as regard himself. But the 
consideration of these duties must be reserved for 
another lecture. 



LECTURE XIV. 



THE DUTIES WE OWE TO GOD. 

The duties we owe to God have been explained to 
be such as have primary reference to Him. These 
duties are now to be inquired after, as they may be 
apprehended by Season. 

I. Reason affirms that it is our duty to seek all 
possible knowledge of God; to know God to the 
extent He may be knoicn by us. 

1. The idea of God having been developed in the 
mind must be the most important of all subjects 
which come within the range of human knowledge. 
For any man to admit that there is a God, and then 
to deny that it is his bounden duty and highest inter- 
est to know what is to be known of God, is to insult 
his own reason. 

2. The knowledge to be sought of God embraces 
a knowledge of His character, what He is, and what 
His will is concerning us. 

3. This duty is discharged only when all the 
means of knowing God within our reach are 
exhausted. 

(1.) The principal means must ever be mental 



160 



DUTY TO GOD. 



application to the subject ; the will should hold the 
intellectual powers to think, to reflect, and deeply 
to study the subject. 

(2.) Every source of light must be investigated, 
and all possible knowledge drawn therefrom. The 
works of nature are a wide field for thought to 
explore. 

As God is All- wise and Omnipotent, it cannot be 
reasonably denied that He can make in any way He 
pleases, through men or otherwise, a special revela- 
tion of His will concerning mankind. This must 
impose on the human mind the solemn duty of 
investigating whatever claims to be a revelation 
from God, so far as to reach its most enlightened 
and entirely honest decision concerning the validity 
of such claim. If reason decides against such claim, 
with such decision duty ends in that direction ; if 
reason decides in favor of such claim, its contents 
must be studied and followed as the rule of duty on 
all subjects of which it treats. All this is too rea- 
sonable to be denied. The rule, of course, demands 
a thorough investigation of the claims of the Chris- 
tian Scriptures, by all men to whom they become 
known. If men cannot believe the Scriptures, after 
a thorough and candid* investigation, they must 
hold themselves open to conviction, and ready to 
receive any revelation which God may see fit to make 
of His will. In view of the undeniable facts that 
have been developed concerning God, in preceding 
Lectures, for men to assume that God cannot or will 



DUTY TO GOD. 161 

not make a revelation of His will to men, and then 
refuse to consider the claims of everything presented 
as a revelation, is most unreasonable. God must be 
able to make a revelation of His will, and if He has 
not done it, He may do it. Natural Theology, then, 
does and must teach that it is the duty of men to 
seek for a knowledge of God and of His will, in the 
diligent use of all possible means of such knowledge. 

II. Reason affirms that it is our duty to love God. 

1. As God now stands revealed perfect in good- 
ness, Eeason affirms that He ought to be loved by 
all His intelligent creatures. 

2. In view of the relation we sustain to God, as 
the workmanship of His creative skill, the subjects 
of His upholding and preserving care, and the recipi- 
ents of His continued bounty, Eeason affirms that we 
ought to love Him. 

3. In view of the capacity and tendency of the 
human soul to love, by which the affections seize 
upon and love minor and perishable things, Eeason 
affirms that we ought rather to love God, or to love 
Him with a more ardent and life-controlling love. 

To deny this, would be to falsify reason. 

III. Reason affirms that it is our duty to worship 
God. 

1. Worship is here used in a very general sense, 
to comprehend honor, adoration, thanksgiving and 
praise. These are mental activities, and constitute 



162 



DUTY TO GOD. 



the moral elements of worship, without which all 
forms and attitudes of worship can have no value in 
the sight of God. True worship is both intellectual 
and emotional, and stirs the soul with a joyful feel- 
ing, in proportion to the clearness of the view 
obtained of the Divine character, and the intensity 
of the love with which the object of worship is 
regarded. 

2. Worship will be varied in its combinations, 
and in its spirit and visible manifestations, accord- 
ing to the clearness and correctness of the views, 
general intelligence, and refinement of the worship- 
ers, Christian worship, tempered as it is by the 
firm belief that God is reconciled in Christ, through 
whom Divine mercy and grace flow to every believ- 
ing heart, is likely to be mild, gentle, peaceful, 
soothing and tranquilizing. Heathen worship, per- 
formed by rude and undisciplined minds, full of error 
in regard to the character of God, is likely to wear 
a rougher exterior, and to stir the darker passions of 
the soul. In Christian worship, love, gratitude and 
praise, are likely to predominate ; in heathen wor- 
ship, fear, awe, dread, admiration and wonder, are 
likely to be the ruling elements. 

3. The worship of God stands confessed as a duty, 
by the almost, if not quite, universal convictions of 
mankind. In Christian lands there may be found 
one in a thousand, perhaps not more than one in ten 
thousand, who will deny that there is a God, and 
who will, consequently, deny all religion and all wor- 



DUTY TO GOD. 



163 



ship, but it is probable such falsify their own con- 
victions. But most men will admit that they ought 
to worship God. Even Deists, and men who repu- 
diate Christian worship, say they worship God in 
their way, that they adore Him in their hearts. 

If we pass to the heathen nations, we shall find 
temples, and altars, and religious rites and forms of 
devotion, and worshipers. Their worship is rude 
and very unreasonable, but it furnishes no less proof 
of the common conviction of mankind, that God 
ought to be worshiped. 

IV. Reason affirms that it is our duty to make 
prayer to God. 9 

Prayer is the language of want, which is felt by 
all rational human beings, and which is reasonable 
and appropriate to be addressed to God when He 
stands revealed to the mind as an Infinite, Benign, 
and Overruling Power. Prayer is associated with 
worship in the practice of all religions, but it is of 
such vital importance, as to entitle it to be noticed 
as a specific duty. 

2. As God is the admitted author and giver of all 
good things, and as we are dependent recipients of 
His bounty, nothing can be more reasonable than 
that we should, in a reverential and worshipful 
manner, ask Him for such things as we desire, and 
as we believe He is willing to give. 

3. Such an association, in the mind, of asking 
with receiving, held there by the daily exercise of 



164 



DUTY TO GOD. 



prayer, must be promotive of devotion, gratitude 
and trust. 

4. The fact that prayer is common to all religions, 
and has ever been, in all lands and ages, cannot be 
accounted for only by supposing that it is a dictate 
of reason, or that it results from the spontaneity of 
man's religious nature. 

V. Reason affirms that it is our duty to trust in 
God. 

1. In our own consciousness of ignorance and 
weakness it appears so natural to trust, where intel- 
ligence affirms help and safety, reason has but little 
to do in the premises, more than to affirm the trust- 
worthiness of God. When other things appear 
equal to the intelligence, so self-distrustful is human- 
ity, that trust in God appears like the impulse of 
nature, grasping for life, safety and happiness. 

2. It is universal in human experience, and hence, 
it must be true in the philosophy of our religious 
nature, that men feel themselves able to trust in 
God, with an assurance proportioned to their own 
consciousness of having done the will of God. 

The attention which has been devoted to the 
above named five specific duties, as due to God, is 
not to be understood as implying that there are no 
other duties of the same class. Some of them are 
generic, comprehending other specific duties un- 
named, and all of them may imply other duties, so 
that when one is admitted, the other must be. Yet 



DUTY TO GOD. 



165 



the above outline is sufficient for all practical pur- 
poses. If men will embrace these duties in the 
earnest sincerity of their hearts, they will not wan- 
der fatally, for want of a more exhaustive list of the 
duties they owe to God. 



LECTURE XV. 



RECIPROCAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN 
MAN AND MAN. 

The subject of the present Lecture is the duties 
which man owes to his fellow-man. These can be 
revealed and comprehended, as a branch of Natural 
Theology, only in the light of the reciprocal rights 
and obligations between man and man. 

Rights and obligations are always reciprocal, as 
seen by the eye of reason. 

If one man has a right to live, all other men must 
be under obligation to let him live, and no other 
man can have a right to do what, or to withhold 
what will prevent his living. 

If one man has a right to the possession and use 
of any thing, all other men must be bound to leave 
him in the undisturbed possession and enjoyment of 
the same. 

If one man has a right to any enjoyment, physi- 
cal or mental, all other men must be under an obli- 
gation to allow him to enjoy the same undisturbed. 

No two rights and no two obligationsM3an exist in 
opposition to each other ; and the rights and obliga- 
tions of different persons, so far as they are related 



NATURAL EIGHTS. 



167 



to each other, never conflict, but are always correla- 
tive and reciprocal. All this is self-evident, an intu- 
ition of reason. 

The natural rights of men, then, furnish a ground 
in which may be seen all relative duties between 
man and man. 

I. All men have a right to life, or a right to live. 

Life is not the gift of man, nor is it self- origina- 
ted on the part 6f those who live. Under God it 
has its origin in nature, and hence, the right to live 
is a natural right, and belongs equally to all men. 

When it is said that the right to live is a natural 
right, it is not meant that life cannot be forfeited. 
He who makes it his business to destroy life, can- 
not have a right to live. The interests which the 
murderer destroys are as great, and may be greater, 
than are destroyed in his own loss of life ; and he 
being the wrong doer, it is right that he should sus- 
tain the loss, rather than the innocent. If the 
alternative be presented, of taking the life of a man, 
or of allowing him to destroy the lives of the unof- 
fending, it must be right to take his life, and hence, 
it would be wrong to let him live at the sacrifice of 
the lives of the innocent. With this exception, all 
men have a right to live, and man's natural right to 
life is a universal idea, recognized by all men. The 
sufficient proof of this is found in the fact 'that all 
men consider murder a crime, and always have, in 
all lands and ages of the world. 



168 



NATURAL RIGHTS. 



It is true, some will kill their enemies, but this is 
done upon one or the other of two grounds; They 
either do what their own convictions tell them is 
wrong, or they act upon the assumption that the 
enemy they kill has forfeited his life. The test of 
the principle is not found in the fact that some men 
justify, or pretend to justify the killing of enemies, 
but in the fact that the universal judgment of 
humanity condemns the killing of friends, or even 
the innocent. This admitted universal right of all 
men to live, gives us a ground in which certain 
duties are revealed. 

1. It is the duty of every man to allow every 
other man to live. It is every man's duty to refrain 
from all actions which will destroy or endanger the 
life of his fellow-being. 

2. It is the duty of every man to do what he can, 
without too great danger to his own life, that may 
be necessary, to preserve the life of his fellow-being. 
The universal judgment of mankind would con- 
demn him who should allow his fellow to die by fire, 
or water, or cold, or hunger, or a wild beast, or the 
hand of an enemy, or sickness, when he commanded 
the means of preventing it. 

3. It is the duty of every man to leave his fel- 
low-being in possession of whatever he has that is 
essential to his life ; and to bestow upon him what- 
ever he has, not essential to his own life, which his 
fellow has not and which is essential to his life. 
The right to life is paramount, and must not be put 



NATURAL RIGHTS. 



169 



on a par with any other right. A man may not 
elevate his right of property to a par with his fel- 
low's right to life. It would be but little better 
than murder to withhold food from a man dying of 
hunger. It may not be said that a man, having 
only food enough to preserve his own life, would be 
under obligation to divide with his starving neigh- 
bor, because two lives would be lost instead of one ; 
but, if he has enough to preserve both lives, he is 
bound to divide, even if it be at the expense of pain- 
ful hunger. 

4. As men may not withhold what is essential to 
the life of another, so men must have a right to 
take what is essential to life, without regard to the 
right of ownership vested in others, provided that 
4hey do not take what is essential to to the life of 
the owner. A man may take food, a horse, a boat, 
or whatever is essential to the preservation of his 
life, and the universal judgment of mankind will 
justify the deed. 

II. The rigid to Personal Liberty is recognized, 
by reason, as a natural and universal right. 

1. Liberty, like life, may be forfeited. When a 
man so abuses his liberty as to endanger the rights 
of others, his liberty is forfeited, and may be right- 
fully takepi from him. But this proves nothing 
against the right of personal liberty as natural and 
universal. 

2. That man's natural right to liberty is univer- 



170 



NATURAL RIGHTS. 



sally held is obvious, from the fact that he who 
deprives a fellow-being of his liberty, is required, 
by the universal sense of humanity, to render a rea- 
son for his conduct. An insufficient reason has too 
often satisfied ; and yet, no reason ever satisfied 
any one which did not, in his judgment, amount to 
a forfeiture of the right of liberty on the part of 
him who is deprived of it. This proves that the 
right to liberty is held to be universal. 

Was not liberty held to be a natural and univer- 
sal right, no enquiry would be made how men 
have forfeited their liberty ; that is, forfeited what 
they may never have had ; but rather an explana- 
tion would be demanded, how every free man came 
by his liberty. 

3. While some men appear to have been con- 
vinced that it was right for them to deprive certain 
other persons of .their liberty, no man ever was or 
ever can be convinced that he is rightfully deprived 
of his liberty, unforfeited by his own crime. 

The cringing slave feels not only the love, but the 
right of liberty within him. While his limbs are 
bound, his mind, his thoughts, are free ; and within 
he reads his right to be free written in the elements 
of his own conscious soul. 

4. Corresponding to the universal right of per- 
sonal liberty, there is an obligation of duty, binding 
every man to allow all others to enjoy and exercise 
their liberty unrestrained, so long as they do not so 
exercise it as to encroach on the rights of others. 



NATURAL K1GHTS. 



171 



III.* The right to acquire, possess, and use prop- 
erty for one's own benefit, is recognized, by reason, 
as a universal right. 

1. The only limitations to man's right to acquire 
and use property, are two. 

(1.) He may not do it by any act which is incom- 
patible with his duties to God. 

(2.) He may not do it by any act, or to any 
extent, which is incompatible with the equal rights 
of his fellow-beings. 

2. The right" in question, under the above named 
limitations, is a universal idea. It has been recog- 
nized, in some form and to some extent, among all 
people, in all lands, and through all ages. 

3. The universality of the right of property is a 
necessary consequence of the right of life, which 
has been demonstrated. The right of life involves 
a right to all that is essential to the maintenance of 
life, which is comprehensive of food, raiment and 
shelter, and the means of acquiring them. 

4. The right of property involves the obligation 
of honesty, the duty of dealing honestly. It is 
every man's duty to leave his fellows in possession of 
what is theirs, unless he obtains it with their con- 
sent, and for an equivalent. To obtain it by false- 
hood, deception, fraud, by theft or force, is wrong, 
and is so regarded by all men. The rudest hunter 
that ever pursued game in forest, knows within him- 
self, just as well as the wisest philosopher, that the 



172 NATURAL RIGHTS. 

game he has fairly taken is his, and that no other 
hunter has a right to dispossess him of the same, 
but with his consent, for an equivalent. 

IV. It is the right and duty of every man to 
acquire, maintain, and preserve a good moral char- 
acter. A man's character is himself, what he is,— 
not what he is thought to be. 

1. The right to have a good character involves an 
obligation binding every man not to harm the char- 
acter of his fellow-man. He violates this, obliga- 
tion who, by any means, make his fellow-beings 
worse. This may be done in various ways. 

(1.) By persuading them, directly, to do evil. 

(2.) By throwing temptations in their way which 
are likely to lead them astray. 

(3.) By persuading them that right is wrong, and 
that wrong is right. 

(4.) By corrupting their minds with error. 

{5.) By exciting and provoking their evil passions 
and propensities. 

No man can rightfully perform an act, or utter a 
word, by which he exerts an influence on his fellow- 
men, which is calculated to make them worse. 

2. The obligation in question is not exclusively 
negative in its force. It requires right action, no 
less than it forbids wrong action. The common 
relation which all men sustain to God ; and the 
relation which each sustains to the community of 
which he is a member, and the advantages which 



NATURAL RIGHTS. 



173 



■each derives from the community, lay every man 
under obligation to put forth all reasonable efforts 
to promote the good of the community. He who 
injures his fellows, injures the community ; and he 
who makes his fellows better, makes the community 
better. Men, then, are not only bound not to harm 
their fellows, but also to make all reasonable efforts 
to make them better. This may be done in several 
ways, of which the two following are principal ones : : 

(1.) By direct persuasive arguments to do right 5 
to practice virtue, 

(2.) By the example and influence of right 
actions. He who practices virtue in a community 
does much to improve others. 

V. All men have a right to a good reputation, m 
Jar as truth - and fair dealing will give it to them, 
A man's reputation is what he is thought to be, not 
what he really is ; and every man has a right to 
be thought to be as good as he is, 

1. A man's reputation for what honesty, integri- 
ty, knowledge and skill he has, is as much his as 
the farm he owns, the house he has built, the money 
he has in the bank, or the hat upon his head. His 
reputation is as much a means of obtaining the 
necessaries of life, and of acquiring property, as is 
his axe, his hoe, his plow, or his harrow. 

2. A man's right to such a reputation as*his real 
character will warrant, implies am obligation bind- 
ing other men to allow him to enjoy it, uninjured 

8 



174 



STATURAL RIGHTS. 



by them. Slander, falsehood, or misrepresentation,, 
relatively to our fellow-beings, by which their repu- 
tation is injured, is a crime against them. 

4. The obligation reaches still further, and binds 
a man to correct an evil report of his neighbor,- 
which he knows to be false or unjust. 

VI. Another comprehensive class of duties is- 
composed of such as depend upon the sex of our 
race. These duties, in their outline at least, are 
understood and practiced among all nations and 
tribes of men. 

1. Chastity is, to some extent, regarded as a vir- 
tue, and practiced in all lands and among all tribes 
of men. There are many and fearful exceptions, 
but as a whole, they are perhaps as common among 
civilized nations as among the wild children of 
nature. But the point is, that the duty is every- 
where known, not that it is practiced. The duty 
of chastity is not • only personal, but also social,, 
rendering seduction, and all that leads ,to it, a crime 
against a fellow-being, and against the community. 

2. The marriage institution, and relation of hus- 
band and wife are known to exist, to some extent, 
among all nations. Not, indeed, anywhere in abso- 
lute perfection and purity, but everywhere sufficient- 
ly to prove that the idea is universal ; so that all 
corruptions may be a departure from known duty, 
or the result of a failure to k&ow what might be 
known on the subject. 



NATURAL RIGHTS. 



175 



3. The relation between parents and children 
is recognized by all people, and the duties depending 
upon the relation are responded to, to some extent. 
The destruction of young children and the leaving 
of aged and infirm parents to die neglected, are ex- 
ceptions, even among the darkest of heathen, while 
they do sometimes occur among the most enlighten- 
ed people. Such violations of the law of nature are 
more noted because they are seen and felt to be 
most unnatural. 



LECTURE XVI 



f HE DUTIES WHICH HUMANITY OWES TO ITSELF, 

I. Self-respect is a duty which all men feel thai 
they owe to themselves, however far they may come 
short of discharging it. This menial activity may 
show itself in bad taste, and put on the airs, and, 
hang out the signs of pride and vanity, yet there is 
such a thing as just self respect, founded upon a 
consciousness of self-worthiness* 

1. Men respect or disrespect others as they 
regard their character or conduct to be worthy or 
unworthy ; and they can but regard themselves by 
the same rule. 

2. It may be affirmed that every person knows 
that he ought to maintain self-respect, by so con-* 
ducting himself as to deserve it, All men desire 
the respect of others, and it is not possible that we 
should not feel bound to maintain that respect for 
ourselves which we wish to receive from others. 

3. We may deceive others into a respect for us^ 
but our respect for ourselves, whatever visible airs 
we may put on, must be according to what we 
really conceive ourselves to be, A consciousness of 



DUTY TO SELF. 



177 



self-worthiness is the basis of true self-respect: The 
wildest savage reproaches himself, and feels degraded, 
when he deceives and injures his equal, or betrays 
his friend ; and he knows that something better is 
due from him to his own being;, to himself. 

II. Self -Culture is a duty which is affirmed by 
every man's intelligence. By culture, 'physical and 
mental improvement is meant, not moral improve- 
ment, in this place. 

1. Physical and mental culture aim at an increase 
of knowledge and skill. These, in some form, and 
to some extent, are regarded as desirable, by all 
men, and all feel it a duty to acquire them. 

2. Knowledge and skill are essential to the main- 
tenance of life, which is nature's own impulse. 

3. Men, finding themselves possessed of powers 
capable of improvement, and adapted to subserve 
the ends of life, in proportion as they are improved, 
cannot be entirely ignorant of their duty to culti- 
vate, improve and develop such powers. Reason 
itself must commend it. 

4. It must not be expected that self-culture will 
be manifested to the same extent, 'and in the same 
direction and proportions by all. In proportion to 
the degree of ignorance and savage wildness, will 
culture take a physical direction, because, in such a 
state, more dependence is placed upon physical 
strength and skill, for safety, and the means of liv- 
ing ; but in the wildest state, knowledge is regarded 



178 



DUTY TO SELF. 



as desirable, is sought as a duty, and enjoyed as a 
means of happiness. To deny this would be to con- 
tradict the universal convictions of mankind. No 
degree of neglect in the premises can prove the 
absence of a knowledge of tlie duty, because men 
are known, often, to neglect what they know and 
confess to be their duty. 

III. The maintenance of moral rectitude is a 
universal duty, known and felt by all men ; not only 
as a duty to God and to the moral system or com- 
pact , but a duty to self, to one's own being. 

1. All men have a knowledge of right and wrong. 
This was sufficiently proved and illustrated in Lec- 
ture XIII., while treating of man as a subject of 
God's moral government. Every man has a judg- 
ment of what is right and what is wrong, in human 
conduct ; and every man has a conscience, which 
utters an approving voice within him, when he does 
what his judgment pronounces right ; and utters 
the voice of condemnation, when he does what his 
judgment pronounces wrong. These facts pertain 
no less to the unlearned, and even the savage, than 
to the educated and the philosopher. Every man, 
therefore, feels and knows, that it is his duty to 
refrain from what his judgment tells him is wrong, 
and to do what his judgment tells him is right, and 
thereby to keep himself innocent, free from guilt. 
Every man knows that when he does what his judg- 
ment tells him is wrong, and brings condemnation 



DUTY TO SELF. 



179 



to bis soul, that he sins against 'himself* that he fails 
to fulfill an obligation which he owes to his own 
moral character, or self-worthiness. 

2. No valid objection to this view is found in the 
admitted fact that men differ in judgment, as to 
what is right and what is wrong, and in the fact that 
one man's conscience condemns what another man's 
conscience approves. Here the science of Psychology 
monies to our aid, and explains the supposed diffi- 
culty. By this science we are taught, that as is the 
judgment, so is the conscience ; and that the con- 
science i^always true to the judgment in its awards, 
blessing where the judgment approves, and punish- 
ing where the judgment condemns. We are also 
taught that the judgment maybe misinformed, that 
all the facts may not have been brought under its 
notice, and that it is largely affected by education.. 
This explains why men differ in judgment concern- 
ing what is right and wrong. The idea of right and 
wrong exists in all rational minds, as an intuition 
of reason; but the judgment, being in error, makes 
a wrong application of the idea, and conscience 
responds to the judgment. But the crime is not in 
the mistaken judgment, nor in the conscience which 
responds to the mistaken judgment, but it is in 
doing what the judgment pronounces wrong, and 
what the conscience condemns. He* who does this, 
sins against himself. 

3. To maintain moral rectitude, in the circum- 
stances of humanity, requires a vigorous and watch- 



180 



DUTY TO SELF. 



ful effort. This arises from two sources, namely 
evil propensities within, and evil influences without. 
These propensities ought to be subdued, and these 
influences ought to be resisted, and this is known 
and felt by all men. 

He who yields to temptation, or an evil influence,, 
condemns himself for his own weakness ; he knows* 
he ought to resist. Also, he who is under the con- 
trol of his evil propensities, feels himself degraded ; 
he knows he ought to subdue them. 

4. Moral rectitude is a state of the heart, dying 
back of overt actions, A man can no mo^e approve 
of. evil thoughts, desires and purposes, than he can 
of the acts which spring from *them. He who 
indulges and cherishes them, knows that he comes 
short of his duty to himself, and degrades himself 
no less than when he commits an overt wrong act. 
Here we bring to view what moral rectitude 
demands in practice. 

(1.) All impure thoughts, and thoughts of prid© 
and vanity, should be resisted and expelled from the 
mind. 

(2.) The spirit and temper of anger should not 
be indulged, but be suppressed, subdued, and rooted 
out of the soul. 

There is a just feeling of resentment, and even 
indignation, which may be awakened by great 
wrong, but it must be kept within the mind's con- 
trol. The moment that it is allowed to rise above 
control, and itself controls the mind, it becomes a 



DUTY TO SELF. 



181 



crime, and the man is degraded in his own judg- 
ment. 

(3.) The spirit and disposition of revenge should 
never be cherished, but resisted and subdued. 
There is a distinction between the noble sentiment 
of public justice and the low, mean, cowardly and 
degrading crime of private and personal revenge, 
This difference is recognized by all minds. 

(4.) Selfishness and covetousness are known and 
felt by all to be degrading crimes. The crime, 
however, does not consist of the simple love of gain, 
or of possession, which may be right, but in desiring 
that which rightfully belongs to another. When 
self-love seeks, or even desires to gratify itself by 
invading the rights of others, it becomes a degrad- 
ing crime, which universal humanity instinctively 
condemns. 

(5.) Envy, which is a feeling of discontent, regret, 
or mortification, on account of the success and hap- 
piness of others, is a degrading crime, and should 
never be harbored in the mind of him who would 
maintain moral rectitude. 

(6.) A fretful, peevish, complaining, murmuring 
disposition, in view of such ills as our foresight and 
skill cannot prevent, is unworthy of a noble mind, 
and inconsistent with the highest development of 
moral rectitude. Nearly allied to this are those 
discouraging, cowardly, desponding feelings under 
which too many minds quail in life's battle. Our 
own reason demands of us that we employ all the 



182 



DUTY TO SELF. 



foresight and skill we can command, to prevent and 
evade evil, and then, that we bear, with a manly 
courage and fortitude, all the ills of our allotment. 
Less than this is a coming short of the duty we owe 
to ourselves^ to our own well-being. 



LECTURE XVII. 



CONCLUDING REMARKS. 

There is a pleasure in searching out truth, though 
it cost hard study ; and in learning and knowing 
there is happiness ; and yet there is satisfaction in 
reaching the end of labor in any given direction. 
This satisfaction is now to be realized in the ter- 
mination of these Lectures on Natural Theology, 
which must here be closed by a few general remarks. 

I. The scope ivliich has been given to the Science 
demands a brief notice. 

1. It has been broad enough to comprehend all 
the fundamental principles of Natural Theology. 
It is not pretended that all has been said that might 
be truthfully said, but more, probably, w T ould not 
make the science any more certain, any more easily 
comprehended, nor yet any more useful. It is not 
practicable to push any subject to its utmost limits. 
It may be that all truth is so connected, that any 
one great truth might lead to a discovery of all 
truth, if our reasoning powers were clear and , 
strong enough to trace the connection, and our in- 
tellectual grasp sufficient to seize and hold the 
whole. No one truth exists alone, and if our mental 



184 



CONCLUDING REMARKS. 



vision was clear enough, it" might appear that any 
one great truth being known to the mind, it might 
be traced back to another truth as its antecedent, 
and forward to another truth as its consequent. 
Then these two new truths, obtained from the one, 
might in like manner, the one be traced back to 
another antecedent, and the other forward to another 
consequent, and so on, ad infinitum. To this view 
add the fact that we have no rule of measurement 
by which we can determine any precise limits to 
human reason, and it will appear obvious that it is 
not practical to push the science of Natural Theol- 
ogy to an extreme and definite limit. Many other 
truths might, doubtless, be safely inferred from those 
which have been demonstrated, but enough has been 
done to settle the science upon a firm foundation, 
and it is better to leave it there than to push it out 
to rest upon what may be regarded as doubtful 
inferences. 

2. While the scope which has been given to the 
science is sufficiently broad and comprehensive to 
embrace the fundamental truth on the subject, it 
has been kept within the range of necessary truths, 
or such as can be clearly and certainly inferred 
from them. 

Nothing has been assumed, and nothing has been 
left to rest upon less than demonstrative argument. 
The whole frame-work has been wrought within the 
ken of reason, and can no more be doubted than can 
the affirmations of reason. No one principle, funda- 



CONCLUDING REMARKS. 



18S 



mental to the science,, as it has been elaborated in 
these Lectures, can be named, which reason does not 
affirm to be a necessary truth, or a fair deduction 
from one. 

II. While it is maintained thai all the principles 
ivhich have been advanced lie within the scope of 
reason, it is not pretended, that all men know and 
understand them, though it might difficult to 
prove that they do not. 

1. Any want of regard for the truths, that have 
been stated, and any visible neglect of the duties 
that have been named, cannot prove that they are 
not understood ; for the reason that men often fail 
to regard admitted truth, and . to perform admitted 
duties. Men even ignore truths because they do 
not wish to obey them, and cleny duties because 
they do not wish to do them. 

2. If it could be proved that many are ignorant 
of the truths and duties which have been developed 
in the system, it would not prove that the system 
is false, that those truths and duties are not founded 
in nature, and capable of being known by reason. 
It is an undeniable fact, that men generally do not 
know all that they might know in their circum- 
stances. What men are found to know on any sub- 
ject, be it much or little, is no proof that they might 
not know more. That the heathen world, generally, 
might have known more of God, and of their duty, 
had they always made a knowledge of God and of 



186 CONCLUDING REMARKS. 



their duty the one great end of life, cannot be doubt- 
ed. In the light of this fact, let it be remarked, 
that the theory of Natural Theology which has been 
advanced does not rest upon what men know, but 
upon what, in the nature of things, they might 
know. This view clears the theory of every objec- 
tion in this direction. 

III. Shoufflk any one raise an objection to the 
Science, as it lias been elaborated, on the ground that 
it is an exhibition of Christian Theology, rather 
than Natural Theology, a sufficient reply may be 
offered in few words. 

1. If the objection comes from a believer in the 
inspiration of the Scriptures, the objection itself is a 
compliment which he pays to Natural Theology. 
He has before him a system of religious truth and 
duty which he affirms is a revelation from God, and 
on reading Natural Theology, he confesses that, as 
far as it goes, it is in perfect harmony with the 
teachings of His inspired Book. This is just as it 
should be, just as it must be, to have both Eevealed 
and Natural Keligion true. The only objection that 
can be urged in this direction, by a believer in the 
Scriptures, is that the doctrines and duties of the 
system which has been presented, are only matters 
of Kevelation, and have not been, and cannot be 
demonstrated by reason in the light of nature. But 
it is too late for this objection now, the thing has 
been done ; and the Christian, while he cannot 



CONCLUDING REMARKS. 



187 



refute the arguments by which Natural Theology 
has been demonstrated, is constrained to confess^ 
that, as far as it goes, it is in harmony with the 
Scriptures. This is enough ; it is not pretended 
that it teaches all that is taught in the Scriptures, 
2. If the objection is urged by one who does not 
believe in the inspiration of the Scriptures, the 
objection itself is a compliment which he pays to 
the Scriptures. That Nature teaches all that has 
been embraced in the system of Natural.Theology^ 
contained in these Lectures, cannot now be denied ; 
the arguments are finished, and reason has pro- 
nounced them sound, and to affirm that it is identi- 
cal with Christianity, as far as it goes ? is to admit 
that the Scriptures teach the truth. 

IV. Admitting the entire truth of the system.^ 
and the soundness of all the arguments by which it 
has been supported, it does not fill the measure of 
man's religious wants, and hence does not supersede 
the Scriptures, in which those wants are more fully 
met. 

1. The immortality of the human soul may be 
demonstrated by arguments having their foundation 
in nature, yet it cannot be pretended that as clear 
views of a future state can be derived from nature 
as from the Scriptures. 

2. The doctrine of rewards and punishments, or 
of divine retribution, graduated according to the 
conduct of men, is a doctrine of reason ; but it can- 



188 



CONCLUDING REMARKS. 



not be denied that the Scriptures give a much 
clearer view of the subject than nature, 

3. The existence of sin in the world, and the 
depraved state of human nature, cannot be hid 
from the eye of reason, or unknown in the experience 
of men j yet the Scriptures pour a flood of light on 
these subjects, beyond what man ? in his circum* 
stances, would ever possess without them. 

4. The doctrine of the resurrection has never^been 
recognizees taught by nature, upon which subject 
the Scriptures speak directly and clearly, 

5. Nature, with all her lights and tongues,, is 
dark and silent on the great mediatorial system, 
which the Gospel reveals. Nature cannot teach on 
this subject, because her lights were all created, and 
her tongues all commenced their play before this 
system of grace was developed or needed. The 
science of salvation through a Mediator, having its 
necessity in the apostacy and corruption of humani* 
ty, which occurred after the creation, cannot be 
revealed in and through nature. This is revealed 
only in the Gospel, and here Eevealed Eeligion 
triumphs over Natural Eeligion, without subverting 
it, as far as it goes, Here the end is reached, and 
if all that has been said shall be the means of lead- 
ing one human wanderer, through the channels of 
truth which nature reveals, to the altar of Chris- 
tianity, where the fountain of salvation is ever open 5 
and ever flows full and free, the end will be gained, 
and the labor more than paid beyond computation, 



